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1. Preliminary remarks on Hermann Lotze’s metaphysics 
 
1.1. Lotze on science and metaphysics 
 
 
In the “Preface” to his Mikrokosmos, Hermann Lotze wrote:  
 
But all the same it is in such mediation alone that the true source of the life of science is to be found; not 
indeed in admitting now a fragment of the one view and now a fragment of the other, but in showing how 
absolutely universal is the extent and at the same time how completely subordinate the significance, of the 
mission which mechanism has to fulfil in the structure of the world.1  
 
The previous quotation allows us to frame the core of Rudolph Hermann Lotze’s thought: the 
search for a conciliation and a mediation between the deepest needs of human mind and the 
results of scientific research. The truth to which scientific research aspires is related to the 
movements of the mind; in order to be accepted as true, every theory must correspond to 
man’s deepest needs.  In search for truth, man cannot take into account only the inner world 
of feelings and of the movements of the mind, without resorting to scientific research. 
Undoubtedly, this latter plays a principal role in the search for truth. On the other hand, it is 
not possible to acknowledge only the value of the results of scientific research, without taking 
into account the reality of man’s inner life. This latter is what actually allows man to 
recognize the existence of a trans-sensual reality, about which science cannot say much.
 According to Lotze, through the notions of natural forces and laws, science cannot reach 
 
1 R. H. Lotze, Mikrokosmus. Ideen zur Naturgeschichte und Geschichte der Menschheit. Versuch einer 
Anthropologie (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1856–1864); new ed., Mikrokosmos, Nikolay Milkov (ed.), (Hamburg: Felix 
Meiner Verlag, 2017), XIII*; english trans., Microcosmus: An Essay Concerning Man and his Relation to the 




the essence of the world, since this is rooted in trans-sensual reality. Such a reality cannot be 
measured and, therefore, is downgraded by science as indeterminate and nebulous. Lotze 
recognized the considerable progress of mechanical science in the three decades before the 
publication of his Medicinische Psychologie (1852); his task was to preserve human sphere 
from those materialistic and reductionist interpretations that reduce the life of the mind to a 
physical mechanism.  
Lotze’s aspiration for a mediation between very different positions becomes clear in his 
analysis of the German philosophical schools of his time: German Idealism, Johann Friedrich 
Herbart’s realism and Jakob Friedrich Fries’ mathematical understanding of reality. Lotze 
critically analyzed these traditional perspectives by choosing and adopting, among their 
arguments, those that he considered correct, without adhering however to any of these 
schools.  
Although Fries greatly influenced Lotze’s view on scientific method, Lotze never 
embraced determinism, since it was at odds with his own moral perspective. Lotze 
strenuously defended the free will and criticised Fries who had extended mathematics and 
deterministic physics to biology and psychology; in his opinion, even living beings had to be 
subsumed within a mechanic-mathematical explanation.  
Lotze’s thought was also greatly influenced by Herbart, who had provided the main 
coordinates of the realistic method: Realism represents the foundation of Lotze’s thought. 
Because of his inclination to critical selection,2 although Lotze assimilated Herbart’s realism 
 
2 Lotze’s critical method consisted in a critical selection of elements from Herbart’s realism and Hegel’s ideal-
ism. This selection is a critical activity which allowed Lotze to select only those theories, offered by the philo-
sophical schools of his time, which, taken as a whole, were not contradictory. He rejected the realistic meta-





as a fundamental element of his own philosophy, still he did not consider mathematics as a 
cornerstone of scientific psychology.3 The realist method is something that Lotze’s 
philosophy shared with natural sciences. Starting from realistic positions, Lotze’s thought 
reached idealistic conclusions.4 
Lotze’s accurate critical analysis of scientific notions revealed his competences in 
medicine, his realism and objectivism: in science, man should not be interested in the 
knowledge of reality in itself, but only in those empirical properties that can be object of 
experiment. Certainly, such a philosophical perspective can hardly be reconciled with the 
conception of reality––suggested by Kant and Hegel––as mere representation of thought.  
In general, however, Lotze owes much to Kant’s teachings. However, according to Lotze, 
we cannot deal with the faculties of human mind, if we do not first tackle the ontological 
nature of the things in front of us. For this reason, Lotze firstly focused on the empirical 
properties of things, which led him to atomism. 
Kant’s Copernican revolution in epistemology and the primacy of practical reason he 
maintained were adopted in the philosophical elaboration of Lotze, who, gradually shifting 
from scientific realism to idealism, never embraced uncritically scientific results, without 
verifying whether they were compatible with human moral sphere. He strongly opposed 
 
realism to the concrete scientific research. Similarly, he accepted the idealistic metaphysics according to which 
the structure of the world is ‘ideal’ but, at the same time, rejected Hegel’s idealism because it deprived the ideal 
structure of its concrete content. It led Lotze to state the possibility of a coexistence without contradiction be-
tween the two German philosophical schools.  
3 We will later see in detail how Lotze denied Herbart’s project of mathematization of psychology. 






materialism, proposing a model of science based on man’s moral needs: this perspective 
suggests that nature and reality are provided with a purpose and a meaning that emerge in 
different ways and allow us to elaborate a new concept of science based on “living 
hypothesis” and not only on “working hypothesis”.5 This perspective fundamentally relies on 
a conception of nature as macrocosm, as a great organism able to orient itself. The disciplines 
that Lotze took into account here are above all biology, physiology and psychology.  
As we read in the text cited at the beginning of this chapter, Lotze’s main objective was to 
reach an equilibrium between man’s moral and aesthetic needs, on one hand, and the needs 
and results of the scientific research, on the other; this assumption led Lotze to embrace a 
general mechanical theory of nature which has, however, to be circumscribed and clearly 
corrected. The problem of the explanation of reality is a pivotal element of his philosophy, 
which, once again, recalls the axiom of conciliation between the mechanical description of 
reality and the purposiveness of nature. Laws of nature have the logical status of hypothetical 
judgment, because what a law states will necessarily occur, if certain conditions are fulfilled; 
in other words, a law is nothing more than a relation between a reason and its implication. 
Thought is able to grasp experience thanks to the hypothetical principle; according to Lotze, 
knowledge has always a hypothetical value.  
Lotze considered this conception even more problematic because of the ineffectiveness of 
the natural law. As a logical relationship between premise and consequence, natural law is 
not able to produce any change in the physical world, nor does it allow to understand why 
there are certain conditions in it and not others, considering that these conditions are those to 
which law applies. Precisely for this reason, at the level of scientific operativeness—the 
methodological-investigative level—the idea of pure law is accompanied by the notion of 
 




cause which is actually present in reality and whose effects match with the law. The question 
of the contingency of the beginning, however, remains unsolved. In fact, the notion of end is 
the fundamental notion of Lotze’s concept of science. He does not mean to say that a part of 
reality is subject to laws and another part to a finality. The fact that the whole reality is 
subject to the laws of nature, according to Lotze, does not contradict the idea of an end. 
In this sense, scientific laws do not operate according to the principle of sufficient reason. 
In other words, they cannot determine whether a thing is such and not something else. The 
laws of science are only principles based on the assumption that there are given facts which 
produce effects in the world with necessity. Moreover, according to Lotze, science cannot 
explain why reality assumes this or that determined form. This observation results in the 
question of the individual and morphology. With respect to reality, Lotze’s idea of purpose 
played the same role as the principle of sufficient reason. The scientific description of the 
world according to the mechanical model stimulates the philosophical issue of the meaning of 
man, of human life and of the totality of nature; for this reason, Lotze refused to embrace the 
results of scientific research without a philosophically critical attitude. This attitude is 
testified by the way in which Lotze philosophically dealt with the principle of conservation of 
energy (Erhaltung der Kraft). Lotze considered this principle as an indispensable scientific 
assumption. In fact, he employed it as a means of investigation, although he clearly stated 
that it had not a final and objective metaphysical validity. According to Lotze, man 
comprehends the cosmos in two distinct ways between which man himself needs to mediate: 
the scientific description (Beschreibung) of events according to the mechanical model and the 
meaning (Bedeutung) of the totality of events or world for man. In this case, the principle of 
conservation of energy is valid from a descriptive point of view but not from a metaphysical 
one. Lotze did not accept the metaphysical validity of this principle, because embracing this 




against man’s aesthetic needs: in other words, this would make the world basically 
monotonous. An indispensable metaphysical principle of Lotze’s philosophy is the 
conception that the world has a fundamental poetic essence that can only be ensured by 
preserving its vitality, freedom and poetry. The principle of conservation of energy works 
against it. 
Lotze’s philosophy developed these two aspects in parallel: we have an access to reality 
both at superficial levels and at structural levels that grasps reality as a whole. It can also 
occur that a principle may be valid at one level but and not at the other. Importantly enough, 
this does not make Lotze’s philosophy contradictory, but moderate and comprehensive.  
 
1.2. Lotze’s atomism 
 
Lotze’s realism was very different from that of Herbart, according to whom the core of 
metaphysics was the motionless, unrelated substances and whatever man perceives as 
movement and relation was not a substantial but just an accidental property, which was thus 
considered as belonging to the field of psychology. Lotze introduced the problem of 
metaphysics in a completely different way from Herbart, by stating that the change and 
relationality of substance have a metaphysical and not a psychological value. Reality itself is 
changing and relational; substances are always in relation to each other. Lotze supported a 
constructivist theory of substance, in which this latter is considered as a whole composed of 
parts which, in their turn, are related to each other. Reality conceived as a whole made up of 
parts in relation to each other is discrete and not continuous. The parts composing the whole 
are atoms which are not identical with the ancient notion of atom, but are rather metaphysical 
points without extension (unräumlich). Extension is a secondary characteristic of atoms, 
appearing only when these latter are identified and differentiated as starting points of the 




According to Lotze, metaphysics deals with the analysis of our phenomenal world6, 
understood as given reality; the role of change was central in Lotze’s metaphysics, as much 
as that of temporality, which clearly distinguishes metaphysics from logic, in which the 
notion of Geltung is absolutely timeless. The key concepts of Lotze’s metaphysics were those 
of atom, whole and relation: the parts (atoms) of the substance establish a relation to each 
other, giving rise to the whole (substance). Only the atom, the whole and the relation have 
trans-sensual value. Space, matter and extension per se have no metaphysical value. Lotze 
excluded both a materialistic metaphysics that might hypostatize matter and save it from 
change, and an idealistic metaphysics that might hypostatize ideas. Lotze rejected the 
Newtonian way of understanding space and matter (extension) as eternal and immutable; he 
preferred a metaphysical unreality of space and matter, considered as mere human ideas that 
man constructs on the basis of external stimuli.7  
The reality that we perceive is a material and three-dimensional spatial extension. When 
we explore the essential and metaphysical nature of reality, we see how limited and reduced 
in our perception it is, despite the fact that its configuration is not misleading. Lotze’s 
 
6 Lotze addressed the issue of metaphysics from a human point of view. He denied Herbart’s metaphysics and 
introduced temporality and history into this discipline. He understood metaphysics from an anthropological 
point of view. See: N. Milkov, “Einleitung”, in: R. H. Lotze, Mikrokosmos, N. Milkov (ed.), (Hamburg: Felix 
Meiner Verlag, 2017), XLVI; E. W. Orth, “R. H. Lotze: Das Ganze unseres Welt- und Selbstverständnisses”, in: 
Josef Speck (ed.), Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen. Philosophie der Neuzeit IV, (Göttingen: Vanden-
hoeck & Ruprecht, 1986), pp. 9–51, p. 43.  
7 It is important to highlight the different use of the term ‘idea’ in Lotze and Kant. In Kant, the subjectivistic and 
formal root was predominant, whereas in Lotze the idea had an empirical-objectivistic root: it tells us something 
about external reality. In Kant the idea deals with man, in Lotze it is a—non-total, but partial and perfectible—




realistic position maintained that our objective perception and experience as well as our 
scientific research are able to give us some information about the configuration of external 
reality, despite the fact that they are not able to achieve its essential meaning. Lotze’s realism 
and objectivism can be synthesized in the idea that the world is not made by us, but rather 
given to us in our objective perception and experience. The conceptualizations in scientific 
research can tell us something about the world, provide us with information about it. 
However, this ability to provide information on the outer world is limited.  
Our scientific conceptualizations provide us information about the world, but they do not 
exhaustively represent its meaning: there is always something unsaid that belongs to 
metaphysics and the philosophical speculation. Lotze’s realism thus highlights the limits of 
human scientific knowledge which is clearly devoid of universal and metaphysical value. In 
order to explain this point, we might mention several examples of dualism—
material/immaterial, extended/unextended—which could be seen as cases of the general 
mind/body dualism that we frequently encounter in our objective scientific experience. This 
dualistic aspect that Lotze described in the terms of occasionalism (on it we will focus later), 
can be useful for science—in particular, for scientific psychology—to account for some 
recurring elements at physical and psychic level. However, science cannot claim at that to 
have advanced a positive theory but simply an operational-methodological description with 
no metaphysical value.  
According to Lotze, metaphysics is not dualistic, and this because it deals with the whole 
(with the substance) and the internal relations between unextended atoms in it. Furthermore, 
Lotze elaborated a metaphysics of the un-extended, mentalistic reality, although it is based on 
realism. According to him, human knowledge is based only on itself, that is, on its own ideas 
and conceptions, so that it can be neither confirmed nor falsified. Moreover, since knowledge 




transcendent knowledge—he must trust human reason. Important point is that trust does not 
mean uncritical acknowledgement of every result of knowledge, but an accurate analysis of 
every product of human thinking. Lotze did not embrace the dogmatic idealism, which did 
not recognize human knowledge as endowed with informativity, but, respecting the form of 
objectivity of our mind and the conviction that ideas are always related to something. He 
adopted a form of critical idealism8 that confirmed as valid only those ideas that meet human 
values and needs and discards those that apparently contradict those values. Science should 
also embrace this critical idealism, in order to function properly.  
One consequence of this position was that Lotze was confronted with the problem of 
justifying the transition from the immaterial and un-extended atoms to the materiality that we 
experience in our perception. The assumption of the metaphysical unreality of matter only 
shifted the problem to the level of perception. How is it possible that an immaterial and un-
extended atom can give rise to the material and extended bodies that we perceive? Pure 
extension in itself does not represent a problem, because—as we have seen—unextended 
atoms are points related to each other through their mutual resistance and they give rise to a 
 
8 The critical selection, mentioned above, led Lotze to develop his peculiar critical idealism. He was an idealist 
because from a metaphysical point of view he understood primordial reality as ideal or mental but, on the other 
hand, he tried to avoid Hegel’s formalism. Hegel considered the mind as the pure form of the mind without ref-
erence to any specific content. For this reason, according to Hegel, psychology was the discipline that dealt with 
the development of the pure form of the mind. According to Lotze, it was impossible to determine a priori the 
development of the mind but on the basis of physiological and biological experience and therefore on the basis 





n-dimensional extension understood as an infinite multiplicity of directions.9 The knowing 
subject can only perceive three-dimensionality. Apparently, the real problem lies in the 
empirical characteristics of matter as well as in its solidity. If atoms are—metaphysically 
understood—immaterial and un-extended points, how is it possible for them to give rise to 
the solidity of the material world that we perceive? The subject to which sciences refer is the 
world that we perceive, with its different empirical characteristics; an unextended atom, a 
metaphysical or immaterial point, is not a notion that can be adopted by physical science 
because the point is a geometric concept, whereas physical forces and movements are based 
on the idea of materiality. If the ultimate components of reality are immaterial, how do 
physical forces operate on immaterial points? The forces operating on mathematical-
geometric points are without effect in the realm of matter, they do not activate on material 
bodies. The question, therefore, does not completely account for the problem highlighted by 
Lotze, that is, the impossibility of a transition from the metaphysical to the perceptive level, 
understood as the subject’s perspective on reality. According to Lotze, reality has four 
spheres of meaning—being, happening, existing, and being valid—, and none of the four can 
be reduced to or included into another. These four forms of reality are fundamental and 
irrevocable concepts entirely based on themselves (in sich selbst beruhenden Grundbegriffe). 
In Lotze’s words: 
 
For we call a thing Real which is, in contradistinction to another which is not; an event Real which occurs or 
has occurred, in contradistinction to that which does not occur; e relation Real which obtains, as opposed to 
 
9 Nikolay Milkov wrote on Lotze’s atoms: “To be more specific, we conceive of them as impermeable, filling 
up the space, only because of their demonstrated reciprocal resistance (1856a, p. 402).” (N. Milkov, “Rudolph 





one which does not obtain; lastly we call a proposition Really true which holds or is valid as opposed to one 
of which the validity is still doubtful. This use of language is intelligible; it shows that when we call 
anything Real, we mean always to affirm it, though in different senses according to the different forms 
which it assumes, but one or other of which it must necessarily assume, and of which no one is reducible to 
or contained in the other.10  
 
Metaphysics deals with what is given to us and what is; psychology focuses on the way in 
which man perceives a happening event (Localzeichen); logic deals with the timeless validity 
of our judgments, concepts and Sachverhalte. The transition from one of these three 
disciplines to the other is impossible. Reality is perceived by the subject in a certain way, and 
we must not confuse what reality is for the subject, with what it is in itself. Human thought 
has a limited but not a misleading access to reality (here we recognize the realist and 
objectivist roots of Lotze’s philosophy); human perception and objective experience are able 
to grasp only small portions of reality that, from a metaphysical point of view, have not a 
necessary and a priori value. The problem of the human perception is treated in detail in 
Medicinische Psychologie, in which Lotze developed his theory of local signs that we will 
discuss later. 
In conclusion, Lotze’s philosophy achieved a consideration of reality from a mental 
perspective. His main thesis was that the analysis of reality—of the multiple material 
reality—leads us to consider this latter as a single factor of a whole mental process. Even if 
we consider Lotze’s philosophy as a path leading to a mentalistic metaphysics, it is 
nevertheless important to grasp its intermediate points, that is, that his realistic starting point 
led him to tackle the development of the scientific research of his time. 
 
10 R. H. Lotze, Logik. Drei Bücher vom Denken, vom Untersuchen und vom Erkennen (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 





1.3. Philosophy of space: metaphysics and geometry 
 
Lotze dealt with the notion of space since 1840, when he wrote his Habilitationsschrift in 
philosophy entitled De summis continuorum, in a strong and increasingly exacerbated 
opposition to his mentor C. Hermann Weiße. Lotze presented his critical analysis of Weiße’s 
conception of space also in Bemerkungen über den Begriff des Raumes, Sendschreiben an D. 
Ch. H. Weiße (1841). We should be aware that Weiße had played an important role in the 
education of the young philosopher Lotze. Thanks to Weiße’s criticism of Hegelian 
idealism—by adopting Leibnizian arguments—the young Lotze could study more in depth 
Leibniz’s philosophy, which was fundamental for the development of his notion of space.  
As a speculative theist, Weiße criticized Hegel’s principle of identity between thought and 
being, rationality and reality, stating that the concrete and individual reality always possesses 
something more (das positive Mehr) than pure conceptual knowledge. There is no 
conciliation between the concrete (understood in its facticity) and the abstract. Hegel’s 
system had been criticized not only by Weiße but also by I. H. Fichte, since, according to 
them, it had not considered concrete reality at all. These critical arguments were rooted in an 
anti-psychologistic perspective which did not entail any identification between the logical 
process and the objects of thought. The logical conditions of our knowledge as well as the 
thinkability of a thing (cognitio circa rem) should not be confused with the conditions of the 
thing itself (cognitio rei); concrete reality is always much richer than the logical thought that 
allows us to know it.  
Moreover, Weiße attempted to reconcile the Hegelian system of necessity with Schelling’s 
system of freedom, and to this end he drew on Leibniz’s thought and his critical arguments 
against the monism of the logical and mathematical necessity of Spinoza’s system. Leibniz 




the “real necessity or contingency” that, in its turn, is a fundamental aspect of human 
existence. Citing Leibniz’s Théodicée (I, 34), in Grundzüge der Metaphysik Weiße wrote: 
 
In diesem Sinne behauptet Leibnitz, welcher dem Spinoza gegenüber diesen höhern Standpunkt (jedoch mit 
mehrfachen Modificationen, welche durch die Vorausnahme des noch Höheren, namentlich des 
teleologischen Moments herbeigeführt werben) repräsentirt, zwar eine von der logischen und 
mathematischen ausdrücklich unterschiedene, reale oder hypothetische Nothwendigkeit menschlicher 
Handlungen, und sagt dennoch von dem Willen als solchem, daß er frei, daß er entbunden nicht bloss von 
dem Zwange, sondern auch von der Nothwendigkeit ist.11  
 
Lotze’s interest in Leibniz’s philosophy was mainly due to the influence of Weiße’s work on 
him. Like his mentor, and like I. H. Fichte, Lotze admired Leibniz’s thought. On this point, 
however, he also followed Herbart. Years later he remembered:  
 
ich ging in der That lieber durch das prachtvolle Thor, das er [Herbart] selbst seiner Metaphysik versichert 
zum Eingang aufbauen gekonnt zu haben: das Thor der Leibnizischen Monadenwelt.12  
 
In particular, Lotze was impressed by Leibniz’s preference for concrete and individual 
reality. This idea of Leibniz clearly influenced Lotze’s 1838 first philosophy dissertation on 
Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz as well as his dissertation for his first medical degree (De 
futurae biologiae principiis philosophicis) in which he presented a Leibnizian idea of value. 
But Lotze was also influenced by Leibniz’s idea that space is relational and not absolute, as 
Newton interpreted it (as sensorium Dei). 
 
11 C. H. Weiße, Grundzüge der Metaphysik (Hamburg: Friedrich Perthes, 1835), 467–68n. 




From a philosophical point of view, space is pure relationality, a pure infinity of 
directions. In human perception and in the objective experience, space is perceived as three-
dimensional, not because three-dimensionality represents the metaphysical essence of space 
in general, but because our experience is always partial, in particular, three-dimensional. 
Three-dimensionality is generally considered as the fundamental characteristic of space only 
because it appears as a factual evidence to our intellect. Lotze, however, questioned the 
principle of evidence. In this connection he criticized Weiße because the latter had given the 
three-dimensionality of space a metaphysical meaning (Bestimmung des Raumes). As Weiße 
wrote: 
 
Der Raum hat unabhängig von den concreten Dingen, deren allgemeine formale Voraussetzung und 
gleichsam deren Gefäß er ist, als Totalität in sich selbst, ein, wenn auch nur ideales, rein begriffliches 
Bestehen. Er ist die Totaleinheit jener zu gleich qualitativen und quantitativen Bestimmungen, welche den 
Inhalt der Geometrie ausmachen, obgleich sie von dieser Wissenschaft, wie oben bemerkt, nicht 
ausdrücklich als inwohnende Bestimmungen des Raumbegriffs gefaßt werden. Durch diesen Satz, daß der 
Inhalt der Geometrie einer und derselbe mit der inwohnenden Bestimmung des Raumes ist, wird dieser 
Inhalt ausdrücklich unter das Princip der Metaphysik gestellt oder dieser Wissenschaft einverleibt, 
entsprechend, wie im ersten Buche der Inhalt der Arithmetik.13 
 
Since, according to Weiße, geometry and metaphysics are in a relation of an “absolute unity” 
(Totaleinheit), the content of Euclidean geometry should be able to exhaustively explain the 
metaphysical meaning of space itself. 
Lotze opposed the idea of considering the infinity of space’s possible directions as 
geometrical, that is, basing three-dimensionality on the right angle. His shift from a precisely 
 




determined pure geometrical concept (three-dimensionality of space) to the metaphysical 
notion of space in general (infinite multiplicity of directions) completely changed the course 
of the reflection on this issue, which traditionally was based on the idea of automatic 
symmetry (identity) between geometry and metaphysics. Lotze considered such an automatic 
symmetry untrue. The metaphysical problem questions whether it is possible to reconcile the 
infinite directions of space—metaphysically understood—with the three-dimensionality of 
geometry and whether this can explain the nature of spatial extension. Reducing the 
metaphysical infinity of possible dimensions to three dimensions is clearly related to the 
possibility of determining the place (Ort) of a point through coordinates. This reduction 
cannot be used to construct a spatial extension or even just to symbolize its essential 
moments. Extension entails the infinite multiplicity of directions as its given possibility, 
whereas the notion of place only entails three possible dimensions for all the possible spatial 
relations between spatial figures. Reflecting on Leibniz’s concept of possibility, Lotze tried 
to develop his conception in both a philosophical and a mathematical perspective. The 
fundamental idea of Leibniz was that space is not a pure receptacle (Gefäß), but the order of 
what continually fills it.  
In his second philosophy dissertation (habilitation), De summis continuorum, Lotze 
explicitly stated that Euclidean geometry cannot adequately explain what space is. He 
proposed a clear distinction between extension (Ausdehnung) and place (Ort). The notion of 
extension is a philosophical concept of pure multiplicity of possible directions—in whose 
construction mathematics plays a fundamental role—whereas the place “makes these 
possibilities concrete, putting them into three coordinated directions”.14  
 






According to Lotze, space is the infinite number of relations and dispositions of elements 
considered as empirical conditions of an event. In this sense, Lotze can be undoubtedly 
considered as a thinker of “new empiricism”.15 He rejected Kant and Fries’ conception of 
space as innate intuition, because he did not consider space infinitely extended in three 
dimensions as a true (innate) element of our consciousness. Human mind rather orders the 
elements of perception according to a spatial pattern, so that only through a retrospective 
reflection (spätere Reflexion) we are able to grasp the infinite number of possible relations 
and spatial dispositions of these elements which, therefore, cannot be limited to the 
geometrical three dimensions. According to Lotze, precisely this retrospective reflection 
allows our consciousness to reach a comprehensive vision (Gesammtanschauung) of all 
possible and infinite spaces. In Lotze’s words: 
 
Wir meinen damit nicht, dass der unendliche nach drei Richtungen ausgedehnte Raum von selbst ein 
immerwährender Gegenstand unsers Bewusstseins sei, den wir etwa seit unserer Geburt in Gedanken 
anstierten, begierig, ihn mit Bildern zu füllen. Wir meinen nur, dass die ursprüngliche Natur unsers Geistes 
uns dazu treibt, unsere Empfindungselemente in räumlichen Lagen zu ordnen, und dass eine spätere 
Reflexion auf die unendliche Anzahl solcher Anordnungen, die wir unbewusst vorgenommen haben, uns 
auch die mehr oder minder lebhafte Gesammtanschauung des alle umfassenden unendlichen Raums zum 
Bewusstsein bringt.16 
 
This philosophical reflection on the concept of space in itself was carried out by Lotze in his 
1840 second dissertation in philosophy in which he provided a mathematical account of 
 
15 W. R. Woodward, Hermann Lotze. An Intellectual Biography (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 79.   





space. Like Fries, Lotze considered mathematics of great importance to philosophical 
reflection. Although he did not agree with Fries’ Kantian perspective on the concept of space, 
he undoubtedly owes Fries the idea that philosophical reflection should embrace mathematics 
as an integral and unavoidable part of its own development.  
As an anti-psychologist, Lotze definitely separated the psychological and physiological 
consideration of space, presented in the Medicinische Psychologie as “Localzeichentheorie”, 
from the logical-philosophical concept of space, considered as validity and ideality 
(Ausdehnung). This latter was analysed by Lotze in his De summis continuorum, in 
Mikrokosmos and also in his Logik (1874). In his 1840 dissertation Lotze stated that 
Euclidean method was not adequate to deal with geometry philosophically. For this reason, 
he tried to identify the mathematical formulas in order to calculate the area of several 
geometric forms, based on the assumption that these latter can be constructed from infinite 
arithmetic series: he did not use Euclidean evidence but mathematical constructions.17  
The idea of construction is at the core of Lotze’s thought, which he further developed in 
his “greater” Logik (1874), and is essential to understand the relation between Lotze’s 
thought and Kant’s philosophy; Lotze generally embraced Kant’s perspective, except for 
some reservations that highlight Lotze’s critical nature. 
In Mikrokosmos Lotze also dealt with the problem of spatial representation and clarified 
his relation to Kant’s philosophy on this topic. In the fourth chapter of the second book, 
partly dedicated to the question of innate ideas, Lotze tackled the problem of space, 
proposing a preliminary distinction between “quaestio juris” and “quaestio facti”. He 
rejected associationism, according to which our judgments are mere connections of ideas that 
 
17 On the concept of construction see: R. H. Lotze, “De summis continuorum” (1840), Kleine Schriften, I, 63–




the psychological mechanism of representations explicates as simple empirical material 
coexisting within our experience (zusammenhängen). Lotze considered this approach to the 
problem of judgement irrelevant with respect to the real point, the “quaestio juris”, that is, 
the validity of judgement. According to Lotze, what converts the merely coexistent material 
of a judgment to a coherent (zusammengehören) and therefore valid judgment—whose 
elements intrinsically belong together—is only a retrospective activity of our thought on this 
material, that we access through a psychological mechanism.18 Here Lotze also distanced 
himself from the psychological interpretation of Kant’s thought that Fries proposed in Neue 
oder anthropologische Kritik der Vernunft (1807).  
Lotze considered the coherence of judgment as product of a retrospective activity of 
thought on the material provided by our psychological process. Quite consistently, he did not 
consider, like Kant, the concepts of space and time as innate ideas, since these concepts are 
produced (erzeugt) by the thought’s activity. However, this does not mean that he considered 
them less universal and necessary. Their validity is guaranteed precisely by the fact that they 
are constructed by the activity of thought (die Tätigkeit des Denkens), since this is what 
constitutes their coherence and validity. This argument is based on Lotze’s idea that our 
consciousness is not a mirror that reproduces precisely the image of the outside world, but 
rather a continuous critical activity that examines all the data that it receives, re-elaborating 
them in accordance with its own criteria. As Lotze stated: 
 
we saw how the mechanism of association and reproduction combined certain impressions more closely than 
others, and how a degree of system was introduced into the motley multitude of retained impressions, which 
gathered together the similar and separated the dissimilar. Yet even here, all these laws of the train of ideas 
by their operation created only relations between the several acts of the cognitive activity, created objects of 
 




an intuition that might afterwards come; they did not show the scrutinizing glance that apprehends and 
interprets that order. It is in a third performance that we first meet with the glance of the mental eye, in the 
intuitions of Time and Space, into which the mind's uniting and relating action translates, as into a new 




Thus both space and time, the relations of impressions in both space and time, are not something found and 
picked up all ready on its path by our cognitive energy, but are evolved from itself.20  
 
The second chapter of the ninth book of Mikrokosmos is dedicated to the doctrine of the 
ideality of space. In these pages Lotze clearly embraced Kantian perspective, although with a 
few reservations about the idea of the innateness of the a priori form of space. According to 
Lotze, space and spatial relations are simply forms of our subjective intuition and cannot be 
applied to things nor to the relations between things per se, understood as the cause of our 
individual subjective intuitions. Lotze further stated that our representations are not what they 
mean—thus providing a clear distinction between representation and content of 
representation,—so that our spatial intuition is not spatial but it is rather its content that is 
provided with a spatial meaning. Spatial relations are not between representations, but 
between their contents. We generally think that space as well as the relations between the 
things that we perceive exist also outside us and precisely between things. Actually, our 
intuition of space, our perception of spatial relations arises from the interaction of our 
sensations or of the inner states of our nature (Wechselwirkung von Eindrücken oder inneren 
Zuständen unseres Wesens) which are neither spatial in themselves, nor are their interaction. 
 
19 R. H. Lotze, Mikrokosmos, I vol. 257–8; engl. trans., 229. 




In this sense, space is not a form of our intuition (Form unseres Anschauens) in which our 
mental activities operate and from which our spatial image of the world emerges; space is 
rather the form of our intuition (Form unserer Anschauung) considered as a product 
(Erzeugnis) of our consciousness. In this way, starting from purely non-spatial, intensive 
activities and states of our representative activity, consciousness produces the appearance of 
an infinite extension.21 
The way in which we develop and construct our spatial intuition from the interaction of 
non-spatial sensations cannot provide an answer about the spatiality or non-spatiality of the 
external world which is the source of our sensations. Even if the external world was actually 
spatial, in order to be known, it should be translated into our inner language which is not 
spatial; the extended images of things as well as their size relations could not be perceived. In 
order to be perceived and known, the sensations coming from an actual spatial world should 
be converted into an ordered multiplicity of non-spatial stimuli of our mind, which is the only 
possibility for us to construct our intuition of the spatial world.  
The psychological research, which explains how we develop the intuition of space and 
whether such intuition is innate in our mind, is not able to answer the question about the 
actual spatiality of the world. Only metaphysics can determine the type of reality 
(Wirklichkeit) of space. The reality of space is the ideality (Idealität).22 
Lotze embraced Kant’s theory of space ideality but criticized his innatism. According to 
Lotze, Kant’s mistake consisted in having based his doctrine of the ideality of space on the 
assumption that our spatial intuitions have to be innate, in order to be as universally and 
necessarily valid as geometry is. According to Lotze, innatism cannot provide universality 
 
21 See: R. H. Lotze, ibid., III vol., 485–88. 




and necessity to the notion of space. If we considered space only as the subjective form of 
human intuition, as an a priori and innate intuition of our mind, the idea of space would 
depend on the nature of the knowing subject and we could not account for other possible 
knowing beings, endowed with other forms of intuition and, therefore, we would not 
guarantee the universality and necessity of space. Lotze considered innatism theoretically too 
weak as a possible foundation of the universality and necessity of geometry.23  
Our spatial intuitions, as ideals, do not apply to outer things in themselves, because they 
are mental. According to Lotze, from a metaphysical point of view there is no extended 
matter filling the space, as common sense would suggest. Metaphysically, there are only 
unextended atoms, which through their forces (Kräfte) outline some paths, thus producing 
within our intuition images of an extended materiality. Properly speaking, extended 
materiality is a product of the movements and changes of the intensive states of our mind.24  
In Logik (1874) Lotze added that what he defined as the universality and necessity 
(Notwendigkeit) of the intuition of the space—the postulates of geometry—is simply based 
on their self-evidence, given to us by intuition, and not on their being innate. Before that, in 
Mikrokosmos, Lotze outlined the difference between the concept (Begriff) and intuition 
(Anschauung), stating that space and the general laws of spatiality are not concepts but 
intuitions. Lotze’s idea of space is formless (gestaltlos) and therefore able to assume infinite 
different forms and relations which he conceives as multiple orders of a variety (Vielheit). 
More specifically, Lotze defined space as “the possibility of the juxtaposition of a 
plurality”.25 The general laws of spatiality—the principles of geometry—present space as an 
 
23 See: ibid., 494. 
24 See: ibid., 485–86. 




infinite whole (unendliches Ganze). These principles—whether conceived as innate ideas or 
as the first products of the mutual action of our sensations (erstes Erzeugnis der 
Wechselwirkung unserer Eindrücke)—are nothing else than the immediate certainty 
(Gewissheit) that one single straight line passes through two points. As such, space and the 
laws of spatiality differ formally and essentially from the laws of formation (Bildungsgesetze) 
prescribed by the general concept to its particular examples. The general concept only 
requires each of its particular examples to be constituted of a group of marks (Gruppe von 
Merkmalen) connected to each other in a certain way. Moreover, the particular concepts are 
always subsumed under the general concept, whereas the laws of spatiality connect the 
particular and concrete space to the space as a whole. In other words, individual examples of 
space are not considered simply as examples of a general concept of space but as parts of a 
whole space coordinated and structured according to the general laws of spatiality. The 
specificity of the laws of spatiality is the possibility of an unlimited progress (endloser 
Fortschritt), an idea that can be included in the specific nature of the series (Reihe), through 
which space extends infinitely. As Lotze wrote: 
 
space appears to us as a kind of integral by which that whole is given which proceeds from the summation of 
all the infinitely numerous applications of the law of juxtaposition, when we abstract wholly from the nature 
of the reality that stands in those relations, and substitute for it the mere empty framework of the related 
points. Now when we have once got hold of the intuition of space, space appears to us as the all-embracing 
whole, in which and through which is possible the multiplicity of all those relations from the summation of 
which it has itself really originated.26 
 
 




In his “greater” Logik (1874) Lotze dealt again with the question of space, stating that 
geometry is synthetic a priori and that through intuition we are able to grasp the principles of 
geometry as self-evident. Geometry has no logical-analytical basis—the principle of identity 
and contradiction—but requires the intervention of intuition to show its principles as self-
evident and preserves its a priori nature, even if intuition refers to experience. Lotze later 
explicitly stated that intuition is the basis of self-evidence and not of induction, based on the 
repetition of particular examples. In Logik (§ 357) he also criticized Kant’s grounding the a 
priori character of spatial intuition on mere innatism. In other words, Lotze criticized the use 
of the term “a priori” in the sense of “innate” because, in his opinion, this latter meaning is 
completely irrelevant: 
 
It is not because the idea of space is innate in us, that we are in a position to frame universal propositions in 
geometry, which once thought are valid always; if it were at all intelligible without any such hypothesis how 
the idea of a particular combination of spatial points of relation could arise in us purely through external 
impressions, still, in presence of such an idea, the immediate apprehension of the universal truth contained in 
those relations, which is the service of intuition, would be not more inexplicable (though it would be equally 
inexplicable) and not less possible than if those same points of relation could only be brought into our 
consciousness by the help of an innate mode of reaction and spontaneity in the mind itself.27   
 
At the core of Lotze’s interest here was the idea that our knowledge of space in geometry is 
based on the self-evidence of the postulates of geometry which is achieved through the 
immediate apprehension of spatial relations within the intuition (Anschauung). The cause of 
these relations can also be empirical, but they assume general validity, once we immediately 
 
27 R. H. Lotze, System der Philosophie. Logik. Drei Bücher vom Denken, vom Untersuchen und vom Erkennen 




grasp their truth through intuition. In other words, it is not relevant what gives rise to this 
immediate knowledge in us. Lotze employed the term ‘a priori’ in a narrow sense, by 
indicating as a priori the knowledge that does not arise from a process of induction or 
addition of particular examples, but is considered as a truth of general validity that precedes 
the particular example, precisely as the determining rules. As Lotze wrote: 
 
I therefore reserve the question of the a priori, in the sense of the innate character of spatial Intuition, with 
any further question which may arise out of it, for the Metaphysic, and apply the term a priori to spatial 
intuitions in a restricted sense only, viz. to indicate that they are not derived by a process of induction or 
summation from particular instances which exhibit them, but are thought to begin with as truths of universal 
validity, and are thus prior to the particular instances in the sense of being rules by which they are 
determined.28  
 
Stating that our spatial knowledge is a priori, Lotze did not mean that this latter is innate or 
simply precedes our actual knowledge of experience, which would suggest a chronological a 
priori, but that it is logically (and not temporally) prior to experience. 
Intuition is in not a process (Verfahren). Unlike discursive thought, it does not arise from 
the connection of multiple acts. With respect to its content, intuition works as a passive 
receptivity and, yet, so rapidly that it is not even possible to distinguish the different stages of 
its development. Although it is possible to outline the course of the representations that result 
in intuition, any further psychological analysis of its final phase, i.e. the immediate 
consciousness of the necessary truth (entailed in the terms of the relation integrally given), is 
impossible. Lotze maintained: 
 
 




How this final step is accomplished, the immediate apprehension of the necessary truth which is implied 
when once all the members of the relation are completely given, is a point upon which certainly at present, 
and in my judgment no less certainly for ever, any further psychological analysis is impossible. It is only in 
this sense of absolutely immediate apprehension that I have here employed the term intuition, and it leads 
me to a further observation as to the meaning of the expression a priori as applied by us to intuition.29 
 
Lotze employed the term ‘intuition’ only to mean an absolutely immediate knowledge. The 
immediacy of intuition provides us an a priori knowledge which is due neither to induction 
nor to the mere collection of particular examples, but is rather a truth of general validity and, 
therefore, like the determining rules, prior to these examples.  
Affirming the logical and non-temporal primacy of our a priori knowledge, Lotze 
established the distinction between the thought as a psychic process and the objective content 
of thought. Logic is not interested in the conditions that give rise to the thought as psychic 
process; the meaning (Bedeutung) of logical forms lies in the sense (Sinn) of the connections 
with which the content of our world of representation has to comply.30 Besides opposing to 
Kantian innatism of the pure forms of intuition, here Lotze also criticized Fries, who, through 
his psychologistic interpretation of Kant’s transcendental aesthetics, had considered our a 
priori knowledge as temporally prior to experience and, more generally, as the human innate 
psychic structure. According to Fries, only this sense of a priori could provide knowledge 
with universal and necessary validity. Lotze considered our a priori knowledge as the content 
of thought that is grasped in intuition and, consequently, not as temporally prior to any 
possible experience: once it is recognized as self-evident, it actually becomes logically prior 
to experience.
 
29 Ibid., 581–82, § 357; engl. trans., 515. 





2. Physiological and psychological studies in the first half of the 19th cen-
tury 
Between the 1830s and 1840s, philosophers, psychologists and other researchers had 
questioned intensively the scientific status of psychology. In these years, mathematics and 
natural sciences—physics, physiology and chemistry—had experienced a rapid development. 
Philosophy, understood as epistemology, and natural sciences had addressed the problem of 
mental phenomena; the human sensory-perceptive activity was no more considered as a 
purely philosophical problem and gradually became of interest to the physiological research. 
Between the early 1800s and 1874—the year of publication of both Gründzuge der 
physiologischen Psychologie by Wilhelm Wundt and Psychologie vom empirischen 
Standpunkt by Franz Brentano—the main debate focused on whether human mental life 
could be reduced to merely physical events and, as in consequence, whether it could be 
scientifically explained on the basis of experimental data alone. Both the question on the 
reduction of mental life to physiology and that regarding what kind of science can be used 
legitimately in psychological research were fundamental for the development of scientific 
psychology. The objective of the present chapter is the analysis of the development of 
psychology between 1802, year of publication of Rapports du physique et du moral de 
l’homme by Pierre Jean Georges Cabanis, and 1852, year of publication of Medicinische 
Psychologie oder Physiologie der Seele by Rudolph Hermann Lotze. 
 
2.1. The study of the nervous system 
Between the 1820s and 1850s, Germany and France were in the forefront of scientific 




Justus von Liebig’s chemical research: the chemical laboratory that he directed in Giessen is 
the first case of modern teamwork research unit. We should also mention Alexander von 
Humboldt and Christian Gottfried Ehrenberg’s naturalistic research in geography, botany and 
zoology, and Heinrich and Gustav Rose’s research in chemistry and mineralogy. Of special 
interest for the present study is to pass in review the state of the physiological research at that 
time. The point is that Lotze extensively adopted it as a scientific support for his 
psychological conceptions, such as that of “local signs” on which we will focus later. At that 
time, the physiological research, which mainly focused on the problem of the inexplicable 
relationship between mind and body as well as on a more accurate definition of phenomena 
in the psychic sphere, used to tackle the issues of sensation, perception and brain localization 
of mental functions. The great number of experiments carried out in this way resulted in the 
formulation of the concept of ‘specific sensory energy’ which, by highlighting the nervous 
activity, circumscribes parts of the sensory-perceptive process that could not be explained on 
the basis of a mere physiological foundation and could therefore be attributed to the existence 
of a specific psychic activity. To be sure, it is not possible to reduce the physiological 
research of those years to a single dominant attitude. In fact, alongside reductionist positions 
such as those of Johannes Petrus Müller and somehow also of Jean Pierre Marie Flourens, 
there were other authors, such as Hermann von Helmholtz and Gustav Theodor Fechner, who 
clearly opposed reductionist materialism, and authors such as Ernst Heinrich Weber who 
were not interested in the evaluation but only in the definition of the set of experimental data 
and scientific explanations that can be actually provided.  
Furthermore, Franz Joseph Gall and Johann Gaspar Spurzheim’s phrenology tried to 
provide a mechanical explanation of psychic phenomena through the theory of localization. 
According to the theory of brain localization of mental functions, in the brain every idea has 




phrenologists intended to overcome the Cartesian dualism between mind and body, by 
showing that mind is nothing else than a function performed by the body, in the hope to solve 
the problem of the mind. Actually, since phrenologists were not able to explain how a purely 
physical movement could concretely give rise to intensive states of consciousness, they 
shifted the problem of the mind, with all the questions related to the psychological tradition—
memory, will, emotions—to the brain. The dualism remained, in fact, unsolved.   
The physiologists of the nervous system, such as Marie-Jean-Pierre Flourens and Johannes 
Peter Müller, definitely opposed phrenologists, already discredited in the scientific circles, 
refuting their theses on the role of the cerebellum and extending their own scientific research 
to nerves, considered as the real path leading to brain. Among other things, phrenologists 
argued that cerebellum was the organ in which sexual inclination was located. This thesis, 
however, was experimentally refuted by Combette and Flourens, who demonstrated that 
cerebellum’s role was basically that of coordinating and regulating all the partial movements 
as regular and determined movements of the whole body.  
The Scottish physiologist and physician Charles Bell (1774–1842) was the first who 
distinguished the sensory function of dorsal spinal nerve roots from the motor function of 
ventral roots (Bell-Magendie law) and who theorized the doctrine of specific sensory 
energies in 1811.1 In his 1853 work De la vie et de l’intelligence, Flourens accounted for the 
anatomical distinction of nerves discovered by Bell and the problem of specific sensory 
energies, which Müller would later present more systematically, as well as for the question of 
the cerebral localization of mental functions. With regard to the latter aspect, between 1820 
 
1 Bell published extensive studies of the nervous system in 1811. These studies initially circulated privately in 
his book An Idea of a New Anatomy of the Brain (Bell C, Shaw A (November 1868). “Reprint of the “Idea of a 





and 1840 Flourens carried out a series of experiments, partially embracing the experimental 
and observational results presented by Luigi Rolando in Italy.2  
In brief, Flourens managed to determine experimentally the various functions of the brain 
as well as of parts of the nervous system. Moreover, he discovered that the nervous system 
operates like a compact and organized whole and single system. Despite the fact that mental 
functions are located in different and specific parts of the brain and the nervous system, even 
when one of these parts is removed, the single function does not disappear but is taken over 
by the rest of the system. This notwithstanding, all the mental functions have undoubtedly 
their own physical and physiological location within the central and peripheral nervous 
system. In this sense, Flourens became the main exponent of an essential physiological 
reductionism which, however, did not coincide with Gall’s and Spurzheim’s phrenological 
theses—we could recall the well-known debate about the cerebellum’s functions—that were 
not accepted in the scientific world. Whereas Bell-Magendie law exclusively focused on 
sensations and movement, Flourens questioned higher mental functions: perception and 
volition. In 1822 through his experiments he detected four constitutive parts of the brain in 
which he could locate distinct functions: the medulla oblongata (principle of the respiratory 
mechanism), corpora quadrigemina (principle of vision), the cerebellum (coordination of 
locomotory movements) and the proper cerebrum, the lobes of brain hemispheres, the site of 
perceptions and volition: intelligence. The bodily movement production is located—
according to the law of Bell-Magendie—in the spinal cord and its nerves, but balance as well 
 
2 In 1809 the Italian anatomist Luigi Rolando published his Saggio sopra la vera struttura del cervello 
dell'uomo e degli animali e sopra le funzioni del sistema nervoso. He provided important considerations on 
cerebral hemispheres—fissure of Rolando bears his name—as well as on the nervous system. We should also 





as the control of different movements within the overall motion are located in the cerebellum. 
The cerebrum (lobes and hemispheres) was the exclusive seat of intelligence (perception and 
volition), as discovered by Flourens thanks to his experiments on chickens. Flourens noticed 
that, by depriving the animal of a single lobe, this lost the ability to see with the eye of the 
opposite side but its intelligence was preserved.3 When both lobes were removed, the animal 
completely lost its ability to feel (sight, hearing, instincts, etc...) as well as its intelligence 
(perception, will and spontaneous action). According to Flourens, this meant that the 
cerebrum is the only seat of intelligence. Indeed, there is no intelligence, once the whole 
brain is removed. However, his interpretation of the experimental data did not take into 
account the fact that, although intelligence disappears once the cerebrum is removed, this 
does not necessarily mean that the cerebrum is the exclusive seat of this mental function. 
Cerebrum might be an important factor for the development of our consciousness, without 
being its only and exclusive seat. In the years following the publication of Flourens’ 
outcomes, other researchers and scientists discussed and questioned his results. Interpreting 
his results in the sense of a rigid and clear localization, Flourens proposed a distinction 
between sensation and perception based on the distinction of the organs that host these 
psychic functions. Removing corpora quadrigemina, we lose the sense of sight; if we remove 
one cerebral lobe, our sensation remains but not our perception. Basing on the differentiation 
between sensorial facts and cerebral facts, he distinguishes sensation from perception, 
claiming that this should suggest a substantial autonomy of different organs which 
corresponds to an autonomy of their functions. Such a fragmented and dissected conception 
of the nervous system will be criticized by scientists after Flourens.  
 
3 It is difficult to understand what Flourens meant by intelligence here—the ability to perceive the surrounding 




Another fundamental contribution is that of Johannes Müller who, in his Physiologie des 
Gesichtssinnes (1826) and his great systematic work Handbuch der Physiologie des 
Menschen (1833–1840), provided more scientificity to physiological studies. Focusing on the 
problem of the interaction between physiological and psychological levels, he dealt with the 
question of what method physiological research should adopt, but also with the question of 
which is the epistemological meaning and scope of the physiological research. In his 1826 
work, Müller questioned the origin of self-consciousness, stating that this latter is always and 
only knowledge of the ego’s inner changes. From the very first moment of their life, the 
person perceives her body as something extended and occupying space and radically different 
from what is outside. It is the education of our senses that leads us to identify external causes 
of our internal changes and even to consider our internal changes as an external reality in 
front of us. Dealing with the fundamental principle of physiological research, Müller 
theorized the existence of specific sensory energies that are not immanent to external things, 
but rather to the nerves that always activate and respond in the same way to external stimuli. 
The notion of “specific sensory energy” (Sinnesenergien) means that a nerve fiber, subject to 
external stimuli, no matter how different these may be, always responds in the same way, and 
this is precisely what constitutes its specificity or quality.4  
Our nervous system is not a purely passive mechanism that records and duplicates the 
outer world into us. Rather, it is an active system that responds to the external impulses of the 
specific energies of luminous, dark, etc. If we limit ourselves to the sense of sight, these 
energies do not belong to the outer world, but to the nerve that releases them, when it is 
 
4 This concept is close to that of Irritabilität or Reizbarkeit introduced by Albrecht von Haller and widely em-





subject to a stimulus. This position gives rise to a further problem. If the specific sensory 
energies belong to the structure of the nervous system, why does the subject attribute them to 
the outer world, considering them as objects provided with a spatial dimension? 
Müller answered this problem in his considerations on representation. He sets out that our 
sensory process is always accompanied by representation which highlights the existence of 
states that are not purely sensory. The visual sensation, for example, works as follows. A 
stimulus from outside activates the sensorial energies of retinal nerves; alongside this sensory 
activity there is the representative activity or imagination (Vorstellung) regarding the object 
of the sensation. The resulting representation takes the place of the content of sensation, that 
is, the specific sensorial energies, and transforms these latter into external objects provided 
with spatial extension. In consequence, Müller distinguished the sensory activity taking place 
in nerves, whose specific content consists of specific sensorial energies, and the 
representative activity that locates the thought object in a spatial dimension outside our body. 
This is, according to Müller, the origin of our representation of external objects. In his very 
first months of life, the child already experiences the representation of the resistance of parts 
of the body between each other as well as the representation of the resistance of an outer 
world against the body: this is how we achieve a representation of the external world causing 
our sensations.  
This problem led Müller to discuss that of the origin of our idea of space. The primary fact 
of which we are aware as human beings is the movement of our muscles within our body, 
which occupies a certain space. Examining the sensory structures of sight and touch and 
basing on Treviranus’ thesis about the constitution of the retina, Müller stated that this latter 
is a set of nerve-endings and that nerve-fibers spread over the body-surface and, moreover, 
that nerves’ ability to sense their own spreading is the origin of our notion of space. Basing 




space—which is originally related to specific sensorial energies and is, therefore, a sensorial 
fact immanent to our nervous structure—is then projected outwards, becoming a 
representation of space. The representation of space is not something innate at a sensory 
level, but it gradually arises through experience. It is important to explain how we transfer the 
notion of space from the world inside us—from our nerves and their sensation of spreading—
to the world outside us.  
Our body is always present within our visual field. In almost all our visual impressions it 
occupies a part of the visual field, so that its presence is a constant in the dynamics of our 
vision and, thanks to its constant presence, we represent our body as opposed to the external 
bodies. Visual or tactile sensations are so strong and convincing that we confuse these 
specific sensory energies with objects of the outer world. The sense of representation lies in 
this confusion or transfer. Without the intervention of the representation, the nerves that give 
rise to human sensation would only sense their own inner affections. The simple comparison 
of the sensory fact with the representative fact led Müller to introduce the problem of the 
mind. 
Müller’s conclusion was that human knowledge is completely constituted of physiological 
and intellectual structures that cannot be reduced to a physiological level. In his Handbuch 
der Physiologie des Menschen (1833–40) he paid constant attention to the physiological 
research and observation as well as to those elements that denote a relation between the 
physiological aspect, which he called principle of life (“Lebensprinzip”), and the psychic 
manifestations, which he called principle of mind (“Prinzip der Seele”). The features of this 
relation between body and mind—and in this respect Müller was very clear—are absolutely 





But we cannot lose sight of the fact, that the brain is an aggregate of numerous differently organised parts, 
and in this respect a highly complicated piece of mechanism; while the mind exists in a latent state, in the 
germ, independently of this mechanism, although incapable without it of manifesting itself or acting upon 
the body. The manner in which the mind makes use of this highly complicated and delicate piece of 
mechanism, is certainly inconceivable.5  
 
Before reviewing the positions of authors, such as E. H. Weber and G. T. Fechner, who 
were certainly important to the development of Lotze’s conception of psychology, we would 
like to dwell briefly on the foundation of Flourens and Müller’s theses as well as on the way 
in which they were questioned by some later authors.  
As F. A. Lange clearly and precisely pointed out in Geschichte des Materialismus, 
although Flourens and Müller’s physiology of the nervous system greatly contrasted with 
phrenology, which had no recognition in the scientific world, both authors nevertheless 
upheld a theory of centralization.6 According to Flourens and Müller, higher mental 
functions, such as thought and will, had an exclusively cerebral localization. It deserves 
notice that Flourens’ experiments mentioned above seemed to lead to these considerations 
which, however, were not confirmed by the experiments of Oscar Hertwig and François 
Achille Longet, both mentioned by Lotze in his Medicinische Psychologie.  
These experiments showed that, if we remove the upper part of the hemisphere of a 
pigeon’s brain, the animal loses its hearing but after a lapse of time immediately recovers it. 
This experiment discredited the claimed empirical evidence of the conception of the exclusive 
 
5 J. P. Müller, Handbuch der Physiologie des Menschen, 2 vol. (Koblenz: Verlag von J. Hölscher, 1840), 559; 
engl. trans., Elements of Physiology, W. Baly (trans.), (London: Taylor and Walton, 1842), 2 vol., 1388. 
6 See: F. A. Lange, Geschichte des Materialismus und Kritik seiner Bedeutung in der Gegenwart (Iserlohn: Ver-
lag von J. Baedeker, 1875), II, 332–75; english trans., The History of Materialism and Criticism of Its Im-




anatomical localization of psychic faculties. The recovery of temporarily lost faculties made 
it clear that it is impossible to exclusively localize the specific faculties in specific areas of 
the brain. Furthermore, this suggested that the brain was not the only seat of mental 
functions, albeit a necessary and fundamental factor for their realization.  
Later studies on the brain made by Theodor Hermann Meynert, Julius Eduard Hitzig, Carl 
Wilhelm Hermann Nothnagel and David Ferrier conceived the brain not as the seat of higher 
mental functions, but as the organ that coordinates and combines sensations and movements.7 
The experiments of the above-mentioned authors reject a brain localization of mental 
functions because, when a certain part of the brain, which that is supposed to be the seat of a 
certain mental function, is ablated, we do not lose this function (as a close localization would 
rather suggest), but it is preserved by our nervous system through alternative paths. This 
proves that our nervous system has to be considered as a whole.  
 
2.2. Hermann Lotze on phrenology and the question of the location of the mind  
Lotze addressed the question of the validity of phrenological conception both in Medicinische 
Psychologie and in Mikrokosmos, highlighting their theoretical difficulties without, however, 
ignoring the fact that some parts of the empirical material of their analysis may be true.8 
Phrenology assigns multiple functions to the brain and searches for special brain organs that 
 
7 See above all: T. H. Meynert: “Vom Gehirn der Säugetiere”, in Handbuch der Lehre von den Geweben des 
Menschen und der Tiere, Salomon Stricker (ed.), (Leipzig: Verlag von Wilhelm Engelmann, 1871), 694f. 
8 See: R. H. Lotze, Medicinische Psychologie oder Physiologie der Seele (Leipzig: Weidmann’sche Buchhand-
lung, 1852), 106–15; and Mikrokosmos. Ideen zur Naturgeschichte und Geschichte der Menschheit. Versuch 
einer Anthropologie, N. Milkov (ed.), (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2017), I, 353–85; english trans., 
Microcosmus: An Essay Concerning Man and his Relation to the World, E. Hamilton and E. E. Constance Jones 




might be the anatomical seat of complex mental operations. According to Lotze, the division 
of brain into special regions at the service of different mental activities can be hardly upheld 
and is theoretically problematic. First of all, it cannot explain the interaction performed by 
the different mind activities on each other. In other words, if we assume that the brain is 
divided into special organs for the different activities of the mind, then we can no longer 
account for the overall effect and unity, which is the main feature of human psychic life. 
Moreover, as Lotze continued, it would also be difficult to implement the theses of 
phrenology, because we should presuppose a researcher provided with a perfect knowledge 
about every nuance of the individual character, precisely since the cause of the character lies 
in the physical organ that produces it. This hypothesis clearly contradicts the actual formation 
of the character, because it is determined not only by the body conformation but also by 
various external, environmental conditions, in one word, by experience. Ultimately, 
phrenology erroneously considers experience, life events and illnesses as direct consequences 
of a single and unique cause: the brain conformation.  
The fundamental question of phrenology, analysed by Lotze both in Medicinische 
Psychologie and in Mikrokosmos, is whether the mind has its place in the corporeal and 
spatial world. Obviously, if we assume the philosophical conception of space as an idea 
(Idealität des Raumes), we do not need to raise the question of the seat of what is trans-
sensual (Sitz des Übersinnlichen) within an extended world. This metaphysical point of view 
on reality, in accordance with Lotze’s mentalism—which will be discussed later—,is only a 
point of arrival for our knowledge, which still cannot be practically used by science. The 
science dealing with the psycho-physical mechanism cannot be based on such a monist 
perspective: it must assume mind–body dualism and grasp its relations, combinations and 





es würde unabsehbare Schwierigkeiten verursacht haben, philosophische Theorien über die Idealität des 
Raumes hier zu besprechen, deren Berücksichtigung natürlich die Frage nach einem Sitz des Übersinnlichen 
in einer räumlichen Welt gänzlich umgestaltet haben würde.9 
 
Lotze dealt with the seat of the mind in the brain in the tenth paragraph of Medicinische 
Psychologie. Analysing this problem means questioning also the form of the interaction 
between body and mind, since it entails the localization of every single part of the brain, 
whose changes of state (Zustandsänderungen) are immediately (unmittelbar) related to the 
mind’s changes of state. According to Lotze, the seat of the mind was not necessarily the 
anatomical point where all nerve fibers converge; in other words, here he criticized the theory 
according to which brain is the only seat of the mind. He wrote in this connection: 
 
wie unvollkommen auch noch unsere Kenntnisse über die feinere Structur der Centralorgane sind, so 
begünstigt doch das, was wir wissen, sehr wenig die Annahme eines einzigen örtlichen Mittelpunktes, in 
welchem alle Nervenfäden, oder doch mindestens alle wesentlich verschiedenen Gruppen derselben durch 
einzelne Verbindungsfaden sich sammelten. Dieser Mangel eines Schlusspunktes für das ganze 
Nervengewebe, noch fühlbarer gemacht durch die Anatomie der niederen Tiere, lässt unsere Vorstellung von 
einem bestimmten Sitz der Seele unsicher werden.10  
 
Analyzing the relation between stimulus and impression (Reiz-Eindruck), Lotze stated that 
the stimulus from the outer world is recorded by nerves as an impression, which from the 
surface of human body runs up to the seat of the mind—producing in this way qualitative and 
psychical final states (Endzustände) on the basis of physical states—through all the 
 
9 R. H. Lotze, Kleine Schriften, David Peipers (ed.), 4 vols. (Leipzig: Verlag von S. Hirzel, 1885–91), 3 vol., 8. 





components of our body: bones, muscles, blood and parenchymatous organs. According to 
Lotze, it is not necessary to theorize that all nerve fibers necessarily converge to a single core 
point, which would correspond to the only and fixed seat of the mind, similarly to a 
mathematical point. In his opinion, it is much more likely that the mind is located in the 
amorphous Parenchyma (ungeformtes Parenchym) or in the cellular masses (Zellenmassen), 
that is, between the nerve fibres.  
In such non-centralistic, mobile and dynamic conception of the mind, the role of the brain 
is far from being of minor importance: the entirety of the weaves and crossings of nerve 
fibers located in the brain are supposed to produce, through the interaction of various 
physical nervous stimulations, those ultimate qualitative states that constitute the material on 
which the mind activity is based.11  
 The rejection of a fixed and exclusive place of the mind leads to the idea that this latter is 
constantly in direct and immediate contact (unmittelbare Berührung) with the stimulated 
nerve endings, by whose influence it is directly affected. This rejection also implies a denial 
of any possible demonstration of the existence of a central point to which all these endings 
would converge. Only a dynamic mind could operate in this way.  
Lotze expressed his own conception of the mind employing an apt metaphor that contrasts 
with the old idea proposed by phrenologists, according to whom the mind waits for the 
nervous impressions. On the contrary, Lotze considered the mind to be dynamic and in 
constant search for its working material. In Lotze’s words:  
 
 





Sie [die Seele] soll nicht ruhig sitzend zuwarten, bis der Eindruck an sie gelange, sondern sie soll ihm 
entgegeneilen und überall an Ort und Stelle, nämlich an den centralen Enden der jedesmal erregten Fasern 
die Eindrücke aufsammeln, die ihr dort dargeboten werden.12  
  
 
2.3. Three scientific psychologists  
2.3.1. Ernst Heinrich Weber 
Müller’s research raised the question of the connection and distinction between a 
physiological and a psychological level in the sensory process. The work of the physiologist 
Ernst Heinrich Weber also contributed to this debate. Müller’s conception of the specific 
energies of nerves as qualities that these latter produce was embraced by Weber and then—as 
we will see later—by Lotze. The figure of E. H. Weber was important for the formation of R. 
H. Lotze’s scientific thought. Thanks to his correspondence with Ernst Friedrich Apelt, we 
know that Lotze attended the classes (precisely eight courses) of the anatomist and 
physiologist Weber, which included experiments on the sensory process.13 These courses 
allowed Lotze to understand in depth the concept of mechanism in natural sciences. This 
concept was instrumental to provide an order to medical science, but also to identify the 
limits of the claims of the mechanistic perspective. This project resulted in Lotze’s first 
doctoral dissertation in Medicine De futurae biologiae principiis philosophicis, that he 
 
12 Ibidem. 






defended in 1838.14 In fact, with regard to ‘nerve qualities’, we initially (ursprünglich) 
perceive only qualities with different intensities and then we assume the existence of a mind 
activity which disposes all the perceived qualities within a spatial order. Weber stated that: 
 
wir durch die reine Empfindung ursprünglich gar nichts über den Ort wissen, wo auf den die Empfindung 
vermittelnden Nerven eingewirkt wird, und dass alle Empfindungen ursprünglich nur unser Bewusstsein 
anregende Zustände sind, welche dem Grade und der Qualität nach verschieden sein können, aber 
unmittelbar keine räumlichen Verhältnisse zu unserem Bewusstsein bringen, sondern nur mittelbar, durch 
die Anregung einer Tätigkeit unserer Seele, mittelst deren wir uns die Empfindungen vorstellen und in 
Zusammenhang bringen, und zu welcher wir durch eine angeborene Seelenanlage oder Seelenkraft 
angetrieben werden.15  
 
In his contribution, published in Rudolph Wagner’s Handwörterbuch der Physiologie 
under the title of Über Tastsinn und Gemeingefühl (1846), Weber examined tactile and 
acoustic sensations and tackled the problem of common sensation (Gemeingefühl) which is 
 
14 See: R. Pester, Hermann Lotze. Wege seines Denkens und Forschens. Ein Kapitel deutscher Philosophie- und 
Wissenschaftsgeschichte im 19. Jahrhundert (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1997), 52–53. In his 
interpretation Pester stated that Lotze’s development of the concept of mechanism was strongly influenced not 
only by Weber, but also by Marshall Hall’s theory of involuntary reflexes movement. As we will see later, this 
theory played an important role in Lotze’s theory of local signs (Localzeichentheorie). Lotze mentioned the 
concept of mechanism already in a letter to Apelt dated 18 February 1837. (See on this: W. Woodward, op. cit., 
54–55n). Lotze expressed a kind of exasperation towards Weber’s classes, because they focused too much on 
the subject of mechanism and did not consider that of dynamis which was essential to Lotze. The dual 
mechanism–dynamis model will be central in his 1838 philosophical dissertation. 
15 E. H. Weber, “Der Tastsinn und das Gemeingefühl”, in Handwörterbuch der Physiologie mit Rücksicht auf 
physiologische Pathologie, Rudolph Wagner (ed.), (Braunschweig: Druck und Verlag von Friedr. Vieweg und 




the general sense of ‘self’ that the body experiences in its relation with the external world as 
well as with its internal organs. The common sensation is related to the notion of sensory 
circles (Empfindungskreise) which is the root of our sense of location (Ortssinns). This local 
sense consists in the possibility that two sensations, albeit equal, are perceived as different 
simply because they are stimulated in different places of our body. This is possible because 
our skin is divided into areas that Weber called sensory circles which become larger when 
sensibility (Ortsempfindlichkeit) is lower, and smaller when sensibility is higher. If two 
stimuli are addressed to the same sensory circle, we will sense only one on our skin with a 
certain intensity; whereas if stimuli apply to two different sensory circles, separated by one or 
more unstimulated circles, we will have different sensations and we will be even in a position 
to locate them. Examining the problem of the sensations caused by different stimuli, Weber 
discovered the irregular spread of nerve fibers over the surface of the body. For example, 
there are more nerve fibers on the tongue than on the central part of the arm and leg. This 
unequal distribution of nerve fibers led him to determine a “limit (die Schwelle)” of the 
nervous system’s ability to distinguish sensations.  
Through further experiments on muscle sensation, sight and hearing, Weber realized that 
the possibility of distinguishing two sensations does not depend on the absolute size of the 
stimulus, but on the difference of increase between the second and the first stimulus. There is 
a relation of proportionality between two stimuli in succession, so that we can detect the 
minimum perceptible difference of one sensation from the other. Weber’s law stated that, in 
order to produce a different sensation, the minimum level of increase required by the second 
stimulus with respect to the first one can be determined experimentally for each kind of 
stimulus (tactile, visual, acoustic, etc.). In this way we can determine the exact limit that each 
new stimulus must overcome with respect to the previous one. This limit also changes from 




Already in his 1846 essay, Weber listed the fundamental points of human perceptual 
process: 
 
i. the movements in the bodies around us that resonate within our sense organs; 
ii.  the movements of our nerve fibers caused by the movements mentioned above, which 
are nevertheless of a different kind; 
iii. the changes in our consciousness which are stimulated by nerve movements and that 
we call sensations; 
iv.  the representation of sensations through the categories of time, space and number; 
v. the abstract concepts of the mentioned categories as well as of all the other categories, 
and the concepts resulting from their composition.16 
 
According to Weber, our spatial sense (Raumsinn) is a common sensation (Gemeingefühl) 
or general sense (Generalsinn), because our perception of space (Raumvorstellung) is not 
merely based on the nervous activity nor on a specific class of sensations, but is a peculiar 
disposition and order of the optical and tactile nerves. The specific qualities provided by the 
stimulated nerve fibers are not sufficient to constitute the perception of space. Be that as it 
may, Weber considered necessary to assume a psychic activity that, starting from the 
physiological material, makes such a perception (Raumvorstellung) possible. Our idea of 
space as a disposition or order—developed through our mental activity—of the specific 
qualities provided by nerves is not something given (ursprünglich). Space is the product of a 
physiological and psychic mediation. According to Weber, the anatomical modifications of 
 





nerves do not directly cause the perception of space, because there is always a psychic 
element of mediation (psychisches Zwischenglied) that organizes the specific qualities of the 
nerves.17   
Ultimately, it can be said that Weber’s investigations provided a series of methodological 
procedures aimed at investigating physiologically unexplained types of behaviors rather than 
the physiological mechanisms of sensation. Weber considered it possible to understand the 
relations between the mind quantities as a whole, without employing external units of 
measurement or knowing the absolute difference between the different quantities. Moreover, 
Weber’s physiological research is of prominent philosophical importance, because it 
investigates sensation, the perception of space, the concept formation and the conceptual 
outline of the sensory self-consciousness, that is, the common sensation (Gemeingefühl).18  
Weber’s research on the localization of sensory stimuli through specific sensory circles 
was important to the elaboration of Lotze’s theory of local signs. The fundamental idea of his 
research consisted in considering the notion of space not as something innate or given 
(ursprünglich) but as something that is acquired through the relation with the environment. 
This suggests the existence of a causal link between the behavior and the structure of the 
nervous system and perception of space.19 
 
17 For Carl Stumpf’s criticism of the Weberian theory of the Raumvorstellung see C. Stumpf: Über den 
psychologischen Ursprung der Raumvorstellung (Leipzig: Verlag von S. Hirzel, 1873), 84–86. 
18 On the concept of common sensation and its subsequent reception see: Riccardo Martinelli: Misurare l’anima. 
Filosofia e psicofisica da Kant a Carnap (Macerata: Quodlibet, 1999), 35f; Stefano Poggi: I sistemi 
dell’esperienza. Psicologia, logica e teoria della scienza da Kant a Wundt (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1977), 519–29. 





2.3.2. Gustav Theodor Fechner 
Weber’s investigations were of great importance to Gustav Theodor Fechner, who 
developed psychophysics as an autonomous discipline. Fechner, in his turn, greatly 
influenced Lotze’s education. W. Woodward portrayed him as Lotze’s “closest advisor”.20 
Both Lotze and Fechner were part of the ‘Friday circle’, which included another important 
mentor of Lotze, Christian Hermann Weiße. The debates between Lotze and Fechner took 
place mainly in this circle. As if in support of this note, Lotze wrote in a letter: “I have 
recently had a conversation with Fechner which entertained me very much”.21 Lotze attended 
Fechner’s lectures on optics, acoustics and the theory of heat; these lectures taught to Lotze 
to understand 
 
die Bedeutung des quantitativen Experiments, demonstrierte die Notwendigkeit der messenden 
Naturwissenschaft und trainierte die mathematische Verarbeitung ihrer Ergebnisse.22  
 
Of course, there was also theoretical disagreements between them. During the 1850s and 
1860s, they discussed philosophical and psychological questions, such as that of 
measurement in psychology, expressing diverging positions. 
Gustav Theodor Fechner, with a constant attention to Weber’s studies, dealt with the 
problem of the measurement of sensation in two works: Zend-Avesta (1851) and Elements of 
Psychophysics (1860). The central thesis of Fechner’s psychophysics affirmed that it is not 
possible to directly measure sensation in its absolute value, but it is possible to measure it 
 
20 W. Woodward, op. cit., 55. 
21 Ibid., 56. 





indirectly on the basis of the external stimulus by which it is caused.23 Eventually, Fechner 
came to the conclusion that the sensation is proportional to the logarithm of the stimulus. In 
1851, in Zend-Avesta, Fechner explained the principle of his mathematical psychology: the 
intensity of the psychic activity increases logarithmically according to the intensity of the 
physical stimulus, whether it be an optical or an acoustic stimulus. 
In order to grasp the core of Fechner’s psychophysics—i.e. the idea that it is possible to 
indirectly measure the sensation by measuring the stimulus, given that the stimulus has a 
precise logarithmic relation with the sensation to which it gives rise—it is necessary to 
consider the philosophical background of such a formula of measurement (Maßprinzip). To 
this purpose, we have to consider Fechner’s definition of psychophysics: 
 
Unter Psychophysik soll hier eine exakte Lehre von den funktionellen oder Abhängigkeitsbeziehungen 
zwischen Körper und Seele, allgemeiner zwischen körperlicher und geistiger, physischer und psychischer, 
Welt verstanden werden.24 
 
The functional relationship between body and mind reveals that there is no ontological 
difference between them; body and mind are simply two aspects of one and the same thing. 
The theoretical foundation of Fechner’s metaphysics lies in Spinoza’s monism, which 




23 See: G. T. Fechner, Elemente der Psychophysik, 2 vol. (Leipzig: Druck und Verlag von Breitkopf und Hartel, 
1860), 54f., 60f. 
24 Ibid., 8. 




Körper und Geist oder Leib und Seele oder Materielles und Ideelles oder Physisches und Psychisches (diese 
Gegensätze hier im weitesten Sinne als gleichgeltend gebraucht), sind nicht im letzten Grund und Wesen, 
sondern nur nach dem Standpunkt der Auffassung oder Betrachtung verschieden. Was sich selbst auf 
innerem Standpunkt als geistig, psychisch erscheint, vermag einem Gegenüberstehenden vermöge dessen 
dagegen äußern Standpunkt nur in anderer Form, welche eben die des leiblich materiellen Ausdrucks ist, zu 
erscheinen. Die Verschiedenheit der Erscheinung hängt an der Verschiedenheit des Standpunkts der 
Betrachtung und der darauf Stehenden. Insofern hat dasselbe Wesen zwei Seiten, eine geistige, psychische, 
sofern es sich selbst, eine materielle, leibliche, sofern es einem andern als sich selbst in anderer Form zu 
erscheinen vermag, nicht aber haften etwa Körper und Geist oder Leib und Seele als zwei grundwesentlich 
verschiedene Wesen an einander.26 
 
This passage allows us to understand more in depth two central aspects of Fechner’s 
metaphysics: its peculiar perspectivism and the way in which his identity conception is to be 
understood. Fechenr’s perspectivism underlined how the reality that we conceive or interpret 
is always determined by our own point of view or perspective. Mind and body do not differ 
as to their essence: metaphysically speaking, they are the same thing. It is the knowing 
subject’s view that understands them as two different aspects of that same thing. Everything 
is determined by the point of view from which we conceive the problem of mind-body 
relationship. If we adopt an inner point of view, this fundamentally unitary essence manifests 
its mental aspect, whereas, if we assume an external point of view, it will manifests its 
material side. Fechner further wrote: 
 
Die Naturwissenschaft stellt sich consequent auf den äusseren Standpunkt der Betrachtung der Dinge, die 
Wissenschaft vom Geiste auf den inneren; die Ansichten des Lebens fussen auf dem Wechsel der 
 
26 G. T. Fechner, Zend-Avesta oder über die Dinge des Himmels und des Jenseits. Vom Standpunkt der 





Standpunkte, die Naturphilosophie auf der Identität dessen, was doppelt auf doppeltem Standpunkte 
erscheint; eine Lehre von den Beziehungen zwischen Geist und Körper wird die Beziehungen beider 
Erscheinungsweisen des Einen zu verfolgen haben.27 
 
Alongside Spinoza, another important philosopher for Fechner’s thought was Leibniz, whose 
Monadology, proposition 57, seems to have been another inspiring source of Fechner’s 
perspectivism.28 In fact, Fechner’s perspectivism cannot be considered separately from his 
identity conception, since they are two converging conceptual elements that support each 
other. The problem of unity cannot be understood without the support of perspectivism and, 
vice versa, it is not possible to enucleate the question of perspectivism without considering 
the metaphysical unity at which it aims.  
The metaphysical unity of a given object—in this case, of the mind–body relation—cannot 
be known in itself by the subject, without considering the particular perspective of the 
knowing subject with respect to that object. This set of perspectives, which allows the object 
to show one side or another, does not undermine the metaphysical unity of the object. Such a 
unity exists, but, in his constant and irreducible partiality, the subject grasps only a part of it. 
To clearly understand the intimate connection of perspectivism with the identity 
conception, we will mention Fechner’s example of the circle that we find in the introduction 
to his Elemente. Fechner, while proposing some general considerations on the relationship 
(Beziehung) between body and mind, employs the example of the circle, to point out that 
 
27 G. T. Fechner, Elemente der Psychophysik, I, 6; on “Wechsel des Standpunkts” see: M. Heidelberger, Die 
innere Seite der Natur. Gustav Theodor Fechners wissenschaftlich-philosophische Weltauffassung (Frankfurt 
am Main: V. Klostermann, 1993), 130. 
28 See: Leibniz G. W., Principes de la Nature et de la Grace fondés en Raison, Principes de la Philosophie ou 




concave and convex are two perspectives of the same thing and that they are related to the 
subjective point of view on the same reality: the circle. Fechner wrote: 
 
Z. B. wenn Jemand innerhalb eines Kreises steht, so liegt dessen convexe Seite für ihn ganz verborgen unter 
den concaven Decke; wenn er ausserhalb steht, umgekehrt die concave Seite unter der convexen Decke. 
Beide Seiten gehören ebenso untrennbar zusammen, als die geistige und leibliche Seite des Menschen und 
diese lassen sich vergleichsweise auch als innere und äussere Seite fassen; es ist auch ebenso unmöglich, 
von einem Standpunkte in der Ebene des Kreises beide Seiten des Kreises zugleich zu erblicken, als von 
einem Standpunkte im Gebiete der menschlichen Existenz diese beiden Seiten des Menschen. Erst wie wir 
den Standpunkt wechseln, wechselt sich die Seite des Kreises, die wir erblicken, und die sich hinter der 
erblickten versteckt. Aber der Kreis ist nur ein Bild, und es gilt die Frage nach der Sache.29    
 
This aspect of Fechner’s metaphysics recalls Leibniz, whose thought undoubtedly influenced 
Fechner’s concept of pre-established harmony (prästabilirte Harmonie), present both in 
Zend-Avesta and in Elemente.30 According to Leibniz, mind and body are two clocks marking 
the same time, by virtue of the pre-established harmony between them. Fechner pointed out 
that Leibniz had not considered the much simpler possibility that body and mind might be 
synchronous, being one and the same clock, which appears either externally or internally.  
Starting from his unitary understanding of the mind–body problem Fechner further 
embraced a parallelism of the psychical and bodily objects.31 Fechner’s parallelism was 
undoubtedly monistic, exactly as Spinoza would have meant it, and opposed Leibniz’s 
dualistic parallelism, which considered mind and body as two clocks that are synchronous 
 
29 G. T. Fechner, Elemente, 2–3. 
30 See: G. T. Fechner, Zend-Avesta, II, 347f.; Elemente, I, 5.  





thanks to the pre-established harmony. Fechner strongly upheld Spinoza’s thesis, also thanks 
to Schelling’s writings on the philosophy of nature, according to which the mind–body whole 
constitutes one and the same element. Fechner rejects the validity of Leibniz’s thesis.32 
Schelling is an important source for Fechner’s considerations. As highlighted by 
Heidelberger, Fechner and Schelling provided similar answers to the problem of the causal 
relation between mind and body. In his System der gesammten Philosophie und der 
Naturphilosophie insbesondere (1804) Schelling stated: 
 
No causal relation is possible between the real and the ideal, or between being and thinking; thinking can 
never be the cause of a distinction in being, or conversely, being can never be the cause of a distinction in 
thinking. For what is real and what is ideal are only different views of one and the same substance; they can 
effect as little in each other, as a substance can effect something within itself. They do not match, as two 
different things can match, for which the cause of harmony is something outside of themselves, as Leibniz’ 
harmony has been understood and explained using the example of two clocks; but instead, they match 
because they are not two different things, they are only one and the same substance. Just as (to use a 
convenient example) a person who had two names is still one and the same person, and the person named A 
is the same as the person named B, and does the same things, not because they are somehow linked or one of 
them causes the other, but because the person called A and the person called B are, in fact, one and the same 
person.33 
 
32 Du Bois-Reymond warned that Leibniz did not forget but clearly rejected the possibility that the two clocks 
might be the same one. To explore this argument see: Du Bois-Reymond, Über die Grenzen des Naturerkennens 
(Leipzig: Verlag von Veit & Comp, 1872), 20f; M. Heidelberger, op. cit., 138.   
33 F. Schelling (1804), Sämtliche Werke (Stuttgart and Augsburg: Cotta’scher Verlag, 1860), 6th vol., 500–1. 
The English translation is in: M. Heidelberger, Nature from Within. Gustav Theodor Fechner and his 
Psychophysical Worldview, C. Klohr (trans. by) (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004), 114. Both 






In conclusion, we can say that Fechner’s perspectivism, which was in many aspects 
similar to that of Leibniz, ultimately led Fechner to a monistic parallelism that is in clear 
contrast with Leibniz’s dualism. 
It is necessary to note what Fechner meant by his metaphysical position, defined as 
conception of identity. It is obvious that Fechner’s position cannot be identified with our 
contemporary identity theory in philosophy of mind but rather with a two-sided theory of 
mind and body (Zwei-Seiten-Theorie).34 The reference to dualism should not mislead us, 
 
influence on Fechner see: M. Heidelberger, op. cit., 32f. and 153f. It is worth noting that Schelling’s writing 
mentioned above was published for the first time in Nachlass and that, for this reason, Fechner could not have 
read it while writing Zend-Avesta.  
34 Rudolf Carnap, in Der logische Aufbau der Welt (Berlin-Schlachtensee 1928, § 22, 28–29), stated that the 
problem of psychophysics is the central problem of metaphysics, because it raises the question of the connection 
(Verbindung) of the physical process with the psychic one. Carnap posed the psychophysical question within 
metaphysics, because this concerns the essential connection (Wesensbeziehung) between mind and body and not 
the simple coordination (Zuordnung) of the two. Alongside occasionalism and pre-established harmony now 
explored mainly from the historical point of view, the attempts made to solve the question—according to 
Carnap’s argument—are the theory of interaction (Wechselwirkung), of the psycho-physical parallelism, and the 
theory of identity understood as two-sided theory (Zweiseitentheorie). As regards the theory of identity, Carnap 
stated that “the identity theory does not even admit that there are two types of objects, but assumes that the 
psychological and the physical are the two ‘aspects’ (‘the outer’ and ‘the inner’) of the same fundamental 
process.” Carnap’s position in this regard is well known: he thought that questions about the essence (Wesen) 
and the essential foundation (Grund) are posed in the wrong way; according to him, metaphysics tries to answer 
wrong questions. Carnap continued: “Once the constructional forms of the objects and the object types are 
found and their logical locations in the constructional system are known, and if furthermore the correlation 
problem of one of the above relations has been resolved, then we have found everything (rational) science can 





since it is not a metaphysical dualism, as we have already said, but a dualism depending on 
the perspectivism of the subject’s observation and thus emerging at the level of the 
appearance (Erscheinung). The identity of the mind–body remains actually unchanged. As 
Fechner wrote: 
 
Sie (die Identitätansicht) ist von einer Seite ganz materialistisch, denn das Geistige muß sich danach überall 
ändern, nach Maßgabe als sich das Körperliche ändert, worin es sich ausdrückt, erscheint in sofern ganz als 
abhängig davon, als Function desselben, ja läßt sich ganz in solches übersetzen; aber sie ist von der andern 
Seite ganz spiritualistisch und idealistisch; denn für sich existiert gar nichts Materielles, es hat als solches 
eine Existenz blos für den Geist gegenüber, als Ausdruck von etwas sich geistig selbst Erscheinenden für 
andern Geist; ist in sofern ganz Function des Geistigen und Verhältnisses von Geist zu Geist.35  
 
What we have seen clearly suggests that the accusation of reductionist positivism directed 
at Fechner is unfounded, because, if we adopt its metaphysical construction, it is not possible 
to reduce the mind to the physical aspect, since they share the same ontological root, so that 
what we call ‘physical’ and ‘mental’ are nothing more than mere phenomenal appearances of 
that metaphysical unity. 
It is now clear why Fechner claimed to be able to measure the psychic aspect only 
indirectly through the physical stimulus (Reiz); between the physical stimulus and the psychic 
‘response’, understood as perception (Empfindung), there is not a relation of cause and effect, 
or in other words, there is not a physical element ontologically different from the psychic, 
 
cannot even be formulated in scientific terms.” (English translation: The Logical Structure of the World and 
Pseudoproblems in Philosophy, Rolf A. George (transl. by) (California: University of California Press, 1967). 
See also: M. Heidelberger, op. cit., 142f. 




which corresponds to the effect; there is only a functional relation and not a constitutive 
dependence of the psychic on the physical aspect. Functional relation clearly means here that 
what is phenomenally (in Erscheinung) different—because of the point of view—is 
metaphysically one thing, and therefore the scientist is free to choose the part most suitable 
for measurement. Fechner said: 
 
Insoweit ein functionelles Verhältniss zwischen Körper und Seele besteht, würde an sich nichts hindern, 
dasselbe eben so in der einen als in der anderen Richtung ins Auge zu fassen und zu verfolgen, was man sich 
passend durch das mathematische Functionsverhältniss erläutern kann, das zwischen den Veränderlichen x 
und y einer Gleichung besteht, wo jede Veränderliche beliebig als Function der anderen angesehen werden 
kann, und dieselbe in ihren Veränderungen von sich abhängig hat. Ein Grund aber für die Psychophysik, den 
Verfolg der Seite der Abhängigkeit der Seele vom Körper vor der gegentheiligen zu bevorzugen, liegt darin, 
dass nur das Physische dem Masse unmittelbar zugänglich ist, indess das Mass des Psychischen erst in 
Abhängigkeit davon gewonnen werden kann, wie später gezeigt wird.36 
 
We have to underline that there are two types of psychophysics, one external and one 
internal: the external deals with the relationship between stimulus and nerve activity, the 
internal with the relationship between nerve movement and the production of sensations.37 
Fechner explained that his law deals mainly with internal psychophysics. Basically, he 
considered the changes and movements of the sensory organs as proportional to the intensive 
changes of psychic activity; this is what gives rise to the logarithmic relationship between 
mental and physical activity.38 
 
36 G. T. Fechner, Elemente, I, 9.  
37 See: ibid., 10f.  






2.3.3. Alfred Wilhelm Volkmann 
Alfred Wilhelm Volkmann’s studies of optical physiology39 greatly influenced the 
analysis of the visual localization on which Lotze founded his psychological notion of local 
signs. All these studies—including also Treviranus’ and Weber’s considerations on the 
constitution of the retina—were based on the idea that the nerve endings located in the retina, 
along with their specific qualities, are able to sense their exact position within the retina.40  
Lotze was very interested in the studies of optical physiology, as suggested by a letter that 
he wrote to his friend Apelt which reviews the debate between Treviranus, Weber and 







39 See: A. W. Volkmann, Neue Beiträge zur Physiologie des Gesichtssinnes (Leipzig: Breitkopf und Härtel, 
1836), 24–34.  
40 The results of Treviranus’ research were of fundamental importance to Müller’s theory of the acquisition of 
the perception of spatiality through nerve activity; see J. P. Müller, Handbuch, II, 262, 263, 271. 





3. The reductionist approach to the mind–body problem and its critics  
 On the basis of these scientific results, in Germany around the middle of the 19th century 
new openly reductionist materialist positions were presented by Friedrich Karl Christian 
Ludwig Büchner, Jakob Moleschott and August Christoph Carl Vogt. They tried to reduce 
the whole human sphere to mere physiological characteristics and, as an implication, to study 
human mind through the methodology of quantitative sciences. In order to understand more 
clearly the adverse context in which Lotze wrote Medicinische Psychologie, as well as the 
problems at stake in the transformation of psychology into a science, we should first focus on 
what happened in this realm in France in the early 19th century.  
This is the context in which P. J. G. Cabanis, in dealing with the Cartesian problem of res 
cogitans and res extensa, attempted to overcome such dualistic conception and to advance a 
physical monism instead, by reducing all manifestations of res cogitans to physical events.1 
Cabanis’ main idea consisted in asserting the unity of matter and mind, both understood in a 
physical way. In this respect, physiology presented itself as the branch of science capable of 




1 This conception is related to those of Julien Offray de La Mettrie, Étienne Bonnot de Condillac and John 





Since Cabanis, therefore, the resolution of mental functions into the activity of the nervous system has kept 
its ground in physiology, whatever individual physiologists may have thought as to the ultimate grounds of 
all things.2 
 
The same idea of the unity of mind and matter was adopted by the German Materialists 
Ludwig Büchner, Jacob Moleschott and Karl Vogt between the 1830s and 1850s. These 
thinkers had adopted from German Idealism, then in its decline, the demand for a single, 
systematically formulated guiding principle capable of explaining nature in its totality. 
However, they no longer meant the ‘totality’ as related to mind, but rather to the physical-
physiological organization of bodies. In this way the German Idealism was inverted, although 
its intrinsically monistic approach remained unchanged. In fact, the radical German 
materialists, availing themselves of the rich physiological research of that time, tried to 
reduce all the sensory, volitional and cognitive processes to a physiological process.  
It is worth pointing out here that, in those years, Germany was at the forefront of scientific 
research. It is sufficient to consider the chemical research carried out by Justus von Liebig: 
the chemical laboratory he directed at Giessen is the first case of modern teamwork research 
unit. We should also mention other contributions to science such as Alexander von Humboldt 
and Christian Gottfried Ehrenberg’s naturalistic research in geography, botany and zoology, 
Heinrich and Gustav Rose’s explorations in chemistry and mineralogy. Johannes Müller’s 
Handbuch der Physiologie (1833) and Ernst Heinrich Weber provided a strong scientific and 
mathematical component to the physiological research, which until then had been decisively 
affected by idealistic Naturphilosophie. The influence of the French researchers, Jean Pierre 
 
2 F. A. Lange, Geschichte des Materialismus und Kritik seiner Bedeutung in der Gegenwart (Iserlohn: Verlag 
von J. Baedeker, 1875), 70; english trans., The History of Materialism and Criticism of Its Importance, Ernest 




Marie Flourens, François Magendie, François Leuret, François Achille Longet, Paul Broca, 
had also played an important role in the development of the physiology of cerebral and 
nervous system. The great amount of experimental data collected by these authors had a 
foundational role with respect to the new radical Materialism. Whereas it is true that the 
physiological research can provide important contributions to understand cognitive processes, 
the real aim of the new Materialists was to bring human mental life back to its physiological 
roots. According to the Materialists, the rise of new fields of scientific analysis and 
physiological research, along with the outcomes of physics and chemistry, provided the 
theoretical conditions for the reduction of every psychic manifestation to physical events, in 
the way that it could be explored on the basis of experimental data. 
In his most important work Kraft und Stoff (1855), Ludwig Büchner stated that all brain 
processes—which are subject to the principle of conservation of energy (Erhaltung der 
Kraft), a cornerstone of his materialism—can be explained in terms of mechanical laws. 
Büchner aimed at providing a comprehensive mechanical explanation of human being which 
could account for all his mental activities, including the so-called higher mental functions. It 
is precisely in this work that Büchner took his radically materialistic and reductionist turn, 
claiming that all brain activities, in addition to obeying mechanical laws, also produce mind 
(Geist) as their proper effect. This point of view reduces the mind, understood in the sense of 
psychic activity, entirely to the mechanical activity of the brain. 
 
3.1. Hermann von Helmholtz 
It is interesting to highlight the fact that, in 1847, a few years before the publication of 




theory of perpetual motion, had already published two papers on the conservation of energy.3 
Helmholtz developed his interest in this subject in the expressly physiological context of 
animal heat, as attested by his paper “Über die Wärmeentwicklung bei der Muskelaction”, 
also published in 1847, wherein he related animal heat to the mechanical force of kinetic 
energy which derives from the movements of the muscles. In this connection, Helmholtz 
argued for the principle of the impossibility of perpetual motion and thus rejected the 
idealistic and romantic concept of a vital force—a force that supposedly defied the laws of 
thermodynamics and could generate and regenerate indefinitely—which is secured by a 
possible perpetual motion. The central problem of physiology in Germany in the mid-19th 
century was whether or not the origin of animal heat could be explained in terms of a vital 
force, that is, whether or not it had a vital force as its underlying cause.4 Here, Helmholtz 
clearly followed Justus von Liebig who argued for the principle of the correlation of forces, 
stating in 1841 that “no force can originate from nothing” (“aus Nichts kann keine Kraft 
entstehen”), thus rejecting the idea of a vital force as the cause of animal heat.5 Both Liebig 
 
3 H. von Helmholtz, “Bericht über ‘die Theorie der physiologischen Wärmeerscheinungen’ betreffende Arbeiten 
aus dem Jahre 1845”, Fortschritte der Physik im Jahre 1845 1 (1847): 346–55; reprinted in: Wissenschaftliche 
Abhandlungen von Hermann von Helmholtz, 3 vols., Braunschweig: Friedrich Vieweg und Sohn, 1903, vol. 
1:3–11; and: Über die Erhaltung der Kraft. Eine physikalische Abhandlung (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1847); reprinted 
in: Wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen von Hermann von Helmholtz, 3 vols., vol. 1:12–75 (including an appendix 
[68–75] from 1881). 
4 See: Timothy Lenoir, The Strategy of Life: Teleology and Mechanics in Nineteenth-Century German Biology 
(Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel, 1982), 195–96, 215–17, 230.   
5 Justus Liebig, Chemische Briefe, 3rd ed. (Heidelberg: C. F. Winter, 1851), twelfth letter, pp. 116–18, quoted in 
G. Helm, Die Energetik in Ihrer Geschichtlichen Entwicklung (Leipzig: Verlag von Veit & Comp., 1898), 10; 





and von Helmholtz conceived mechanical forces and the heat produced by an organism as 
rooted in a common source. The principle of the correlation of forces (mechanical forces and 
animal heat) lent a more sophisticated expression to the principle of the impossibility of 
perpetual motion, allowing Helmholtz to demonstrate that mechanical, electrical and 
chemical forces in effect create a certain specific equivalent of heat. 
 The physiological research of Liebig and, to an even greater extent, that of Helmholtz, are 
difficult to reconcile with the reductionist position taken by Büchner. While it is true that for 
Helmholtz, mechanical forces generate animal heat, in his view, these forces alone do not 
suffice to explain the constitution of the human brain, and even less so the higher mental 
functions. Helmholtz’s physiological research taken as a whole—that is, with the added 
consideration of his experimental investigations of the sense organs—stressed the fact that 
the activity of the mind is a fundamental and irreducible element of perception. In his 
Populäre wissenschaftliche Vorträge (1871–1876), Helmholtz stated that every sense 
perception is accompanied by a psychic activity which he called “unconscious inference”.6 
 
1909), 57; and Thomas Kuhn, “Energy Conservation as an Example of Simultaneous Discovery”, in Critical 
Problems in the History of Science, Marshall Clagett (ed.), (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1959), 321–56, reprinted in Kuhn’s The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change 
(Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 66–104, 95. 
6 The leading opponent of Helmholtz’s position was Karl Ewald Konstantin Hering (1834–1918). In the 
Beiträge zur Physiologie (1861–64), he argued that spatial perception had its own innate structural order and 
therefore rejected any role of psychology in the formation of perception proper. In Zur Lehre vom Lichtsinne. 
Sechs Mittheilungen an die Kaiserl. Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien. Zweiter, unveränderter Abdruck 
(Wien: C. Gerold, 1878),) Hering directly criticized Helmholtz’s notion of unconscious inference (unbewusster 
Schluss), stating that the idea that the same stimulus (Reiz) gives rise to completely different perceptions 





While Helmholtz recognized the existence of mental activities that, based on the 
experimental data available at the time, were not entirely reducible to physiological events, 
 
different ways or that the given sensory material (das gegebene Empfindungsmaterial) is re-elaborated through 
unconscious inferences, giving rise to different representations. As Hering continued, we hypothesize here that 
sensations are something more corporeal (mehr Körperliches), whereas the interpretation of sensation or its 
elaboration as representation is a purely mental activity (mehr Geistiges) based on an activity of the mind that 
guides it. According to Hering, this way of approaching the problem leads to divide our psychic process into 
two main classes: sensations, which are more bodily and, consequently, directly and immediately dependent on 
the states of the nervous system, and representations, which are rather mental phenomena and, consequently, 
dependent only indirectly on the states of the nervous system, so that they are considered as products of a free 
psychical activity. According to Hering, the division in two groups of our psychical activity reflects the old 
distinction between body and mind and is the result of a mentalism (see on this concept 94n) that tries to deal 
with physiology, by offering it “pure sensations” as sacrifice, although it considers “representations” as 
completely specific of the mind. In his conception, the same stimulus does not produce the same sensation, 
which is then interpreted in different ways, but the same stimulus immediately gives rise to two different 
sensations. The reason of that is related to the fact that sensation—in this case luminous sensation—is not a 
simple function of the stimulus, nor the condition of the part of the nervous system activated by the stimulus. It 
depends on the relative conditions of that part of the brain related to the visual act which contains and organizes 
the optical experiences of our whole life. Exactly as the sound produced by the key of a piano does not depend 
only on the vibrations of the strings, but also on the resonance of the whole instrument, in the same way the 
sensation produced by an external stimulus within us does not depend only on the nerve fiber affected by the 
stimulus, but also on the result of the resonance of our entire sensory system (Sensorium). In this sense, 
Hering’s position can be defined as ‘nativistic’, because the structural order of our perceptions is already 
contained in the cerebral organization and also because, against Helmholtz, he rejected any psychological 
explanation of perceptual processes that refers to the activity of the mind. Our sensations and perceptions 
depend on our cerebral constitution and only a physiological study can explain them. (See: E. Hering, Zur Lehre 





this does not mean that he renounced the idea that such a reduction was possible in principle. 
Rather, his recognition may be read as a cautioning that the radically reductionist position 
was not scientifically sustainable. 
 
3.2. The dispute between Büchner and Lotze 
The basic tenet of Materialism is that everything—both the macrocosm and the 
microcosm—is subject to mechanical laws. Force and matter thus cannot belong to two 
separate domains of reality and must instead be bound up in an intimate relation, where force 
is conceived of as a property of matter. In fact, Büchner believed that such a separation 
would allow for a reintroduction of the concept of vital force, as derived from the 
Naturphilosophie of the German idealists, which he dismissed as mere “figures of speech”  
(Redensarten) and “philosophical charlatanry”.7 As he puts it, “matter is the vehicle of all 
mental power, of all human and earthly greatness”.8 With regards to materialism, he states: 
 
We frequently hear those persons contemptuously called Materialists, who do not share the fashionable 
contempt for matter, but endeavour to fathom by its means the powers and laws of existence; who have 
 
7 When we speak of Naturphilosophie, we refer here to Schelling’s philosophy of nature. We should notice, 
however, that in the Berliner Gruppe of Hans Reichenbach and Walter Dubislav (1926–1933), this term was 
also used to mean a systematic representation of nature with the help of logical-mathematical methodology; see: 
W. Dubislav, Naturphilosophie, (Philosophische Grundrisse Heft 2) (Berlin: Junker & Dünnhaupt, 1933); H. 
Reichenbach, Ziele und Wege der heutigen Naturphilosophie (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1931); new edition: Ziele 
und Wege der heutigen Naturphilosophie, N. Milkov (ed.), (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2011).  
8 L. Büchner, Kraft und Stoff. Empirisch-naturphilosophische Studien. In allgemein-verständlicher Darstellung 
(Frankfurt a. M.: Meidinger, 1855), 23; english transl., Force and Matter: Empirico-Philosophical Studies, In-





discerned that spirit could not have built the world out of itself, and that it is impossible to arrive at a just 
conception of the world without an exact knowledge of matter and its laws.9  
 
For Büchner, the natural laws governing the movement of matter are eternal and immutable. 
Everything can be explained as an expression of this unconditional necessity; in a cosmos 
ruled by mechanistic determinism, there is no place for the concept of the purposiveness 
(Zweckmäßigkeit) of nature which is instead conceived by him as a non-operative product of 
our reflection (reflektierender Verstand). 
 Against the materialists in philosophy of mind, in his Allgemeine Physiologie des 
körperlichen Lebens (1851), Rudolph Hermann Lotze introduced the concept of teleo-
mechanism. He explained it in the following way: 
 
If the foetus is without a brain, it would be but judicious, in a force having a free choice, to suspend its 
action, as this deficiency cannot be compensated. But, inasmuch as the formative forces continue their 
action, that such a miserable and purposeless creature may exist for a time, appears to us strikingly to prove, 
that the final result always depends upon the disposition of purely mechanical definite forces, which, once 
set in motion, proceed straight on, according to the law of inertia, until they meet with an obstruction.10 
 
A year later Lotze wrote: “nature, having no confidence (misstrauen) in the inventive power 
of the mind (Erfindungsgeist der Seele), has endowed the body with certain mechanical 
contrivances.”11  
 
9 Ibid., 23–24; e. t., 29. 
10 R. H. Lotze, Allgemeine Physiologie des körperlichen Lebens (Leipzig: Weidmann’sche Buchhandlung, 
1851), 114. The English translation of this quotation is in L. Büchner, Force and Matter (p. 99).  
11 R. H. Lotze, Medicinische Psychologie oder Physiologie der Seele (Leipzig: Weidmann’sche Buchhandlung, 




Lotze’s double philosophical register—he attributed to nature both a mechanical and a 
teleological character—was sharply criticized by Ludwig Büchner in Kraft und Stoff.  
Büchner maintained that Lotze’s philosophy was contradictory. On the one hand, he asserted 
that nature proceeds according to the law of inertia, with no finality nor purposiveness, 
mentioning the example of the headless foetus; on the other hand, he stated that there is a 
reason (Grund) for nature’s mistrust (misstrauen) towards the inventiveness of the mind 
(Erfindungsgeist der Seele). In this way he clearly recognized that biological nature is able to 
self-orient itself towards a certain finality and purposiveness. Büchner decisively rejected this 
teleological capacity of nature. According to him, every daily medical observation shows us 
that nature proceeds simply on the basis of a blind mechanical necessity; these observations 
show us nature’s helplessness (Hilflosigkeit) to escape from the universality of the 
mechanism and the deterministic system, its quite aimless (unzweckmäßig) direction, wrong 
or unsuccessful despite its healing efforts.12 Karl Vogt agreed with Büchner and in his 
Köhlerglaube und Wissenschaft. Eine Streitschrift gegen den Hofrat Rudolph Wagner in 
Göttingen (Gießen: Ricker’sche Buchhandlung, 1855) discarded with no hesitation Lotze’s 
teleo-mechanism as “wild speculation [spekulierenden Struwelpeter]”.  
Based to the principle of teleo-mechanism—on which we will focus later—Lotze 
maintained that all the processes that take place in the cosmos, either biological or cultural, 
are mechanical processes. In arguing so, Lotze rejected what the philosophy of biology 
considered as the validity of the metaphysical principle of vitalism, since it is of no use in 
that field.  
According to Lotze, the principle of mechanism is universally valid because of its 
extension. However, Lotze also held that, as for its own meaning (Bedeutung), it is subsumed 
 




under the fundamental teleological structure of the real. The idea that the mechanism 
activates in all processes and that these latter constitute only a superficial structure, under 
which there is a more foundational teleological structure—which in biological writings is 
called ‘dynamis’ and orients the development of the whole living world—is a constant of 
Lotze’s philosophical reflection. As Nikolay Milkov pointed out: 
 
In Lotze’s hands, the “Principle of Teleomechanism” (i.e., that ultimate explanations should have the hybrid 
form described above) shapes logic, metaphysics and science through what he calls idealities (Orth 1986, p. 
45)—the fundamental orienting concepts of these fields. Among the idealities are ethical values, logical 
validities and aesthetic worth. In science and Metaphysics, the idealities of spatial and temporal order, the 
principle of atomicity and the aforementioned relationism, play a central role.13  
 
This passage suggests that Lotze’s philosophy was not thus contradictory, as stated by 
Büchner. Lotze’s philosophy conceived a bi-dimensional reality in which the foundation, 
understood as fundamental reality, is the value that provides phenomenal reality with an end. 
Once the phenomenon becomes real and begins its course, it proceeds according to the 
mechanical law of inertia. For this reason, Lotze posed the problem of the beginning. And 
this leads us to the fundamental question of why reality is so and not otherwise.  
The fundamental structure of being is teleological; reality, before becoming a 
phenomenon, is already self-oriented according to a precise direction and not another. In 
Allgemeine Physiologie des körperlichen Lebens (1851), reported then by Büchner in Kraft 
und Stoff, Lotze stated that, once put in action (wenn er einmal eingeleitet ist), the course of 
reality proceeds regardless of the purpose, guided only by the mechanical law of inertia 
 





(Gesetze der Trägheit). In fact, the verb put in action (“einleiten”) is at the core of Lotze’s 
argument, because, once the phenomenal course has come to being, it is unavoidably subject 
to the universality of the mechanism. However, mechanism itself is not able to direct reality 
towards a specific conformation rather than another, since, according to the mechanical laws, 
there are many possible courses of nature and it is the above-mentioned value—being 
fundamental and prior to the beginning of the phenomenal course of nature—that privileges 
one of them. Precisely for this reason, in Lotze’s philosophy teleology and mechanism can 
coexist without contradictions. 
 
3.3. Two further scholars 
3.3.1. J. F. Herbart  
 
The need for a specific psychological analysis and the opposition to the reductionist approach 
were an active and central aspects of a part of the German debate at that time. According to 
Johann Friedrich Herbart it was not possible to consider psychology as an empirical science, 
because usually empirical sciences reach their conclusions, i.e. their general concepts, by pro-
ducing abstractions based on the observational material. In contrast, in Herbart’s opinion, 
psychology cannot be provided with such a clearly observable material, for example, by self-
observation (introspection). As a result, Herbart questioned the validity of the traditional the-
ory of the general faculties of human mind. He explained that, these general faculties (con-
cepts), e.g. representation, feeling, desire, are generated through abstractions based on mere 
self-observation which cannot provide clear empirical material ex definitio. Furthermore, ac-
cording to Herbart, neither empirical nor experimental knowledge can supply a solid basis for 
psychology. Psychological investigations can rather be substantiated only through metaphysi-




on the frontier between them—the problems of time, change, the one-many relation as well 
as the relation between the ego (Ich/Ichheit) and its representations. At the same time, in ex-
ploring the foundations of psychology, metaphysics is supported by mathematics, since, as 
long as mental representations are characterized by different degrees, they can be mathemati-
cally quantified.  
Herbart further held that representations differ according to the variability of their 
alertness (Regsamkeit) as well as to their mutual inhibition (Hemmung). Herbart also meant 
that: 
 
Jetzt ist uns gestattet, dieses, was aus der Zusammenfassung in Ein Vorstellen entspringt, näher anzugeben, 
nämlich in so fern es die Grundlage der Ichheit bildet. Die Objecte der Vorstellungen sind es nicht, wohl 
aber die Regsamkeit des Vorstellens selbst in seiner Hemmung, wovon sich einsehn lässt, dass es dasjenige 
ausmachen werde, worin wir Uns Selbst erkennen. Eben das, was zum Gedächtnis und zum Willen 
gerechnet werden kann, dieses mag auch uns bezeichnen; es mag helfen, jenes bisher vergeblich gesuchte 
Object im Begriff des Ich allmählig aufzufinden.14  
 
Precisely on the basis of this mutual variation and inhibition in representations we form our 
concept of Ego (Ich/Ichheit).15 In his mathematical psychology, Herbart highlighted that if on 
the one hand representations vary according to its vivacity (Regsamkeit, Stärke) and 
inhibition (Hemmung), on the other there is a variable intensive magnitude which, in 
principle, can be calculated. According to him, it is not true that we can calculate only what 
 
14 J. F. Herbart, Psychologie als Wissenschaft neu gegründet auf Erfahrung, Metaphysik und Mathematik. Erster 
synthetischer Theil, in Sämtliche Werke, 19 vols. (Darmstadt-Eberstadt: Scientia Verlag Aalen, 1964), 5th vol., 
276–77. 
15 On the formation of the concept of “I” and on the problematic nature of Fichte’s philosophy, as expressed by 




has been already measured. In Über die Möglichkeit und Nothwendigkeit, Mathematik auf 
Psychologie anzuwenden (1822) Herbart clearly stated that it is possible to calculate without 
measuring—the examples of Kepler and Newton had been of great importance here,—
emphasizing the possibility of adopting a hypothetical use of mathematical calculation in 
psychology. As Herbart pointed out: 
 
Wo man nun aber nicht messen kann, da kann man auch nicht rechnen; folglich ist es nicht möglich, in 
psychologischen Untersuchungen, sich der Mathematik zu bedienen.—So lautet der Syllogismus, welcher 
sich aus dem Kleben an dem Gewohnten und aus einer augenscheinlichen Unwahrheit zusammensetzt. Es ist 
nämlich, um beim letzten anzufangen, ganz falsch, dass man nur da rechnen könne, wo man zuvor gemessen 
hat. Gerade im Gegentheil! Jedes hypothetisch angenommene, ja selbst jedes anerkannt unrichtige Gesetz 
einer Größenverbindung lässt sich berechnen; und man muss bei tief verborgenen, aber wichtigen 
Gegenständen sich so lange in Hypothesen versuchen, und die Folgen, welche aus denselben fließen würden, 
so genau durch Rechnung untersuchen, bis man findet, welche von den verschiedenen Hypothesen mit der 
Erfahrung zusammentrifft.16 
 
According to Herbart, it is possible to calculate representations, understood as variable 
intensive magnitudes, on the basis of their energy, force (Stärke) and inhibition.17 In fact, 
Herbart considered mental life as a mechanics of representations that can be calculated 
mathematically through the higher analysis of differential and integral calculus which is 
fairly appropriate for the fluidity of the psychic process. To be more explicit, the elements of 
the series of mental representations that can be measured mathematically are: the force of 
each single representation, the degree of inhibition between two representations, the degree 
 
16 J. F. Herbart, Über die Möglichkeit und Nothwendigkeit, Mathematik auf Psychologie anzuwenden, in 
Sämtliche Werke, 19 vols., 5th vol., 96–97.  




of connection between representations, the set of the interconnected representations and the 
length of the series of representations. The statics and the mechanics of the mind (Statik und 
Mechanik des Geistes) carry out the calculation of representations’ balance and dynamic. 
According to Herbart, the human mind is a simple essence (einfaches Wesen oder Reales) 
which comes into conflict with other simple essences; in this conflict for self-preservation 
(Selbsterhaltung) the mind produces representations. In this sense, according to Herbart, the 
essence of mind expresses itself in external actions (äussere Einwirkung) and reactions 
(Rückwirkung). It is, therefore, within this process of interaction between particular essences 
that the formation of representation takes place. 
Dealing with the mechanics of mind which, as mentioned above, focuses on the movement 
of representations, Herbart tackled the problem of the formation of those series of 
representations that he called “Complexionen”. These latter emerge either from a fusion 
(Verschmelzung) or from a complication (Complication), depending on whether it is formed 
by homogeneous or heterogeneous representations.  
The product of these series of representations has a spatial character or, as Herbart said, 
can be something spatial (ein Räumliches). However, this ‘spatial’ feature of representations 
does not necessarily belong to the “sinnlicher Weltraum”.18 Herbart’s main idea here was that 
space is a mental construction; the intelligible space of metaphysics is a constructed space. 
He further stated that objects of pure geometry are not placed in the space of the sensitive 
world, which is rather occupied by bodies, by the emptiness between bodies. The figures of 
pure geometry have no place in it and do not even emerge, nor do they stand out against the 
sensible space by limitation. Rather, their formation is completely different and takes place in 
 
18 J. F. Herbart, ibid., 415. To be more explicit, Herbart stated that: “Das Product solcher, sich gegenseitig 




a complete and defined space (vollständiger Raum) which is certainly not the space of the 
sensible world. Between the sensible space and the intelligible space of metaphysics there is 
the same relation as between the Platonic idea and its imitations. This idea has no place in the 
sensible world. 
In brief, in its metaphysical value, space is an ideality, a mental construction separated 
from the sensible world. However even the space of the sensible world is not something 
given (ursprünglich)—or innate, as Kant would have said—but rather a construction that man 
elaborates basing on the visual, emotional, tactile sensation, which, independently of each 
other, allow for the construction of space. Only after the action of our productive activity, 
space becomes a unity, that is, “one” sensible space. 
Herbart criticized the assumption according to which there is only one space: that of the 
sensible world. Strictly speaking, there is no space independent of the productive or 
constructive activity of the mind. There are only occasions (Veranlassungen) in which, 
through their fusion, the series of representations produce (erzeugen) a network of 
reproductive laws (Reproductions-Gesetzen), in which what is “represented (Vorgestellt)” is 
necessarily something spatial.19 
Here Herbart clearly criticized Kant’s transcendental aesthetics. Whereas Kantian space 
was a pure a priori and innate form of our cognitive structure, Herbart’s conception is 
completely different: the intelligible and abstract space is not an innate form of our 
knowledge but a construction or a product of our mental activity. The representations of 
geometry (circle, square, polygons) assume, in the various series of mind representations, a 
spatial disposition prior to the abstract and intelligible space and, after that, our mental 
 




activity produces the “complete space” (vollständiger Raum) as the background (Umgebung) 
suitable for these ideas of geometry.  
In brief, whereas Kant considered the infinite extension of abstract and intelligible space 
as a necessary condition for the knowledge of the things of experience, for Herbart this 
condition is the simple movement and balance of representations in our “inner theatre” that 
only as a construction gives rise to our representation of abstract space. Despite their specific 
differences, Kant and Herbart shared the idea that space has no ontological value. It is—in an 
innate way for Kant and in a constructed, produced and secondary way for Herbart—part of 
the human epistemological structure.  
3.3.2. J. F. Fries 
 
Jakob Friedrich Fries, another philosopher who dealt with the problem of human mind, 
was also important for the development of Rudolph Hermann Lotze’s thought, especially 
with regard to his theoretical explorations of science. Although Lotze never directly referred 
to Fries in his works, we know from Lotze’s correspondence (spanning in the period from 
1835 to 1840) with Fries’s student, Ernst Friedrich Apelt, that the two thinkers knew each 
other in person, and that Lotze was interested in Fries’s work.20 Apelt and Lotze, who was 
five years younger, originally met in the high school of Zittau; after completing high school, 
Apelt went to the University of Jena to study with Fries, where he continued his 
 
20 The reason why Lotze did not directly mention Fries are political and related to the Carlsbad Decrees 
(Karlsbader Beschlüsse), ministerial conferences held from August 6–31, 1819, which imposed measures aimed 
at monitoring and suppressing liberal and nationalistic tendencies in post-Napoleonic Germany. Fries was an 
open liberal, as well as a nationalist and a unionist. As a result of these ministerial decrees, in 1819 Fries was 
suspended from teaching; he was allowed to give mathematics and physics lessons again first in 1824, but was 




philosophical and mathematical studies, and then to the University of Leipzig, where he 
studied mathematics and science. It was in Leipzig that Apelt and Lotze became close 
friends. Their correspondence offers first-hand knowledge of their philosophical interests. In 
particular, Lotze mentioned Ernst Heinrich Weber’s lectures on the physiology of sense 
perception. He also discussed with Apelt Fries’s philosophy of mechanism, which became 
later the basis for Apelt’s theory of rational induction. 
The most important of Fries’s works for Lotze’s scientific development was Die 
mathematische Naturphilosophie nach philosophischer Methode bearbeitet (1822). This 
work introduced the idea of a hypothetical-deductive scientific method, which has been 
central in the thought of the neo-Friesian Leonard Nelson at the beginning of the 20th century, 
and was also been recalled, after further debate, by Karl Popper’s fallibilist theory of 
knowledge.21 According to Lotze, a scientific law is hypothetical insofar as it consists in a 
logically hypothetical judgment stating what will happen in the future, if certain conditions 
are granted. The scientific approach of Lotze’s philosophy was derived from Weber, Fechner, 
and Herbart as well as from Fries, although Lotze criticized the excessive formalism and 
mechanism of Fries’s philosophy of nature, which, in his view, did not account for nor 
responded to the deeper problems of philosophy. 
Lotze also criticized Fries’s (and Kant’s) conception of matter as a dynamic balance of 
forces. In this view, the mass of a material substance determines its dynamic movement when 
it is subject to the influence of external forces. According to Lotze, this understanding of 
 
21 On this subject see: N. Milkov, “Karl Popper’s Debt to Leonard Nelson”, in Grazer Philosophische Studien 
86 (2012), 137–56. He argued that Popper had not elaborated his scientific thought alone and in complete oppo-
sition to the Vienna Circle. Neo-Kantian and Neo-Friesian Leonard Nelson had deeply influenced Popper’s 




matter is fallacious because it disregards matters empirical properties such as extension and 
solidity. Opposing this view, Lotze proposed his concept of atomism, which supported the 
empirical dimensions of matter and took the individuation of material objects as central. In 
his 1822 work, Fries criticized what he considered to be Schelling’s error: replacing the 
concept of material substance understood as mass with that of material substance considered 
as a set of forces (Kräfte), so as to deny the role of mechanism and to reach a dynamic theory 
of substance. Fries stated that: 
 
Das Schelling’sche Philosophem ist nämlich, wenn ich nicht irre, durch seinen Grundfehler von der 
Anwendung der wahrhaft mathematischen Methoden entfernt worden und konnte sich deswegen in der 
Anwendung auf äußere Naturlehre nur bei dem Gebrauch sehr unbestimmter allgemeiner Begriffe, (die 
meistenteils sogar nur von logischem und nicht von metaphysischem Ursprung sind,) gefallen.22 
 
And he continued: 
 
das hat sich denn auch in der Ausbildung unsrer dynamischen Naturphilosophie häufig gezeigt. Schelling 
beging den Fehler, aus der kantischen Construction die materielle Substanz, die Masse als Grundbegriff 
wegzulassen und nur durch entgegengesetzte Kräfte die Construction vollenden zu wollen. Dieses Anziehen 
und Abstoßen ohne etwas, das angezogen und abgestoßen wird, gibt aber keinen bestimmten Begriff und ist 
ein mathematisch unbrauchbarer Gedanke. Daher wurden ihm und seiner Schule einige mathematische 
Zeichen und einige mathematische Kunstausdrücke ein Spielzeug, welches sie der Mathematik ganz 
widerstreitend gebrauchten. Und daraus bildete sich nachher der Hass dieser Naturphilosophie gegen die 
Genauigkeit der Mathematik und besonders gegen die Newton’sche Schule. Auf diese Weise mussten der 
Schelling’schen Naturphilosophie alle mathematischen Prinzipien verlorengehen und anstatt dessen nur leere 
 
22 J. F. Fries, Die mathematische Naturphilosophie nach philosophischer Methode bearbeitet. Ein Versuch 





logische Formeln wie z. B. der Gegensatz des Idealen und Realen, die Indifferenz entgegengesetzten 
Faktoren und ähnliche, übrigbleiben.23  
 
Fries wanted to overcome the disadvantages of Schelling’s Naturphilosophie, in order to 
achieve a science of living beings that would combine the empirical mathematical approach 
with an experimental one; in this way, not only psychology, but also biology would become a 
mathematical science. Adopting the theory of matter as mass, Fries directly opposed 
Schelling’s conception of freedom, which was clearly incompatible with the categories of a 
deterministic physics. 
Fries instead subscribed to the position argued for by Kant in Metaphysische 
Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft, where this latter took the problem of matter as the 
proper subject of the physical sciences and stressed movement as its peculiar property. It is 
the movement what allows bodies to present themselves to the external sense, and it is no 
mere by chance that Kant defined the science of nature as a pure and applied theory of 
movement. Kant advocated uniting the a priori aspect of physical science (general physics) 
with the mathematical doctrine of movement.24 He united matter (of which bodies are 
constituted) and dynamics (movement), by drawing on the Newtonian concept of physical 
 
23 Ibid., 508. 
24 It is in this specific sense that Kant accepted a dynamic theory of matter. The movement of bodies had to be 
discussed in mathematical terms because mathematics, as an a priori discipline of the internal sense, was the 
only science capable of constructing the general concept of object and of conferring the a priori status of the 
science of dynamics. Given this, it is easy to grasp the difference between the concept of dynamics of Kant (and 
later in Fries) and that of Schelling. The latter attempted to broaden Kant’s dynamic theory of matter to living 
beings by renouncing the concept of mass—which played such a fundamental role in defining material 




forces and by putting aside the chemical forces of attraction and repulsion. According to 
Kant, chemistry, unlike physics, lacks the a priori aspect that would ensure its scientific 
nature and thus remains a purely empirical doctrine, unable to access the level of a science of 
nature. Fries, for his part, found fault with Kant’s definition of force as the cause of bodies’ 
movement, arguing that, whereas the pre-Newtonian physics attributed the movement of 
bodies to the impact between them, Newton’s law of universal gravity shows that this 
movement is not simply the result of that impact, but of a fundamental force which Fries 
called Grundkraft. In Fries’s view, Kant made the mistake of considering the forces of 
attraction and repulsion as mere properties of the matter out of which bodies are constituted. 
Moreover, Fries stated that Kant considered other types of forces as unknowable a priori, 
since they are not necessary properties of matter—they are merely accidental.25 
 
Die frühere mechanische Physik ging von dem Vorurtheil aus, daß alle Veränderungen der Bewegung aus 
dem Stoß bewegter Massen erklärt werden müßten, weil der todten Masse keine active Kraft beygelegt 
werden dürfe und im Stoß sich die Massen nur leidend verhielten. Selbst Newton scheute noch dieses 
Philosophen, indem er sich dagegen verwahrte, seine allgemeine Anziehung einer Grundkraft zuschreiben zu 
wollen. Kant hob diesen Irrthum, indem er zeigte, die Gegenwirkung im Stoße werde ja selbst nur durch 
active Zurückstoßungskräfte gedacht, und indem er klar machte, daß wir metaphysisch die Ursach von 
Veränderungen der Bewegung gar nicht anders als durch stetig beschleunigende Kräfte denken können. 
Demgemäß wieß er nach, daß Körper ohne eine ursprüngliche Flächenkraft der Abstoßung und eine 
ursprünglich durchdringende Kraft der Anziehung unmöglich seyen, beschränkte aber zugleich die 
naturphilosophische Construction auf diese zwey Annahmen, indem er behauptete, andere Arten von Kräften 
 
25 Fries’ criticism of Kant here seems to arise from a misunderstanding of Kant’s thought. To be more explicit, 
Fries used the same arguments that Kant espoused in Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft to 
criticize Kant. In the work just mentioned, Kant clearly spoke of a mathematization of dynamics and he was, as 




seyen nicht a priori erkennbar, seyen keine nothwendigen Eigenschaften der Materie, sondern zufällige, 
deren Erforschung der Erfahrung überlassen bleiben müsse. Da liegt aber eine widerrechtlich beschränkende 
methodische Regel zu Grunde. Kant hat nicht bedacht, daß die Construction a priori hier eigentlich der 
reinen Mathematik gehöre und nach deren Recht beurtheilt werden müsse. So maßt sich seine Metaphysik zu 
viel an, indem sie jeder möglichen Materie diese beyden Kräfte a priori zuschreibt und sogar den Grad der 
Anziehung bestimmt. Sie unternimmt aber auf der andern Seite zu wenig, indem sie die mathematische 
Natur dieser Untersuchungen verkennt.26   
 
Fries concluded his argument against Kant by stating that the a priori construction of forces is 
not determined by the fact that they are necessary properties of matter, but because a purely 
mathematical description of the forces is possible: 
 
Die Bestimmung der Formen der Grundkräfte ist eine rein mathematische Lehre aus geometrischen 
Prämissen, so erscheint sie in der hier gegebenen Form und lässt noch eine weitere mathematische 
Entwicklung zu, mit welcher wir der Erfahrung in Rücksicht der Bestimmung einzelner Materien nie 
vorgreifen, aber wohl bestimmen, welche Hypothesen zu Erklärungsgründen überhaupt zulässig seyen oder 
nicht.27     
  
Fries combined the mathematical with the experimental method because, in his view, the 
priority of experience is fundamental; all kinds of cognitive research cannot be reduced to a 
mere search for forms. The need for this union emerges clearly in his book Neue oder 
anthropologische Kritik der Vernunft where Fries dealt with the theoretical justification of 
synthetic a priori judgments. From Friesian standpoint, which is far distant from that of Kant, 
the a priori loses its character of universality and timelessness. Friesian a priori, considered as 
 
26 J. F. Fries, ibid., 460–61. 




depending on the temporality of the human psychological process, acquires an 
anthropological character which is typical of Fries’ thought. From a strictly philosophical-
scientific point of view, this relativization means that the a priori changes and adapts itself to 
scientific development, and no longer possesses the rigidity that characterized it in Kantian 
conception.28 Fries’ judgment was: “Kant aber machte den großen Fehler, dass er die 
transzendentale Erkenntnis für eine Art der Erkenntnis a priori und zwar der philosophischen 
hielt, und ihre empirische psychologische Natur verkannte”.29  
Fries’ project was to define a systematic science of man provided with the clarity and rigor 
of mathematics. According to him, anthropology was a very general science because it 
encompasses the study of the most profound human needs, such as art and human action, as 
 
28 Recently a similar conception of relativized a priori has been developed by Michael Friedmann in Dynamics 
of Reason. The 1999 Kant Lectures at Stanford University (Stanford, California: CSLI Publications, 2001). The 
original Kantian conception of a priori combined two distinct meanings within a same concept: on the one hand, 
necessity, unrevisability, apodictic certainty and, on the other hand, the constitutivity of the concept of the 
object of the scientific knowledge. The notion of relativized a priori makes it possible to acknowledge this 
duplicity of meanings and to provide the notion of a priori with the constitutive character but not with that of 
necessity. Although mathematical and physical a priori principles change and develop along with the continuous 
progress of empirical natural sciences, they do not drop their constitutive character. For another perspective on 
relativized a priori see: P. Parrini, Knowledge and Reality. An Essay in Positive Philosophy (Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Press, 1998). In this work Parrini distinguished between transcendental a priori and contextual a 
priori. The latter interpretation of the Kantian notion of a priori, which is connected to the idea of epistemic 
relativism, makes it possible to find a third way that overcomes both the radical relativism and the metaphysical 
realism. On the idea of contextual a priori see also: P. Parrini, Sapere e interpretare. Per una filosofia e 
un’oggettività senza fondamenti (Milan: Guerini e Associati, 2002). 
29 J. F. Fries, Neue oder anthropologische Kritik der Vernunft (Heidelberg: Christian Friedrich Minter, 1828), 




well as the physiological field. Fries claimed that man lives in two separate and distinct 
worlds: in the first one, as an organized and living body, and in the other, as consciousness. 
The goal is to make both worlds the object of a science that could account for man as a 
whole. Fries outlined three anthropological sciences: the first, called medical anthropology or 
physiology, takes as its subject the human body in all its natural functions; the second, 
consisting of empirical psychology but defined by Fries as psychic anthropology, focuses on 
human interiority as its subject-matter; Fries’ third anthropology takes as its subject-matter 
the comparison of the first two. Fries defined the connection (Verbindung) between the two 
scientific explorations of man as philosophical or comparative anthropology. In other words, 
the subject of physiological anthropology is the matter and the subject of psychic 
anthropology is the activities of human mind. Although the organization of the body and the 
mental states are strongly interdependent (wechselseitige Abhängigkeit), the two realms do 
not mingle (vermischen), since each of them is based on its own closed circle of perceptions 
(geschlossene Kreise von Wahrnehmungen). In Fries’ own words: 
 
so interessant daher auch eine allgemeine Untersuchung ist, welche die Beschaffenheiten und Zustände des 
Geistes, so wie sie innerlich erkannt werden, mit den ihr korrespondierenden Organen und Bewegungen des 
Körpers vergleicht: so ist die Untersuchung der Natur unsers Geistes doch nicht in einer solchen 
Abhängigkeit von der Erforschung der Natur des durch denselben belebten Körpers, dass nicht die eine ohne 
die andere auch sollte stattfinden können.30 
 
It is clear from the above remarks that Fries could not and did not accept the reductionist 
position. In his anthropology, the mental and the physical worlds are of the same order and 
neither one can be subordinated or reduced to the other. At the same time, it must be pointed 
 




out that the very mechanical-mathematical methodology that allowed Fries to advance his 
science of man postulates a man that is profoundly and intrinsically linked to physical-
mathematical understanding of reality. Fries’ non-reductionist idea of human mind left no 
space for teleological reflection. It is precisely for this reason that Lotze criticized Fries’ 
conception, which did not deal with the deeper questions of philosophy. It is the challenge 
that Lotze took on in his work, by trying to reconcile the mechanical-mathematical 




4. Hermann Lotze on the relation between body and mind    
Using Kant and Fries’ discussions as a springboard, Lotze first addressed the problem of the 
accordance (Vermittlung) of mechanism with teleology in his 1838 first dissertation in 
philosophy De futurae biologiae principiis philosophicis.1  
According to Lotze, the various processes and movements described in the physical, 
biological, and psychological fields could all potentially be considered in a mechanical 
perspective. This principle allowed Lotze to avoid recourse to metaphysical entities, such as 
the vital force, in describing the processes that take place in the sphere of organic beings. 
Lotze, who was trained in medicine, was convinced that experimental science and its 
mechanical method were necessary to tackle the problems of reality. In this connection, it is 
important to note that certain dimensions of human existence (for example, mental and 
emotional life, free will) cannot be fully explained through a set of rigid mechanical 
assumptions; in other words, these spheres resist understanding in a fully mechanical 
framework. Mechanical-mathematical description in terms of natural laws is not sufficient to 
achieve a true understanding of this higher and essential level of being; we must reach instead 
a genuine explanation of the significance of these processes. To this end, it is necessary to 
operate at the level of metaphysics and teleology. Precisely this shift from description to 
explanation—interpreted by Lotze as an upward movement from the methodological 
principle of mechanism to the explanatory and metaphysical principle of teleology—was at 
the core of the arguments that drove his biological and psychological works as well as his 
 
1 R. H. Lotze, De futurae biologiae principiis philosophicis (Leipzig: Typis Breitkopfio-Haertelianis, 1838); 




more strictly medical works on pathology and physiology. This core argument gave rise to 
the central concern of Lotzean thought: the need for a reconciliation between the scientific 
description of the world (i.e. what is available to sense perception) and what lies beyond the 
sensible, or, to keep with Lotzean terminology, what lies above it. Lotze addressed this need 
for reconciliation specifically in the “Vorbemerkungen des Verfassers” of his Mikrokosmos, 
where he formulated the problem in the following terms: 
 
But all the same it is in such mediation alone that the true source of the life of science is to be found; not 
indeed in admitting now a fragment of the one view and now a fragment of the other, but in showing how 
absolutely universal is the extent and at the same time how completely subordinate the significance, of the 
mission which mechanism has to fulfil in the structure of the world.2 
 
Here, Lotze resolved the apparent discord between mechanism and teleology, by affirming 
that mechanism is not a metaphysical principle but simply a methodological principle of 
natural sciences. The mechanical methodology is a descriptive means to a better 
understanding of what takes place in reality, but it does not capture the essence of reality nor 
the higher level of being. Mechanism does not explain the origin of human mental life—
understood in the sense of the higher functions of the intellect—nor does it explain the free 
will or the purposiveness of nature. In other words, Lotze conceived the mechanical 
description of natural processes as merely a means by which the different purposes of nature 
are realized within reality. 
 
2 R. H. Lotze, Mikrokosmos. Ideen zur Naturgeschichte und Geschichte der Menschheit. Versuch einer 
Anthropologie (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1856–1864); new ed., Mikrokosmos, Nikolay Milkov (ed.), (Hamburg: Felix 
Meiner Verlag, 2017), XIII*; english trans., Microcosmus: An Essay Concerning Man and his Relation to the 




When Lotze published his 1838 dissertation De futurae biologiae principiis philosophicis, 
at the end of his medical studies, he had come to consider philosophy as a mode of reflection 
on the basic concepts of the different sciences. This line of philosophical inquiry globally 
characterized Lotze’s thought, shaping the fundamental problems that he addressed 
throughout his career. 
In the field of biology, for example, Lotze showed that the lack of philosophical reflection 
gave rise to errors, and argued for the need to overcome “philosophy of nature” of the 
German Idealists, which, in its present form, hindered progress in both biology and 
pathology. Philosophy of nature’s of the German Idealists mistake, according to Lotze, 
consisted in taking “rerum signa” as laws of nature rather than simply to see them as images 
or metaphors.3 Due to this mistake, biology was considered fundamentally different, qua 
science, from physics: whereas the latter mathematically formulated its own laws and thereby 
generated scientific knowledge, the former’s use of the terminology of philosophy of nature 
of the German Idealists relegated it to the world of rerum signa and vital force.   
Lotze understood nature as both an organic and an inorganic system; these two systems 
together constituted all the natural processes whose unvarying forms we understand as 
natural laws. In Lotze’s view, the laws of mechanism, operating in accordance with the forces 
of attraction and repulsion, are valid not only for the inorganic system, but for all phenomena 
and processes. That is why, Lotze’s reflections on the fundamental concepts of biology gave 
rise to formulations and suggestions that are valid across all the sciences. Importantly 
enough, this unified approach was primarily aimed at investigating the meaning of natural 
laws in general. That is why, in the course of his argument, Lotze demonstrated that biology 
is, in fact, a science under the same definition as physics, and dismissed obscure concepts, 
 




such as vital force, that lack explanatory power. Indeed, Lotze criticized physiologists, who 
adopted the Aristotelian notion of “power (δύναμις)” to support their explanations and who 
claimed that the smallest particles of the body are formed through the organic action of the 
mystical vital force rather than in accordance with the physical laws of chemistry. Lotze 
considered this application as incorrect. 
Aristotle’s power was proposed not only to extend mechanism to the organic system of 
living beings, but also to overcome the limits of this system and to integrate all its lacunae. 
Lotze argued that, although all processes take place according to the laws of the mechanical-
mathematical system, this mechanical system is nevertheless incapable of explaining or 
justifying the application of power to things. In other words, mechanism fails to specify 
why—among the many processes possible under the same laws—this particular event 
occurs.4 As such, in a mechanical perspective, the realization of this one individual seemed 
merely to be the result of an absolute predestination. However, whereas the mechanical 
system belongs to the realm of necessity, all organic things have a contingent beginning. 
Mechanical force does not act spontaneously; it must have some external cause. 
The open question here is why things and processes assume specific forms. Force is 
measured according to the movement that it exerts in a given trajectory; however, when the 
effect of force is not a mathematically definable movement but a complex of movements 
organized by a “transcendent image”, we are no longer in the presence of an efficient force, 
 
4 In his 1838 Dissertation, Lotze referred to Pythagoras as regards the universal extension of the mechanical-
mathematical system and to Empedocles with regard to the formulation of the problem of the individual. The 
morphological issue, that concerns the individual form of living beings, poses the following question: if, under 
mechanical laws, many events and processes are possible, why does only this event come to be real? Why is 





but of a “quid” that determines the order of the said complex.5 The force exerts a movement 
in a certain direction, which is given by the goal to be realized. This goal is the organic 
power, which is the true engine driving all events. The power provides reality with the 
grounds of the given movement, that is, the necessary individual specificity that secures the 
occurrence of exactly this event as opposed to any other. The internal requirements of this 
individual specificity determine the choice from among the various forms of phenomena and 
of mathematically-possible forces appropriate for the realization of that choice. 
In Lotze’s view, mechanism cannot be confined to the inorganic system alone; it is valid 
in the organic system as well. If this condition is not secured, the concept of mechanism 
would be radically impoverished. However, the effective connection between organic power 
and efficient forces, that is, between dynamic laws and mechanical processes, needed to be 
justified rationally. To this end, Lotze prima facie affirmed that, at the outset, reality receives 
its specific form from an organic power and is at the same time made eternal by the 
mathematical necessity of the mechanical system. He then invoked both physiology and the 
 
5 The term “image” has Herbartian provenance. Herbart claimed in Hauptpunkte der Metaphysik that: “What is 
thought of as having being is called essence. What is torn away from being and thought of only as something is 
to be called image (intelligent design). The image is not what is formed; for the image to be as an image would 
require a new being—an imagining––an intelligence.” J. F. Herbart, Sämtliche Werke, 2nd vol. (Aalen: Scientia 
Verlag, 1964), 190. [“Was als seyend gedacht wird, heißt insofern ein Wesen. Losgerissen hingegen vom Seyn, 
bloß als Was gedacht, soll es die Benennung: Bild, erhalten. Das Bild ist nicht, was in ihm gebildet wird; sollte 
es seyn als Bild, so bedürfte es dazu eines neuen Seyn,—eines Bildenden, einer Intelligenz.”]. Herbart’s realism 
consisted in granting nothing more than the empirical world, without any further addition: e.g. actions at a 
distance or absolute space. At the same time, he conceded that this empirical world can be the object of thought, 
which renders it as an image, as an appearance, to an intelligible world in which nothing new is added but 
everything is subjected to the critical analysis of intelligence, which represents the possible ways of assembling 




concept of striving (Streben) to support this argument. Processes come into existence through 
striving; only one process, out of many possibilities, is realized. Exactly the organic power 
provides the possible processes with the condition to realize themselves. Bodies are nothing 
more than organized systems of striving, which can be investigated not through speculative 
philosophy, but through experiments and observations. Striving is the medium whereby the 
dynamic and mechanical systems are connected; it constitutes their inseparability.  
Striving is the combination of an impulse and the irritability of the body that receives it; 
thus irritability is the primary property of dynamism, much in the same way that the 
equipollence of action and reaction is the primary property of mechanism. The impulse 
transmitted from the mechanical system to the dynamic one is recognized by the latter as a 
way of reaction. The reaction starts from an irritability, with a striving that sets out an action 
internal to the dynamic system. Mechanism and dynamism are thus united in an action of 
mutual exchange for the purposiveness of reality: dynamic forms stimulate mechanical ones 
to conform to the finality summed up in the totality of the movements and vicissitudes of 
reality. 
Lotze referred to this new system by the Leibnizian term “Systema harmoniae 
praestabilitae”, based on the reciprocal exchange between mechanism and dynamism aimed 
at realizing the purposiveness of nature. Leibniz had stated in his Monadologie (§§ 78–79–
81) that: 
 
These principles have given me a way of naturally explaining the union, or rather the agreement, of the soul 
and the organic body. The soul follows its own laws, and the body likewise follows its own, and they 
coincide by virtue of the pre-established harmony between all substances, since they are all representations 
of one and the same universe. Souls act according to the laws of final causes through appetitions, ends, and 
means. Bodies act according to the laws of efficient causes, or laws of motion. And the two kingdoms, that 




act as if there were no souls (although this is impossible), and souls act as if there were no bodies, and both 
act as if each influenced the other.6 
 
Lotze considered Leibniz as a thinker whose thoughts in philosophy were still 
theoretically valid and whose ideas, such as those of the possible and the individual, had been 
fundamental and helpful to Lotze’s own thought. For Lotze, for example, “harmony” was the 
immanent engine of all events; it is characteristic both for mechanical and for dynamic 
systems. It is by means of harmony that the mechanical system stimulates the dynamic one to 
react through irritability and striving, which, in turn, exert a regulatory action on the 
mechanical system. The qualitative component of reality appears in tandem with the 
quantitative; sensibility appears in tandem with mechanical-mathematical causality. The 
body, which is dynamically constituted of irritability and striving, is affected by external 
impulses which do not work as mere efficient forces, but rather as an occasion for 
spontaneous action. In this case, the causal chain is broken and human sensibility shows its 
freely productive capacity. This capacity means that the body does not react rigidly to the 
efficient force coming from the external stimulus, but this latter simply excites the body, 
which through irritability and effort ‘responds’ actively and productively and not merely 
mechanically. The dynamic system, which constitutes the deepest aspect of mechanism, 
provides reality with an autonomous and self-regulating capacity for movement. Sensibility is 
the site where mechanism and dynamism meet and connect. In short, according to Lotze, 
before any real progress can be made in the science of life, the following conditions are to be 
observed: that mechanical processes are the foundation of everything that happens; that no 
 
6 Leibniz G. W., Principes de la Nature et de la Grace fondés en Raison, Principes de la Philosophie ou 
Monadologie (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1954), 119; english transl: Leibniz’s Monadology. A New 




physical process occurs independently of an organic stimulus; and that, although nature 
reaches its goal through mechanical forces, those forces are mediated by the dynamic system. 
Only by appealing to experience is it possible to show which physical processes occur in 
organisms and on the basis of which laws. From there, it is possible to explain the links 
between these processes and dynamic efforts and to enumerate the dynamic efforts so as to 
show not only the specific mechanical forces at work, but the profound ways in which they 
are connected to each other, as well as to the whole. In Lotze’s words: 
 
Dynamice nervos agere nos quoque concedimus, neque tamen consentanei illis dynamicam actionem 
excludere leges mathematicas fingimus, sed restituta potius illa notione ad significationem pristino valore 
Aristotelico non prorsus indignam, videbimus, quomodo dynamis ad aequilibrium systematis mechanici 
habeat.7  
 
In 1852, Lotze published the Medicinische Psychologie oder Physiologie der Seele in 
which he developed his thoughts for a physiological psychology. In this work, Lotze took 
into account the project of Herbart and Moritz Wilhelm Drobisch for a “Psychologie als 
Wissenschaft” which conceived the mind as a center producing representations aimed at its 
own self-preservation. At the same time, however, he granted a prime importance to the 
contemporary physiological research on the dynamics of the sensory processes. Much as he 
had done in his 1838 Latin dissertation and his contributions to Wagner’s Handwörterbuch 
der Physiologie, in this book Lotze also addressed the relationship between psychical and 
 
7 Lotze R. H., Kleine Schriften, 1st vol., (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1885), 11. “We also grant that nerves act dynamically, 
thus rejecting the idea that mathematical laws exclude dynamic effects. If we resort to that concept, whose 
meaning is thus not far from its original Aristotelian sense, we see a relationship between the dynamics and the 




physical events, acknowledging their constant connection and once again elaborating his 
occasionalist vision. As previously stated, Lotze shared the idea of scientificizing 
psychology, but disagreed with Herbart and Drobisch on the type of science that psychology 
should take as its model: according to Herbart, psychology should direct itself to mathematics 
in order to reach the status of science, whereas, according to Lotze, it should follow 
physiological science. In Lotze’s view, the core of Herbart’s arguments on the mechanics of 
the mind was fallacious since it is not representations that vary in intensity but their content, 
which, however, has an empirical origin. Thus, Lotze rejected any possibility of 
reconstructing human mental life mathematically. 
4.1. Pilosophical psychology and perspectivism 
 
The scientific research of the first half of the nineteenth century had showed the complexity 
of a purely physiological explanation of the process of perception and presented the difficulty 
of distinguishing between the purely physiological and the psychological aspect which is 
fundamental for the process of perception. The Medicinische Psychologie: oder Physiologie 
der Seele (1852) was based on this new knowledge related to the subject of the mind-body 
relation.  
Given the great progress of scientific research, the physiology of bodily life (Physiologie 
des körperlichen Lebens) and the physiology of mental life (Physiologie des geistigen 
Lebens) could facilitate the medical studies on a field that had been of purely philosophical 
importance until then: the relation between body and mind (das Verhältnis zwischen Körper 
und Seele).  
Lotze’s physiological psychology attempted to balance between the results of scientific 
research and the philosophical knowledge. Lotze was profoundly convinced that the facts of 
experience (Thatsachen der Erfahrung) are important and central and that they constitute the 




general vision only through the philosophical-metaphysical knowledge which Lotze called 
the principle of criticism, or principle of judging (Principien der Beurtheilung).  
The real subject of Lotze’s research was the concrete laws that underlie the mind-body 
relationship, understood as “connection of appearances” (Zusammenhang der 
Erscheinungen). (This last expression will be explained in the course of the discussion 
below.) According to his philosophical view—i.e., that the various data of scientific 
observation can be brought together in a unitary view only by the metaphysical knowledge 
about the course of things—Lotze stated that the laws that govern the mind-body relationship 
can be found neither by pure speculation nor only by microscopic observation. They can be 
identified only in a self-reflecting observation (reflectirende Beobachtung). An observation 
that starts from speculative principles under which the observational facts (Thatsachen des 
Augenscheins) are subsumed.  
At this point, Lotze’s general theoretical picture becomes more clear. He considered the 
philosophical and metaphysical knowledge of the course of events as the solid basis on which 
it was possible to build psychological research. Lotze maintained that there is a clear link 
(Anknüpfung) between concrete science and philosophical knowledge. In this sense he spoke 
about philosophical psychology.8  
According to Lotze, philosophy had a constructive role: it constructs, based on concepts, 
particular facts or large portions of reality.9 These conceptual constructions underlie our 
 
8 On the idea of philosophical psychology in Lotze see: Kleine Schriften (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1891), 3rd vol., 1ff.  
9 The third rule of the Cartesian method states that starting with simple and easy-to-understand objects, which 





general conviction of the concatenation of things (Zusammenhang der Dinge)10 which is the 
basis for a concrete scientific research. Philosophy and science cannot operate separately, 
because the former prepares the foundations whereas sciences construct their particular 
knowledge on the solidity of this basis.  
Lotze considered philosophy as strictly foundational vis-à-vis science because it provides 
the main coordinates with regard to the concatenations of things on which the concrete 
scientific knowledge develops. It is now clear that Lotze’s interest was to demonstrate that 
the foundations of all human knowledge—i.e., philosophical knowledge divided into its 
various systems—are not self-contradictory. 
In Lotze’s view, the various philosophical schools did not contradict each other. Their 
contradictory nature is only apparent (scheinbar)—their products of thought were only 
different ways of conceiving the same reality, different expressions and perspectives on the 
same thought. Similarly to Hegel,11 according to Lotze, the history of philosophy is not a set 
 
10 It is discussed in R. H. Lotze, Mikrokosmus. Ideen zur Naturgeschichte und Geschichte der Menschheit. Ver-
such einer Anthropologie (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1856–1864); new ed., Mikrokosmos, Nikolay Milkov (ed.), (Ham-
burg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2017), III, 9th book; english trans., Microcosmus: An Essay Concerning Man and his 
Relation to the World, E. Hamilton and E. E. Constance Jones (trans.), (Edinburgh: Clark, 1885), 2 vols., 2 vol. 
11 See G. W. F. Hegel, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (Heidelberg: 
Verwaltung des Oswaldschen Verlags, C. F. Winter, 1830), third ed., § 13. In that paragraph Hegel made the 
distinction between external history (äußerliche Geschichte) of philosophy and the “true” History of 
Philosophy. According to the external history, the various philosophical systems follow each other by accident, 
as if their principles were different and unconnected. According to Hegel, there is not a diversity of principles 
but a single living and thinking Mind (der Eine lebendige denkende Geist), which brings to self-consciousness 





of contradictory systems but a set of very different systems referring to the same universe 
(Weltall) whose fundamental features (Hauptzüge) are clear, from whatever point of view.12 
Lotze conceived reality (Wirklichkeit) as a whole (Ganzes) that can be grasped from 
different points of view (Standpunkte). In fact, in Mikrokosmos he stated that: 
 
The traveller who goes round about a mountain, if he goes repeatedly backwards and forwards and up and 
down, sees a number of different profiles of the mountain recur in an order which might have been foretold. 
None of them is the true form of the mountain, but all are real projections of it. But the true figure itself, as 
well as all these apparent ones, would consist in some relation of all its parts to one another. This true figure, 
the actual inner relation of things, may perhaps also be discovered, and then, of course, this true objective 
law of reality would be preferred to all derivative and merely partial though valid expressions of it; 
meanwhile we comfort ourselves with the thought that the nature of truth is such as to make possible 
innumerable apparent manifestations of itself, and a valid movement of knowledge from one to the other.13   
 
 
principles, on which each philosophical system is based, are not different—as external history argues for—but 
they are rather branches (Zweige) of a single Whole (das Ganze). 
12 In order to make his idea of perspectivism even clearer, Lotze proposed the metaphor of the geometer; see: R. 
H. Lotze, Kleine Schriften (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1891), 3rd vol., 3.  
13 R. H. Lotze, Mikrokosmos, 3rd vol., 217; engl. trans., II vol., 334–35; see: F. Baab, Die kleine Welt. Hermann 
Lotzes Mikrokosmos: Die Anfänge der Philosophie des Geistes im Kontext des Materialismusstreits (Hamburg: 
Felix Meiner Verlag, 2018), 131n. The metaphor of the traveller (Wanderer) was very popular among the 
German philosophers at that time. Baab refers to Thomas Borgard’s hypothesis, according to which Lotze 
would have taken this metaphor from his friend and mentor Ernst Friedrich Apelt. The latter had used it in Die 
Epochen der Geschichte der Menschheit (Jena: Mauke, 1845–46). According to Gottfried Gabriel, Gottlob 
Frege also used this metaphor in his early writings (see: G. Gabriel, “Einleitung des Herausgebers: Objektivität, 
Logik und Erkenntnistheorie bei Lotze und Frege”, in H. R. Lotze, Logik, Drittes Buch. Vom Erkennen 




As Florian Baab has reminded us, the object of Lotze’s perspectivism was the human 
being, considered both as the object and as the subject of perception, both as the object of the 
natural sciences and as that of the sciences of the mind, and, again, both as a social 
individual, subject to the historical course and as an individual (or nature) tending to truth 
and the highest values. It is this aspect that gave rise to oppositions and apparent 
contradictions between the different philosophical systems—idealistic, materialistic, 
mechanistic, or finalist; they were rooted in the conflictual character of human nature. 
According to Lotze, the only way to a solution of the conflict between the various 
philosophical systems lies in the idea that the perspectives of the human nature are so 
heterogeneous that this latter cannot be exhaustively contained within a single system. 
Therefore, each system is only a particular point of view on human nature. If we really want 
to overcome any partial and one-sided philosophical and scientific account of truth (einseitige 
Wahrheit) and to reach a general perspective on the nature of man, we must consider these 
different points of view as mutually related. Only this approach can allow us to reach that 
ideal of knowledge of human nature as a whole that runs through Lotze’s thought.14 
As Nikolay Milkov has reminded us, Lotzean ‘teleomechanism’ also derived from his 
perspectivism. If our point of view on man is scientific, only mechanistic descriptions are 
allowed; but, if we assume a metaphysical point of view, they are no longer valid. 
Metaphysics requires teleological explanations. Milkov wrote that: 
 
It is easy to see this double-demand for mechanism and teleology as contradictory, so long as one fails to 
recognize that each demand is a “methodological” demand only, made by the requirements of two 
disciplines with differing norms and purposes. Similarly, the idealistic tendencies of his system were part of 
 





a psychological description of reality, “a personal manner of reading things, a poetic intuition of the cosmic 
life” (Santayana 1889, 155). Other aspects of his system—like his atomism—were radically objectivistic, 
suited only to the demands of scientific description and scientific work.15 
 
In order to understand the function of perspectivism in Lotze’s thought, we can consider § 
14 [realistic and idealistic conceptions (Realistische und idealistische Auffassungen)] of the 
Medicinische Psychologie, in which Lotze dealt with the realistic (Herbart) and idealistic 
(Hegel) points of view in psychology.16 According to Lotze, these two philosophical 
perspectives simply have different finalities and, therefore, there is the possibility of mutual 
“coexistence” without contradiction.17  
In Lotze’s opinion, these two points of view—of Herbart and of Hegel—interpreted the 
same subject, that is, the multiplicity of the empirical world (Welt der Erfahrung), but in two 
radically different ways. Realism considered empirical multiplicity as appearance 
(Erscheinung) and idealism as consequence (Consequenz) of an absolute essence or idea. The 
realistic point of view stated that what appears corresponds to what it is (so wie scheint, so 
wie sein), whereas Hegel’s idealism conceived the world of experience as relative and 
depending on the absolute idea. Realism resolved the contradiction of appearances in a realm 
of invariableness (Unveränderlichkeit), simplicity (Einfachkeit) and unrelatedness 
(Beziehungslosigkeit) of real essences; idealism imagined an ideal level beyond appearances. 
As we said, the possibility of making these two systems coexist without contradiction is 
given by the fact that they had different finalities. The objective of Herbart’s system was to 
 
15 N. Milkov, “Rudolph Hermann Lotze (1817–1881)”, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
https://www.iep.utm.edu/lotze/. 
16 See: R. H. Lotze, Medicinische Psychologie, 151–60. 




show that beyond empirical variability and contradiction there is a true invariable and 
absolute structure: the ‘real’ structure that Herbart called die Welt der Dinge. The aim of 
Hegel’s system was to found the whole Welt der Erfahrung on an ‘ideal’ rather than ‘real’ 
level.  
According to Herbart, this metaphysical world of things—which is the structure of the 
empirical one—is constituted of real essences. Even the mind is conceived as an invariable 
real essence tending towards self-preservation. In brief, Herbart, too, conceived the mind as 
something simple, unrelated and invariable. Lotze criticized this idea of Herbart, considering 
impossible to reconcile the absolute simplicity of the mind with the multiplicity of 
representations of the mind.  
Lotze sought a mediation (Vermittlung) between invariableness (Unveränderlichkeit) and 
mental life (Seelenleben). He wrote: 
 
Deshalb wollen wir gegenüber den künstlichen Versuchen, Unveränderlichkeit und Leben zu vermitteln, 
lieber die Behauptung wagen, die Seele sei nothwendig ein veränderliches Subject der Erscheinungen, 
müsste sie auch um deswillen als ein Seiendes von bedingter Setzung, nicht aber als Substanz in dem 
eminenten Sinne des Realismus bezeichnet werden. Wohl werden gegen diese Veränderlichkeit auch andere 
Einwürfe erhoben, aus der Besorgniss herrührend, dass die Einheit der Persönlichkeit zu Grunde gehen 
möge, die wir durch unser ganzes wechselvolles Leben als fortbestehend zu behaupten, sittliche 
Aufforderungen fühlen. Aber wenn wir die Seele für veränderlich halten, so sagen wir weder, dass sie in 
beständiger Veränderung begriffen, noch dass der Wechsel ihrer Zustände regellos sei. Zwar müssten wir 
zugeben, dass sie nach unserer Meinung in jedem Augenblicke gewissermassen ein neues und anderes 
Wesen sein könne, aber dennoch würden die verschiedenen Augenblicke Glieder einer zusammenhängenden 
Entwicklung und die Seele jedes Momentes die Consequenz der Seele aller früheren Momente sein. 




ich ebenso wenig begreifen, als wie der Realismus trotz seiner Hypothese einer unveränderlichen Substanz 
der Seele es anfangen sollte, eine noch grössere Constanz der persönlichen Individualität zu gewähren.18 
 
A fundamental element of the realistic conception of the world was, according to Lotze, the 
centrality of the causal description of the origin of the phenomenon, based on the set of all 
the initial conditions of the elements involved as well as on the nature of their relationships.19  
On the contrary, Idealism aimed at something different. Hegel conceived the world as a 
whole (als ein Ganzes), as an implication of an absolute idea and did not care about concrete 
and empirical sciences. Lotze stated that: 
 
Causale Untersuchungen lagen daher überhaupt nicht in der Richtung dieses Philosophirens [Hegels], und 
die Absurditäten, die so zahlreich entstehen, wenn man seine Interpretationen des Sinnes der Erscheinungen 
für Angaben ihrer Verwirklichungsweise ansieht, beruhen auf einem Missverstande der ganzen Absicht, 
dessen sich allerdings Hegel selbst zuweilen schuldig machte.20 
 
Apparently, the possibility of the non-contradictory coexistence of idealism and realism 
consists in the Lotze’s peculiar attitude towards both of them. On the one hand, he rejected 
the idea of realism according to which the structure of the world is ‘real’; on the other hand 
he embraced the constant attention of realism to the concrete scientific research; similarly, 
while accepting the idealistic conviction that the structure of the world is ‘ideal’, he rejected 
 
18 R. H. Lotze, Medicinische Psychologie, 155. 
19 See: ibid., 156. 





Hegelism, since it deprived this ideal structure of its concrete content so that this structure 
was no longer ‘ideal’ but had become an ‘idea’ in its pure formal sense.21  
Lotze’s conclusion was that Hegelian psychology was one-sided. It ended at the history of 
the development of the pure form of the mind regardless of the concrete scientific data.22 
Precisely for this reason, idealism in its Hegelian version was useless for a concrete 
psychological research.  
At the end, Lotze’s point of view becomes completely clear. On the one hand the constant 
attention to the concrete data of scientific research, and on the other hand the centrality of 
philosophical-speculative principles capable of organizing in coherent ways the contents that 
the empirical and concrete sciences provide. This non-contradictory coexistence between 
speculative ideals and scientific content eventually results in the idea of self-reflecting 
observation (reflectirende Beobachtung), the only possible guide in psychological studies.  
 
4.2. Physiological psychology between materialism and mentalism23 
The fundamental problem that recurs in Medicinische Psychologie is the question of the 
mental phenomena (psychische Erscheinungen). Lotze started his psychological reflection 
 
21 The role of idealities is fundamental in Lotze’s thinking. Consider the logical concept of Geltung, the ideality 
of space, the ideality of his atomism. 
22 “Unmöglich ist es daher a priori zu bestimmen, welchen allgemeinen Gesetzen die Thätigkeit der Seele folgen 
werde; sie müssen rückwärts aus der Erfahrung erschlossen werden, der auch der Realismus Alles verdankt, was 
er ausser den unbrauchbaren Folgerungen aus dem Begriff der Substantialität seinen Erklärungen zu Grunde 
legt.” (Lotze, Medicinische Psychologie, 160). 
23 I translate the German term “Spiritualismus” with “mentalism” for three reasons: (i) Today, the term “spiritu-





from the question of mental states: are they produced by a psychic principle of the mind 
without any bodily action, or are such mental states produced from a cooperation 
(Zusammenwirken) between the physical forces of the body and the life of the mind?24  
 The concept of the mind as a necessity of the unity of consciousness (Einheit des 
Bewusstseins) and as principle of mental states is based on the idea of its incomparability 
(Unvergleichbarkeit) with physical events.25 Clearly, starting from this point of view, it is not 
possible to conceive psychology as close to natural sciences—using the results of 
physiological research. To be sure, it is not possible to reconstruct the unity of consciousness 
on the basis of physical and mental states cooperating together. A mind composed of specific 
states appears rather as a simple aggregate than as a unity.26  
 With regard to the question of the subject of psychology, that is, the exchange relations 
(Wechselverhältnisse) between body and mind, Lotze outlined three possible points of view: 
materialism, the identity of real and ideal, and mentalism. Materialism embraces the 
methodological principle of the natural science and refuses to accept the existence of the 
mind, because such an existence would represent an unjustified duplication of the 
explanatory principle. Apparently, materialism is rather interested in a unity of the 
 
years after Lotze published his Medicinische Psychologie, this term failed to impose itself as terminus tech-
niques both in the Germanophone and in the Anglophone literature. (iii) Mainly on pp. 55–65 of his Medi-
cinische Psychologie, Lotze used the term “spiritual” (das Geistige) in the sense of “primordial reality” (ur-
sprüngliche Realität). Usually, however, the German term “Geist” is translated into English with “Mind”. Ap-
parently, “mentalism” is a more appropriate translation than “spiritualism”. 
24 See: R. H. Lotze, Medicinische Psychologie oder Physiologie der Seele (Leipzig: Weidmann’sche Buchhand-
lung, 1852), 9ff; Kleine Schriften, III, 4. 
25 See: R. H. Lotze, Medicinische Psychologie, 15. 





explanatory principle of reality—not only by rejecting the existence of a psychic principle but 
also and especially by considering psychology a natural science. Mental life is an element 
completely depending on the material elements of the body.27 Lotze stated that such a 
position is certainly metaphysical. His metaphysical exploration is motivated by the 
“fragmentary and naturalistic” knowledge which erroneously affirms that everything can be 
reduced to the level of experience and intuition of natural sciences.28 The body has an 
ontological primacy; the mind is only a secondary effect of brain processes. In fact, 
materialism disregarded any research based on the deepest and most essential needs of human 
mind, such as the aesthetic and moral needs. Materialistic positions rejected the immortality 
of the mind and the free will as well.29 This is certainly a position opposing Lotze’s thought. 
This explains why he opened his Medicinische Psychologie with a harsh criticism against the 
various forms of materialism. 
A second set of points of view (Ansicht) on psychology was called by Lotze “identity of 
the real and ideal” (“die Identität des Realen und des Idealen”).30 If materialism did not 
 
27 See: ibid., 30. 
28 See: ibid., 32. 
29 See: ibid., 35. 
30 Ibid., 45ff. J. J. C. Smart, in Sensations and Brain Processes (1959), returns to the identity theory, although in 
a way radically different from Lotze. Whereas in the identity theory exposed and criticized by Lotze mind and 
body were conceived as identical, both original and therefore not reducible, the contemporary type identity the-
ory has materialistic intentions. This latter states that reality is matter and affirms the general identity of mind 
and body, reducing the psychical sphere to the physical substrate. See: Smart, J. J. C., “Sensations and Brain 
Processes”, in Philosophical Review, 68, 1959, 141–56; Nagel, T., “Physicalism”, in Philosophical Review 74, 
1965, (July):339–56; Taylor, C., “Mind-body identity, a side issue?”, in Philosophical Review 76, 1967, 





address the deepest and most intimate needs of human mind, this second perspective, defined 
by Lotze as “aesthetic”, was based on the recognition of these needs. Materialism recognized 
reality only as matter and discarded the requests of the mental being (Aufopferung des 
selbständigen geistigen Daseins). The need for a unity and identity of the real and the ideal is 
the reason of the double life (Doppelleben) of living beings (beseelter Körper). The organism 
is matter and mind; it manifests itself as a chemical-physical process and as a phenomenon of 
consciousness. According to the theory of identity—exposed and criticized by Lotze,—real 
and ideal, body and mind are original (ursprünglich) and constitute an indissoluble 
(unlösbar) unity. The unity depicted by materialism is quite different, since it takes into 
account the atoms of matter with their masses and specific properties, and the mental life as 
simply one of these properties. The mind is a property of matter. The concept of unity 
belonging to this second point of view is constructed differently. The idealreality is an 
original unity in which mind and body have the same ontological value.  
According to materialism and to the principles of mechanics, mental and bodily life is the 
result of systems of masses and forces. The supporters of the ideal-reality theory considered 
the mechanical-materialist conception as an external point of view on reality, because all 
events were considered as a result of the application of forces to certain material atoms—
each of them with its own mass—under certain circumstances. Bodies are understood as 
simple aggregates of atoms. This conception does not account for the interiority and the sense 
of totality about things. The theory of identity is the core of Schelling’s Naturphilosophie, in 
which the living organism is understood as something absolute that manifests both its bodily 
 
and Religion. (Pittsburgh University Press, 1967); Ravenscroft, I., Philosophy of Mind. A Beginner’s Guide 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 39–49; Schneider, S., “Identity Theory”, Internet Encyclopedia of 





and its mental side. This organism, which is simultaneously corporeal and mental, moves 
according to its own force—Lebenskraft, which is inherent in things. Lotze denied the 
explanatory value of this concept in physiology. According to him, Lebenskraft was a 
mystical force that causes everything and therefore explains nothing.31 Many physiologists, 
such as Gottfried Reinhold Treviranus and Johann Heinrich Ferdinand von Autenrieth, 
employed this concept.32  
The search for interiority and for a sense of things opens up to the notion of the internal 
vital force that moves and shapes things. Things are no longer mere objects on which external 
forces exert their action, but they become the subject of movement. According to Lotze, such 
a mystical, nebulous and unclear concept is not useful for the scientific research. The organic 
body cannot have only one cause—vital force—that moves it and shapes it, because the body 
is an aggregated system of multiple contemporary activities of the constituent elements one 
towards the other. The physiological research cannot rely on the use of the Lebenskraft, 
because a single absolute force would not be able to explain the multiplicity of forms, sizes 
and directions charcterizing the molecules that form the organic aggregates. If we consider 
every single molecule provided with its own vital force, then we have to explain how the 
 
31 See: R. H. Lotze, “Leben – Lebenskraft”, in Handwörterbuch der Physiologie mir Rücksicht auf physiologi-
sche Pathologie, R. Wagner (ed.), (Braunschweig: Vieweg, 1842), 1st vol., IX–LVIII; Allgemeine Physiologie 
des körperlichen Lebens (Leipzig: Weidmann’sche Buchhandlung, 1851).  
32 G. R. Treviranus, Die Erscheinungen und Gesetze des organischen Lebens (Bremen: Heyse, 1831–33), 2 voll. 
He was a doctor and biologist contemporary with Lamarck. He proposed the theory of transmutation of species 
which somehow prefigured evolutionism. J. H. F. von Autenrieth, Ansichten über Natur- und Seelenleben 
(Stuttgart und Augsburg: Cotta, 1836). He attended Antonio Scarpa’s classes in Pavia and was a student of 





universal vital force can coordinate these particular forces.33 Lotze claimed that the organic 
body is a means (Hilfsmittel) for the activity of the mind.  
This second point of view, affirming a unity of the world as connection of real and ideal 
(Verknüpfung des Ideellen und Reellen),34 is limited. In order to explain the subject-matter of 
psychology, philosophy and science must cooperate. A philosophical perspective that stresses 
unity regardless of the mostly unknown determined relations within this unity cannot be 
helpful for the scientific explanation of the specific psychological facts. In its attempt to 
explain the psychological facts, science must take into account the relations (Verhältnisse) 
between an extensive size such as the body and an intensive magnitude such as the mind. In 
fact, only this mutual activity gives rise to the psychical fact. Lotze wrote: 
 
Wir wollen hier über nicht weitläuftig sein; oft genug werden wir noch Veranlassung finden, die praktische 
Untauglichkeit der voreiligen Anwendung jenes Identitätsprincips zu rügen, die ein trübes Verlangen nach 
Einheit wohl auf trübe Weise befriedigt, über die bestimmteren Verhältnisse der Vereinigten dagegen meist 
unbelehrt lässt.35 
 
In short, if the mistake of materialism consist in a radical reduction, that of the theory of 
identity in the identification of the mind and the organic body. According to Lotze, the need 
for unity can be satisfied only by the mind. 
Another possible point of view on psychology is mentalism, which places reality within 
the mental sphere. Unlike the first two positions, which did not critically examined the 
 
33 The concept of vital force is problematic not only from the physiological but also from a logical point of 
view, see: Lotze, Medicinische Psychologie, 53–55. 
34 See: Kleine Schriften, 3rd vol., 4–5. 





original reality of the material principle, mentalism conceived matter as secondary and 
depending on the mind.36 Lotze undoubtedly considered himself a mentalist.37  
Mentalism considers “die Materie als eine Erscheinungsform eines an sich übersinnlichen 
Realen.”38 Lotze was convinced that, as for psychology, this point of view could not be 
adopted by science in its practical realization, but that it nevertheless represented a higher 
perspective on science. In fact, Lotze differentiated between the ideal of science and the 
practical realization of science. Science, understood as an ideal, should be able to conceive 
the determined laws of nature as simple necessary consequences of mental states. 
Consequently, psychology would be considered as a theory of the fundamental principles of 
being and action, and physics only as a demonstration of the development of the activity 
(Regsamkeit) of mental life through space and time.  
Things are different as to the practical realization of science. This latter must constantly 
consider the empirical multiplicity given by experience. As an ideal, science presents us a 
mentalistic monism which represents the highest level of human knowledge, whereas, 
understood in its practical use, it constantly deals with multiplicity and, in the case of 
psychology, with the dualism of mind and body. In Lotze’s words: 
 
Noch viel weniger ist es bis jetzt gelungen, die bestimmten Naturgesetze, welche uns die Erfahrung kennen 
gelehrt hat, als nothwendige Consequenzen innerlicher, geistiger Zustände der Wesen zu fassen. Allerdings 
müssen wir daher, wenn wir ein Ideal der Wissenschaft in unserm Sinne zeichnen wollen, die Psychologie 
als die Lehre von den wesentlichen Principien alles Daseins und Wirkens, die Physik dagegen nur als 
Nachweisung der besondern Formen anführen, welche die Regsamkeit des geistigen Lebens innerhalb des 
 
36 See: ibid., 55. 
37 See: Kleine Schriften, 3rd vol., 5.  




Gebietes räumlich zeitlicher Anschauungen entwickelt. Für unsere wirkliche Ausführung der Wissenschaft 
jedoch müssen wir uns, wie so oft in der lückenvollen menschlichen Erkenntniss begnügen , einerseits dies 
Princip zu besitzen, anderseits die Fülle der empirischen Mannigfaltigkeit zuerst durch ihnen näher liegende 
Abstractionen zu beherrschen und sie allmälich erst zur Ableitung aus dem höchsten und wahren Grunde 
ihrer Existenz vorzubereiten.39 
 
Although Lotze agreed with the methods and objectives of science, he nevertheless shaped 
a philosophy that could strongly oppose to materialism. It is not accidental that from the very 
first pages of his Medicinische Psychologie he criticized materialism and the idea of matter 
proposed by materialists as an explanatory principle for the life of the mind: “Die Vorstellung 
der Materie [ist…] das dunkelste und unsicherste Erzeugniss unserer Reflexion”.40  
In particular, he criticized the materialism of Büchner, Moleschott and Vogt. Basing on 
Flourens’ theory of brain localization of psychic functions and from the principle of force 
conservation, as presented by Hermann Helmholtz in 1847, these authors had argued that our 
psychic activity is completely produced by the brain and in accordance with the mechanical 
laws. In their opinion, our psychic activity could be reduced to the mechanical activity of the 
brain.  
Lotze also criticized the “mechanic of mind” (Mechanik des Geistes) developed by 
Herbart and Moritz Wilhelm Drobisch.41 Their mathematical psychology was ultimately to be 
refuted. According to Herbart, our representations vary in intensity such that they can be 
quantified mathematically. In his “Psychologischen Untersuchungen” (1853) Lotze argued 
against Herbart that there is not a variation of intensity but rather of the content of the 
 
39 Ibidem.  
40 Ibidem. 




representations, and the content has an empirical origin, because it is captured through 
sensation and then reproduced through representation. Intensive magnitudes therefore have to 
do with sensation, with the physiological sphere, and not with representation. Intensity cannot 
be excluded from the psyche—emotions, for example, are intensive magnitudes—although it 
cannot be quantified mathematically. 
According to Lotze, attempting to incorporate two attributes so different from each other 
as the real and the ideal into the single concept of matter would not allow for the explanation 
of mental life. It would simply create more confusion and give rise to a conception of man 
which would not provide any unity. Lotze thought that it is rather the idea of mind that can 
explain mental life and the materiality of human nature. As Lotze wrote: 
 
Gegen den Materialismus müssen wir behaupten, dass gerade aus jenen Eigenschaften und Wirkungen der 
Dinge, die wir mit dem Namen der Materialität bezeichnen, das Geistige nie zu erklären sei und deshalb die 
Psychologie nie sich in Naturwissenschaft verwandeln lasse.42  
 
It is clear that Lotze did not believe that matter and mind were identical. He was convinced 
that the clear separation between body and mind was valid in any practical development of 
science (“praktische Ausführung der Wissenschaft”). For this reason, he raised the problem of 
the explanation of the interaction between body and mind, developing the idea of a “physical-
psychic mechanism”.43 In order to understand the relationship between body and mind, we 
have to focus on the most important problem: the causal relationship between two radically 
different substances.  
 
42 Ibid., 65.  





4.3. The psycho-physical mechanism: the occasionalist way 
Lotze dealt with the question of the connection between body and mind (Zusammenhang 
zwischen Leib und Seele) in the sixth paragraph of the Medicinische Psychologie. He did not 
conceive the interaction between body and mind as an efficient causal connection (causa 
efficiens), since there is not a direct action of one matter on the other. The case of psychology 
presented a basic incomparability (Unvergleichbarkeit) between the physical change of a 
material body and the psychic event of the supernatural mind. An effective causal 
construction of one state on the other was not possible.44  
Lotze tried to specify the argument with the help of which natural sciences tried to 
overcome the difficulty resulting from the incomparability between body and mind. They 
explicitly mentioned the interaction between Ponderablen and Imponderablen, stating that 
the possibility of a mutual influence between body and mind does not require the absolute 
identity (Gleichheit) of the two, but their type identity (Gleichartigkeit).45 Natural sciences 
widely resorted to this thought, combining in the same causal connection two different 
natures such as body and mind, whose only similarity would be the spatial existence and the 
ability to exert driving forces. From this point of view, body and mind were conceived as 
identical, since their natures have common roots.46  
The opinion, widely accepted in physiology, according to which bodily states and changes 
are driven by an immediate impact of certain ideas or types, was rejected by Lotze, because 
the psychic element is not endowed with a mechanical force sufficient to activate the other 
 
44 See: ibid., 70ff. 
45 Cf. with the type identity in the current philosophy of mind. 





element, that is, the body.47 Compared to bodily masses, idealities are forceless shadows. 
Lotze’s solution was the two-fold meaning (Doppelsinnigkeit) of the ideal elements. Types 
and designs of our psychic organization are ideal, because their form of existence is ideal 
and, as such, the mind opposes the real and material form of the world. At the same time, like 
matter, human mind also exists in the world and has a positive reality of autonomous 
existence that gives the ideal the ability to act in the bodily world. Here we have a clear 
example of the great importance of the method of dialectics to Lotze’s philosophical 
research.48 Let us read Lotze’s own words: 
 
Die Doppelsinnigkeit dieses Namens darf uns nicht täuschen; jene Typen und Plane der Organisation sind 
ideal in Bezug auf die Form ihres Daseins und im Gegensatz zu der Welt des Realen, in der sie, als 
unwirkliche, nur gedachte oder denkbare Bestimmungen, nicht mitzählen, und auf die sie deshalb 
unmittelbar kein bewegendes Moment ausüben; die Seele ist ideal in Bezug auf die Natur ihres Inhalts und 
 
47 Ibidem. 
48 Lotze attributed to the ideality of psychic organization a double nature: it was both ideal and material. If we 
consider the life of the mind on the basis of the specific form of existence of its contents, it is clearly ideal. 
However, if we change our point of view and evaluate the life of the mind on the basis of its ability to act in the 
material world, it assumes a material character as well. Here the fusion between Hegel’s dialectical method and 
perspectivism is clear. (N. Milkov, “Rudolph Hermann Lotze (1817–1881)”, Internet Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, https://www.iep.utm.edu/lotze/.) Paul Grimley Kuntz wrote: “There seems to be no sense to why 
Lotze is sometimes idealistic and sometimes realistic, except that the idealistic passage is from a section on the 
Soul, and the realistic passage is from a section on the world. But this explanation went counter to Lotze’s 
doctrine of panpsychism: that things are ultimately soul-like. We must shun initially the theory that there were 
two Hermann Lotzes, for there are some passages in which he does seem conscious of the contradictions and 
attempts to mediate between the two.” (G. Santayana, Lotze’s System of Philosophy, P. G. Kuntz (ed.), 





im Gegensatz zu dem Materialen, dessen Eigenschaften sie nicht an sich trägt; aber gleich diesem ist sie eine 
wirklich vorhandene Substanz und genießt in nicht geringerem Grade jene Realität des selbständigen 
Daseins, auf welcher die Fähigkeit beruht, etwas in der Welt in Bewegung zu setzen.49   
 
Lotze, therefore, stated that there is a ‘dialectical’ interaction between the ideal and the 
material nature and that mind and body are simply two different kinds of reality (zwei 
verschiedene Gattungen des Wirklichen): the movements that take place in one state of reality 
are transferred to the other without requiring the existence of any effective causal connection 
(Causalnexus) to be postulated. Obviously, the problem of the incomparability 
(“Unvergleichbarkeit”) between the physical and mental elements arises again.  
Natural sciences explore movements of nature that are comparable (vergleichbare 
Bewegungen). All its states are analytically constructed, starting from the nature of the given 
conditions of a process, without assuming intermediate elements between the movements. 
However, it is not possible to imagine a science that explores incomparable elements.50 
Lotze, however, knew that the task of distinguishing the motions of the mind from those of 
the body, and vice versa, is impossible, once we assume their fundamental incomparability 
(Unvergleichbarkeit). The difficulty of a scientific explanation of this interaction, however, 
does not mean that it does not exist. On the contrary, according to Lotze, the causal 
connection between the natures was a fact: we just cannot provide an appropriate 
explanation. 
The imperfect human knowledge of the mediation (Vermittlungsglieder) between mind 
and body, which allows the physical element to become ideal and vice versa, does not hinder 
 
49 R. H. Lotze, Medicinische Psychologie, 75.  





the possibility of its scientific research in general, although it does not allow us to grant 
psychology the “construirende Form der Wissenschaft”.51 The subject-matter of 
psychology—i.e., the interaction between body and mind—refers to a fundamental 
irreconcilable dualism. As a result, it is impossible to consider—as natural sciences do—the 
psycho-physical mechanism as a whole (Ganzes) constituted of its simple elements. Dualism, 
in this realm, is indelible. 
Lotze further assumed that both in psyche and matter there are internal properties that can 
generate intensive states of mind from the impulses of the matter’s spatial-temporal 
movement. Psychology would never be a natural science able to explain how and why the 
psycho-physical mechanism takes place. There is no formula regarding the foundation of this 
mechanism. This is a clear sign of Lotze’s criticism of Weber and Fechner’s measurement 
paradigm.52 
Fechner upheld a theory of the body-mind relationship in which mind was connected to 
the brain at any point. This one-to-one correspondence between body and mind was 
 
51 Ibid., 77. 
52 See: ibid., 210–11. Fechner’s measurement paradigm stated that it is possible to express the general relation-
ship between the bodily and the mental sphere through a mathematical formula. The bodily sphere can be inter-
nal (nervous system) and external (physical stimulus). According to internal psychophysics, the intensity of the 
sensation corresponds to the logarithm of the intensity of the nervous process and, in order that the intensity of a 
sensation may increase in arithmetical progression, the nervous process must increase in geometrical progres-
sion. Only the external bodily sphere (physical stimulus) is directly measurable—and scientifically accessible—
even if it is indirectly connected to the mental world, because the transition is mediated by the nervous process. 
Fechner’s mathematical formula is based on direct measurement of the size of the stimulus, as follows:  ∆S = C 
∆𝑅
𝑅
 (S is sensation, C is a constant of integration and R is stimulus (Reiz)). The integration of this formula allows 





synthesized by Fechner’s well-known formula. Lotze criticized Weber and Fechner’s 
formula, considering the mind as based on intensive states—indeed, it is a non-spatial 
substance. The nervous system, on the other hand, is based on extensive states which are 
simple signs for the mind. For this reason, Lotze proposed his occasionalistic understanding 
of the physical-psychic mechanism.  
This does not mean that Lotze actually considered his theory to be a positive one, able to 
explain the body–mind mechanism. He rather identified an occasionalist methodological 
principle that, basing on the admission of our ignorance about the mechanism’s effective 
causal relation as well as on the recognition of the limits of human knowledge, could allow us 
to practically carry out our scientific research in this field.  
In other words, the occasionalist theory of the physical-psychic mechanism does not allow 
us to explain how a material stimulus, running through bodily sensations, can produce a 
psychic state. This notwithstanding, we are able to grasp the correlation between the external 
and the internal, that is, between body and mind. As Lotze himself wrote it in Medicinische 
Psychologie: 
 
Wir können also nicht angeben, wie es ein materieller Bewegungsreiz, der unsern Körper trifft, anfangen 
mag, um einen psychischen Zustand zu erzeugen, wohl aber können wir eine Beantwortung der Frage 
hoffen, welche aussern einfachen Reize tatsachlich mit welchen einfachen inneren Zustanden allgemein und 
gesetzlich verkettet sind, und wie aus der weiteren Zusammensetzung dieser Paare von inneren und aussern 
Ereignissen das Ganze der Wechselwirkung zwischen Leib und Seele, d. h. das physiologische Seelenleben 
entstehe. Indem wir aus der Erfahrung die Tatsache entlehnen, dass mit einem durch äussere Reize erzeugten 




b stets konsekutiv ein Körperzustand β folge, sehen wir a und b als Veranlassungen an, an welche der 
Naturlauf beständig und allgemein die Wirklichkeit von α und β gebunden hat.53   
 
According to Lotze, occasionalism was only a methodological and descriptive theory and not 
a positive—explanatory—theory about the nature of the subject. In fact, this theory cannot 
achieve true knowledge of its subject. If we want to achieve a true knowledge, we must 
address metaphysics. It is the only discipline able to explain the nature of this mechanism 
“even if it does not allow practical use”.54  
The “wahre Theorie” and the “wahre Ansicht” of the body-mind relationship are the 
above-mentioned mentalistic theories. According to Lotze, mentalism accounted for the truth 
about the relationship between consciousness and body, despite the fact that this truth is not 
useful for an effective scientific practice. In summary, we can say that mentalism is true but 
not useful.55  
The occasionalist theory arises from the fundamental type-difference (Ungleichartigkeit) 
between body and mind, “welche keine Construction psychischer Zustände aus Bewegungen, 
sondern nur eine tatsächliche und proportionale Aneinanderkettung beider erlaubte”.56 
Employing the language of metaphysics, Lotze stated that materiality and corporeity are 
nothing more than simple forms of appearance (Form der Erscheinung), “welche ein 
übersinnliches Reales, das dem Wesen der Seele an sich gleichartig ist, unter gewissen 
 
53 Ibid., 77–78.  
54 Ibid., 78. Lotze wrote: “obgleich sie praktisch keine weitere Benutzung gestattet”. (Translation mine—Mi-
chele Vagnetti) 
55 See: Kleine Schriften, 3rd vol., 6.  





Umständen für unsere Auffassung annimmt”.57 In this sense, Lotze’s metaphysics assumed a 
mentalistic meaning.  
In summary, according to Lotze, the substantial core of matter was supernatural. The 
simple observation of the relationship between mental states and physical movements does 
not allow us to explain it as the direct effect of one on the other, because this would 
contradict the principle of type-difference. 
 In this sense, if psychic events result from physical events, they are not directly generated 
by the latter, but by the internal changes of the real, whose shady phase (Schattenphase) is 
constituted by physical processes. Even if psychic states could change the course of physical 
events, they certainly could not directly influence physical forces and physical states, 
although they could impact the states of reality, the manifestation of which consists of 
physical forces and physical states. We should thus explain psychic movements as agents 
acting not directly upon the body but upon certain deeper and more general states of reality 
(Zustände des Realen) which provide us again, as a manifestation, with body movements and 
vice-versa.  
In addition to the methodological level requested for a physiological psychology, there is 
also the level of metaphysics that was fundamental to Lotze’s philosophical psychology. 
Leibniz seems to have been the direct source of inspiration of this metaphysical theory. 
Leibniz affirmed a mind–body dualism in which, however, these two elements are considered 
as manifestations of a single reality. This reality and all its parts are in constant movement 
and change, thus preserving its harmonious unity. In this connection Lotze wrote: 
 
 




Die Materie, so wie wir sie wahrzunehmen glauben, können wir nur für einen Schatten halten; ein 
übersinnliches Reales ist auch in ihr der substantielle Kern, welcher den Schatten wirft. Nun wäre es 
allerdings ein unlösbares Problem, zu zeigen, wie der Schatten eines Körpers unmittelbar eine bewegende 
Kraft auf einen andern Körper ausüben könnte, oder wie der letztere an jenem Schatten Widerstand genug 
finden sollte, um umgekehrt ihn in Bewegung zu setzen. Nichts aber ist einfacher, als dass ein Körper, 
ausserdem dass er Schatten wirft, auch noch einen andern Körper bewege, oder dass er, indem er den andern 
bewegt, auch den Schatten verändert, den jener warf. Gehen daher psychische Ereignisse aus physischen 
hervor, so entspringen sie doch nicht aus diesen selbst, sondern aus den innerlichen Veränderungen des 
Realen, deren Schattenphase jene physischen Vorgänge sind; ändern umgekehrt psychische Einflüsse den 
Lauf der physischen Begebenheiten ab, so wirkten sie doch nicht unmittelbar auf die physischen Kräfte und 
Zustände, sondern auf die Zustände des Realen, deren erscheinender Ausfluss jene sind. So kommen wir auf 
einen physisch-psychischen Mechanismus zurück, in welchem in der That alle Wechselwirkung zwischen 
gleichartigen Gliedern stattfindet, freilich nicht, indem wir materialistisch die Seele zu einem Stoffe, sondern 
umgekehrt, indem wir spiritualistisch den Stoff zur Seele oder einer ihr wesentlich homogenen Substanz 
werden lassen.58 
 
Consequently, human being, understood as a microcosm tending to general harmony, can 
only be studied and analyzed from the perspective of mentalistic metaphysics.  
 
4.4. The psycho-physical mechanism: the interaction 
A correct analysis of Lotze’s Psycho-Physical Mechanism shows that bodily functions do not 
directly produce mental states. The activity of the mind is always presupposed and original. 
The impressions and sensations provide the mind with the object of its applications. The 
mind activity elaborates the data provided by the body in a not receptive and passive way.59  
 
58 Ibid., 79–80. 





Lotze raised the problem of the freedom of the mind, upholding its free constitutive 
activity.60 The mechanism at issue is not a fixed series of physical changes accompanied by 
another fixed series of mental changes: physical events, that stimulate the sense organs, are 
“read”, organized and then transformed by the mind into something purely mental that exerts 
a new mechanical force and produces new physical changes.  
Lotze did not consider physiological psychology as able to determine the freedom of will, 
which is rather a metaphysical question. Physiological psychology showed that the brain is 
much more than a mere material object within the path of mechanically predetermined 
physical movements. It also affirmed the possibility or necessity of properly psychic laws, 
which constitute the true core of this mechanism. However, physiological psychology cannot 
go further. Only metaphysics can determine whether the psychic laws regulating the inner 
states of the mind are similar to the causal, mechanical and deterministic laws, which regulate 
the course of nature. Lotze maintained that his point of view did not contradict a strong 
causal connection. There is no break in the causal chain; in Lotze’s words: 
 
Eine allgemeine Bemerkung muss ich jedoch noch hinzufügen. Man muss nicht glauben, dass unsere 
Ansicht, eben so weit wir sie hier aufgestellt, einem strengen Causalzusammenhang widerspreche. Wenn 
auch immer an einem gewissen Punkte eine physische Bewegung aufhört, eine neue ähnliche zu erzeugen 
und in innere Zustände des Realen übergeht, oder wenn an einem andern Punkte dieses Innere sich wieder 
zum Anfang einer physischen Bewegung gestaltet, so ist doch hier kein Bruch in dem Zusammenhang der 
Causalität, sondern nur eine Umgestaltung in der Form der Wirkung vorhanden, wie sie denn auch auf dem 
Gebiete des unbeseelten Naturlaufs häufig genug vorkommt. Wir würden jede Empfindung als ein 
umgeformtes Aequivalent der Wirkungsgrösse betrachten müssen, die vorher in Gestalt einer Oscillation 
 





oder einer andern Bewegung vorhanden war; jede Contraction eines Muskels als ein Aequivalent der 
Erregung, die in der Form eines psychischen Strebungsprocesses voranging.61 
 
According to Lotze, when there is a transition from the physical to the mental realm, there 
is no break in the chain of causation but only a formal change from a muscle contraction to a 
mental state (Strebungsprocess). This transformation (Umgestaltung) does not transgress the 
laws of causation, because the mental sphere is endowed with its own laws. In this way, 
causation does not lose its universal (with no exception) extension, something that Lotze 
explained in detail in Mikrokosmos.  
In Medicinische Psychologie, § 25, Lotze contended that the mind is able to develop freely 
in accordance with its own purposes and to use the muscular movements of its body to 
achieve its own end.62 These two positions seem to contradict each other, but, once again, 
Lotze adopted the two-fold dialectical register of the scientific description and the 
teleological explanation of the world.  
 In the interaction between body and mind, as described in Lotze’s Principle of 
Mechanism, while the mind uses the body for the realization of its own ends, the body 
supports and drives various mental functions. Sensations, intuitions as well as the highest 
functions of the mind have always a bodily support. Based on the functional form of the 
particular histological elements, on the convergence of several organs into one, on the 
proportions between the organs and the different parts of the body, and, finally, on the 
succession of the various stimuli and stages of the development of the body, this latter drives 
the formation and combination of human psyche.63  
 
61 Ibid., 95.  
62 See: ibid., 296–304.  





4.5.  Lotze’s theory of local signs 
As we have seen in § 1.3., the problem of space played a substantial role in Lotze’s thinking. 
But before starting to discuss it, it is important to make a preliminary distinction: space, 
understood as metaphysical ideality, has nothing to do with the space of our perception. 
Lotze dealt at large with the perceived space in the Medicinische Psychologie. Whereas 
space, understood from a metaphysical point of view, is a pure extension with an infinite 
multiplicity of directions, the perceived space has three directions.64 
Already in the beginning Lotze stated that his position is dualistic and that the external 
space, understood as geometric form provided with a certain extension and position, turns 
into a non-spatial and non-material elements and is, in this way, a sum of intensive states of 
the mind.  
This transformation from extensive to intensive perspective led Lotze to state that our 
vision of space is never a mere reflection of what exists but is always a reproduction.65 This 
reproduction is constituted of three factors: the physiological mediation, which Lotze called 
“local sign”, the psychic manifestation, Lotze called it feeling of movement 
(“Bewegungsgefühl”), and the final global vision of space. Lotze clearly rejected the naïve 
correspondence theory of space, according to which there would be no difference between 
the space of the external world and that of the mind.66 Lotze specified that: 
 
 
64 On the three directions of the perceived space see: ibid., 333–4 and 417–18. 
65 It is not Kant’s idea of space that is innate but it is the mind’s organizing activity that is innate and that makes 
it possible to coordinate and elaborate the sensible data.   




Sollen wir daher eine Anschauung der wirklichen Lage äusserer Objecte gewinnen, so kann es nicht auf dem 
Wege der Auffassung, sondern auf dem der Wiedererzeugung der Räumlichkeit sein. Ueberall wird das 
Extensive in ein Intensives verwandelt, und aus diesem erst muss die Seele eine neue innerliche Raumwelt 
reconstruiren, in welcher die Bilder der äussern Objecte ihre entsprechenden Stellen finden. So wie eine 
veränderliche Grösse abnehmen kann bis zu einem Nullwerth und jenseit desselben wieder wachsen, so geht 
die Regelmässigkeit der geometrisch geordneten Einwirkungen unfehlbar in einem Punkte vollkommner 
Unräumlichkeit zu Grunde und wird jenseit desselben wiedererzeugt.67 
 
In order to face the problem of the reconstruction of the spatiality in general 
(“Wiedererzeugung der Räumlichkeit”), Lotze elaborated his theory of local signs.  
When Lotze addressed the topic of our perception of space, he further investigated the 
problem of psycho-physical occasionalism and tried to find an interrelation between 
physiology, psychology and the philosophy of mind, in the light of the scientific explanation 
of our process of perception. 
The system of local signs (“System der Localzeichen”) is a physiological nervous 
formation that accompanies (begleiten) sensations. When I see an external object, this 
generates a sensation of colour in me. This sensation, said Lotze, is not sufficient to locate 
spatially the object to which this ‘sensory quality’ refers. The localization of the object 
requires an additional (secondary) sensation (Nebenempfindung) which carries the spatial 
information necessary to locate the object, i.e. to locate the stimulated nerve. Thanks to the 
nerve localization it is possible to place this object in the space “through a sort of projection 
of the disposition assumed by the sensations of the object’s qualities during their 
manifestation on the epidermis or on the retina”.68 In Lotze’s words: 
 
67 Lotze, Medicinische Psychologie, 328–9.  





Da nun die spätere Localisation eines Empfindungselementes in der räumlichen Anschauung unabhängig ist 
von seinem qualitativen Inhalt, so dass in verschiedenen Augenblicken sehr verschiedene Empfindungen die 
gleichen Stellen unsers Raumbildes füllen können, so muss jede Erregung vermöge des Punktes im 
Nervensystem, an welchem sie stattfindet, eine eigenthümliche Färbung erhalten, die wir mit dem Namen 
ihres Localzeichens belegen wollen.69 
 
This is the physiological basis of our perception of space. As to the visual sense, the 
oculomotor movements orient the stimulation towards the center of the retina. In this way, 
the system of local signs is developed. Important pioneer studies on this problem were those 
by Fries, Volkmann and Marshall Hall.70 As to touch, the local signs develop in sensory 
circles in the way showed by E. H. Weber, which Lotze embraced and developed further.  
Lotze’s fundamental problem was the following. This system of local signs is only a 
physiological nervous process, an intensive and qualitative ‘specific sensory energy’ and, as a 
consequence, it is not provided with an intrinsic spatial order. The spatial order is introduced 
by the mind. This is the psychological aspect of the representation of space. In Lotze’s words: 
 
Es war indessen auch keineswegs unsere Absicht, aus jenen Localzeichen die Fähigkeit der Seele, Raum 
überhaupt anzuschauen, oder ihre Nöthigung abzuleiten, das Empfundene in diese Anschauung 
aufzunehmen. Wir setzen vielmehr voraus, dass es in der Natur der Seele Motive gibt, um deren willen sie 
einer räumlichen Anschauungsform nicht nur fähig ist, sondern auch zu ihrer Anwendung auf den Inhalt der 
Empfindungen gedrängt wird; und weder jene Fähigkeit noch diese Nöthigung suchten wir aus den 
 
69 Lotze, Medicinische Psychologie, 330–1. 
70 Cf., J. F. Fries, “Über den optischen Mittelpunkt im menschlichen Auge” (Jena, 1839), in Sämtliche Schriften, 
5, 411–91; Marshall Hall, Von den Krankheiten des Nervensystems (Leipzig, 1842). See: W. R. Woodward, 




vorausgesetzten physiologischen Verhältnissen jener Localzeichen zu erklären. […] Sind einmal alle 
geometrischen Verhältnisse, welche zwischen den Theilen der äussern Reize und noch zwischen den ihnen 
entsprechenden Eindrücken im Nerven bestanden, in dem blos intensiven Dasein verschwunden, welches 
den Vorstellungen in der Seele allein zukommt, und sollen sie aus diesem reconstruirt werden, so müssen an 
den einzelnen Empfindungen intensive Merkzeichen angebracht sein, welche die Lage ihrer Objecte im 
Raume vertreten, und aus welchen die Seele die räumliche Ordnung wiederherstellen kann. […] Wir meinen 
damit nicht, dass der unendliche nach drei Richtungen ausgedehnte Raum von selbst ein immerwährender 
Gegenstand unsers Bewusstseins sei, den wir etwa seit unserer Geburt in Gedanken anstierten, begierig, ihn 
mit Bildern zu füllen. Wir meinen nur, dass die ursprüngliche Natur unsers Geistes uns dazu treibt, unsere 
Empfindungselemente in räumlichen Lagen zu ordnen, und dass eine spätere Reflexion auf die unendliche 
Anzahl solcher Anordnungen, die wir unbewusst vorgenommen haben, uns auch die mehr oder minder 
lebhafte Gesammtanschauung des alle umfassenden unendlichen Raums zum Bewusstsein bringt.71 
 
Local signs are nervous, qualitative and intensive elements that differ from each other but 
require a spatial order which is provided by a mental activity which places them into spatial 
series. When our nerve structure is stimulated by the outside world, it creates this whole 
system of local signs through body and muscle movements. These muscle movements are 
connected with certain psychical states. Muscles have an immediate impression 
(unmittelbarer Eindruck) and perceive the size of their movement (die Größe der Bewegung). 
In his physiological psychology Lotze adopted the theory of feeling of movement 
(“Bewegungsgefühl”) and muscle-feeling (“Muskelgefühl”) by G. A. Spiess.72 
 
71 Lotze, Medicinische Psychologie, 334–6. 
72 Gustav Adolph Spiess (1802–1875) was a German doctor, studied medicine at the University of Heidelberg 
with Friedrich Tiedemann. After obtaining his doctorate he moved to Berlin where he met Wilhelm Baum, a 
German surgeon. Between 1825 and 1826 he visited, together with Baum, the universities of Paris, London, 





In the specific case of the visual perception, the psychological component consists in the 
continuous movements of the optical muscle and the related feeling of movement which 
introduces the spatial order as part of the intensive elements. As for touch, the psychological 
component is always the sensory circle. Weber had noticed that the various sensory circles, 
through their reciprocal overlapping, give rise to the sensation of extension. As William R. 
Woodward explained: 
 
In his general formulation for the perception of visual and cutaneous surfaces, Lotze postulated a system of 
nervous excitations, a and b, accompanied by sensations. These are joined by a new nervous event c and a 
new sensation signalling their location in relation to one another. His definition of the local sign c assumed 
an interactionist theory of mind. Bodily movements release mental changes, whereas mental laws 
characterize mind.73 
 
The ability to organize elements in spatial series is an innate capacity of the mind and the 
organized elements (the local signs) are empirical. In this sense Lotze took a median position 
 
main work is Pathologische Physiologie. Grundzüge der allgemeinen Krankheitslehre, 3 vols. (Frankfurt: 
Meidinger, 1857). This work gave rise to a controversy with Rudolf Ludwig Karl Virchow and gave Spiess the 
opportunity to demonstrate his deep medical and philosophical background. He was co-founder and director of 
the medical and microscopic “Senckenberg Natural Research Society” in Frankfurt. Spiess’s theory states that 
the qualitative differences in the feeling of movement have their seat not in an original muscular feeling, but in 
skin sensations. On the contrary, the perception of the order of magnitude of a muscle movement must be 
sought in the immediate self-consciousness of the muscle; see: G. A. Spiess, Physiologie des Nervensystems: 
vom ärztlichen Standpunkte dargestellt (Braunschweig: Vieweg, 1844), 76ff; R. H. Lotze, Medicinische 
Psychologie, §§ 26 and 31. 






(Mittelstellung) between empiricism (‘learn to see’) and nativism74, because there is an innate 
mental capacity that applies to empirical elements.75 This innate capacity of the mind 
organizes local signs into spatial series within a two-dimensional visual field; depth is 
empirically acquired through touch. In the words of Lotze: 
 
Die Ausbildung der Raumanschauungen führt uns auf diesen Vorgang zurück; denn sie sind nicht allein die 
beständige Voraussetzung jedes Unterschiedes zwischen uns und einer uns fremden Welt, sondern schon 
ihre eigene Vollendung zu der Totalauffassung eines nach drei Richtungen ausgedehnten Weltraums ist das 
Product einer eben solchen Deutung der Sinnesempfindungen und ihrer Beziehungen unter einander. Nur die 
flächenförmige Anordnung der Punkte im Sehfeld ist eine Raumanschauung, die wir ohne Zuthun unsere 
Vorstellungsverlaufs der Einrichtung unserer Organisation und dem physisch-psychischen Mechanismus 
verdanken; die Tiefe des Raumes erkennt auch der Gesichtssinn nur mittelbar nach Anleitung der 
Erfahrungen, während dem Tastsinn alle Dimensionen des Weltraums gleichmässig nur durch eine 
Verkettung seiner einzelnen Empfindungen entstehen.76 
 
By way of summary, we can say that, understood as the sensation of the external 
localization of the stimulus in addition to the sensation of movement caused by the changes 
 
74 According to Lotze, starting from simple intensive sensory qualities it is not possible to construct a spatial 
representation, it is the mind that orders the sum of qualities in a spatial sense. Empiricism affirms that spatial 
representation is empirically acquired through the senses, nativism affirms that it is innate. Nativism has many 
forms: Kant affirmed that space was part of the transcendental structure of subjectivity, while Hering affirmed—
naturalizing Kantian philosophy—that spatial perception was innate in the physiological structure of the nervous 
system (see the note on Hering, 59 n). In fact, Lotze overcame both empiricism and nativism because the repre-
sentation of space was neither innate nor empirically acquired but consisted of specific mental acts (innate) that 
ordered empirically acquired data.  
75 See: C. Stumpf, Über den psychologischen Ursprung der Raumvorstellung (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1873), 73. 




of state occurring within muscles and nerves, the local sign is the point of connection 
allowing for the transformation of the space that we perceive into the space that we think, that 
is, into an idea. In this sense, we can speak of an interdisciplinary theory of spatial perception 
that connects together physiology, psychology and the philosophy of mind. Taken together, 
all these activities—the external stimulus affecting the body, muscles’ and nerves’s reaction, 
the sensory formation of the feeling of movement and then its re-elaboration by thought—
allow us to reconstruct the provenance of objects and external events in  our consciousness.  
It is worth remembering that, according to Lotze, there is not a one-to-one correspondence 
between the external physical stimulus and sensation. In other words, we cannot say that the 
activity of the mind corresponds exactly to external reality. On this point, Lotze followed the 
results of the E. H. Weber’s experiments on sensation. According to Lotze, mind freely 
produces representations on the basis of sensation; similarly, sensibility spontaneously 
produces sensations or feelings on the basis of external stimuli. Here the occasionalist theory 
appears again as having been of fundamental importance to Lotze’s thought.  
This understanding separated Lotze from Kant’s perspective. Lotze did not consider space 
as an a priori form of intuition, and, therefore, as subjective. It results from our re-elaboration 
of an objective stimulus which comes from the outside world and hence has an empirical 
root. Space is no longer a priori and innate, although it has its specific genesis.  
A further divergence from Kant’s thought was Lotze’s conception of human sensations as 
a spontaneous product of the mind which does not correspond to nor resemble the outside 
world. The life of the mind, even at its lowest levels, is freely productive. In this sense, Lotze 
wrote that our perceptions and the outside world share the same relation as the wooden key of 
a piano and the sound that it provokes.77 Hermann von Helmholtz also expressed the idea that 
 




sense organs produce not a corresponding image of the external world but only ‘signs’ that 
we mentally re-elaborate and then transform into ideas or representations valid for us. Similar 
idea had been further developed by the Southwest Neo-Kantian Heinrich Rickert and later by 
the logical empiricist Moritz Schlick.78  
In his ‘grater’ Logik (1874), Lotze distinguished the formal significance from the real 
significance of thought. In its formality, thought is nothing more than a tool that we use in 
order to create order among our representations; consequently, it has no direct contact with 
external reality. According to the theory of the formal significance of thought, logical forms 
and the laws of their application are the presuppositions whereby thought constitutes its 
nexus of representations in the particular form that thought itself deems true. At the same 
time, thought also has a real significance, an objective validity that it realizes; the aim of 
thought is not to reflect external reality but to reach the mentioned realization. This objective 
validity, which Lotze called both product and final thought, is realized through the use of 
laws and logical acts, which remain both formal, instrumental and psychological. Thus, in its 
formal significance, thought has no direct contact with reality but in its real significance it 
coincides with reality. In other words, the theory of the real significance of thought is based 
on a basic confidence (Zuversicht) in the coincidence between the movements of thought and 
the course of things. The movement of thought that connects two representations is a psychic 
process; as Lotze explained it: 
 
this movement is merely a psychical process, without which indeed our result could neither be obtained in 
the first instance nor repeated afterwards in memory, but which has nevertheless to be abstracted from the 
 
78 See: N. Milkov, “Concept Formation in Science: Heinrich Rickert and the Logical Empiricists”, (unpublished 





real significance of the act of thought to which it ministered, as a scaffolding (Lehrgerüst) is withdrawn 
when the building is completed. Thus we see at once in an example of the simplest possible kind the 
antithesis between the merely formal significance of an act of thought and the real significance of its 
product.79   
 
He continued thus: 
 
In the same way every one who desires to enjoy the prospect from a hilltop has to traverse some particular 
straight or winding path from the point at which he starts up to the summit which discloses the view; this 
path itself is not part of the view which he wishes to obtain. The Thought itself on the other hand in which 
the process of thinking issues, the prospect obtained, has Objective validity (objective Geltung); the various 
paths followed by various travellers once traversed and left behind, the scene which opens before them is the 
same to all alike, an object independent of the subjectivity of the individual; it is not merely one more 
affection of his consciousness which he experiences, but an object presented to his thought which also 
presents itself as the same self-identical object to the consciousness of others.80       
 
Ultimately, Lotze’s radical opposition to the reduction of mental to physical events led 
him to argue that certain crucial aspects of human mental life, such as knowledge, will, and 
emotion, cannot be explained in strictly physical-physiological terms. The general aim of 
Lotze’s philosophy was thus to overcome any partial vision of man and nature, whether it be 
mechanistic and materialistic reductionism or idealistic anti-reductionism. The major 
achievement of Lotze’s Medicinische Psychologie lies less in the presented results of 
empirical research on some specific mental processes, and more in its deep reflections on the 
interrelation between physiology, psychology and philosophy.  
 
79 R. H. Lotze, Logik (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1874), 540; english trans., Logic, in Three books: of Thought, of Investi-
gation, and of Knowledge, B. Bosanquet (ed. and trans.), (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1884), 475–6.  





4.6.  The impact of Lotze’s theory of local signs 
4.6.1. Hermann von Helmholtz 
Lotze’s theory of local signs was of great importance to Hermann von Helmholtz. Among 
other things, he claimed that sensations are “symbols” or “signs” that allow us to 
acknowledge the “quality” of objects and, therefore, the objects themselves.81 First, we 
should immediately remark that Helmholtz’s ‘empirical’ theory of visual perception was 
based on the recognition of a psychic activity that he called “unconscious inference”.82 This 
psychic activity, essentially associative, is the core of the perceptual process. According to 
Helmholtz, this process is empirical and, in his view, empiricism is entirely consistent with 
the recognition of the existence of a psychic activity preceding experience.83 
 
81 H. von Helmholtz, Handbuch der Physiologischen Optik (1856–1867), (Hamburg-Leipzig: Voss, 1909–
1911), 2nd vol., 5–6.  
82 Helmholtz developed his empiricist theory of vision in his Kant-Lecture “Kant-Rede” (“Über das Sehen des 
Menschen”) held in Königsberg on February 27, 1855. See: H. von Helmholtz, Vorträge und Reden (Braun-
schweig: Vieweg, 1896), 1st vol., 87–117.  
83 It is generally accepted that Helmholtz’s idea according to which spatial perception cannot be simply reduced 
to the empirical and physiological level and the consequent assumption of a psychological activity synthesizing 
the various nervous inputs and organizing them into spatial patterns comes from Lotze’s Medicinische 
Psychologie. See: T. Lenoir, “The Eye as Mathematician. Clinical Practice, Instrumentation, and Helmholtz’s 
Construction of an Empiricist Theory of Vision”, in D. Cahan (ed.), Hermann von Helmholtz and the 
Foundations of Nineteenth-Century Science (Berkeley-Los Angeles-London: University of California Press, 
1993), 109–53; R. Steven Turner, “Consensus and Controversy. Helmholtz on the Visual Perception of Space”, 





As for the problem of sensations, Helmholtz agreed with Lotze’s theory of local signs. Our 
sensations do not resemble the external world, that is, the external objects that stimulate our 
nervous system. Sensations are only signs or symbols that we “learn” to read.84 The 
sensations are not directly connected to the external object but to the nervous system. 
By adopting Lotze’s theory of local signs, Helmholtz overcame Johannes Müller’s 
physiological innatism. Müller held that the representation of space has no empirical genesis, 
but it is closely related to the anatomical and physiological structures of the nervous system. 
Hering also stated something similar, rejecting any psychical activity in the process of 
perception.85 Spatial perception is “innate” in the anatomical structure of our nervous system. 
Significantly, such pre-constituted anatomical structures and innate physiological behaviors 
were not confirmed by experimental investigation. This brought Helmholtz to empiricism in 
psychology. 
The nervous system is not able by itself to organize its qualitative and intensive elements 
into spatial representations. To this end, it is necessary to postulate the existence of a 
psychical activity able to “read” the various “signs” or nerve inputs and to compose a spatial 
representation on the basis of associations. The mind accomplishes these associations on the 
basis of repeated experiences and memory.86  
Lotze showed that the spatial intuition (die räumliche Anschauung) is a thematic core 
connecting anatomical and physiological research with psychology. Empirical research in 
spatial perception (Raumvorstellung) confirmed that certain purely psychological phenomena 
 
84 See: H. von Helmholtz, Handbuch der Physiologischen Optik (1856–1867), (Hamburg-Leipzig: Voss, 1909–
1911), 3rd vol., 433.  
85 See above the Helmholtz-Hering’s controversy (59 n).  
86 H. von Helmholtz, Handbuch der Physiologischen Optik (1856–1867), (Hamburg-Leipzig: Voss, 1909–




could not be explained on a purely physiological basis. It was necessary to postulate a mind 
that could explained what physiology by itself could not: the transformation of purely 
qualitative and intensive sensations into spatial representations.  
 
4.6.2. Wilhelm Wundt 
The relationship between physiology and psychology is central in the thought of Wilhelm 
Wundt who was Helmholtz’s assistant in Heidelberg and was interested in Lotze’s theory of 
local signs since 1862.87 Wundt granted Lotze the merit (Verdienst) of having paid due 
attention to the psychological side of sensorial perception (Sinneswahrnehmung). However, 
on the other hand, he maintained that Lotze did not adequately explain the spatial order in 
which ‘local signs’ are situated but only considered this spatial order as an original and a 
priori property of the human mind. 
 Wundt returned to the Lotze’s theory of local signs in his “Zur Theorie der räumlichen 
Gesichtswahrnehmungen” (1898).88 He once again acknowledged Lotze’s merit in having 
clearly grasped the ‘psychological’ meaning of the reconstruction of spatiality 
(Wiedererzeugung der Räumlichkeit) but criticized the fact that he did not give the question 
an adequate solution. Lotze had merely postulated the existence of the mind as an organizing 
activity. Moreover, according to Wundt, Lotze developed the theory of local signs in order to 
answer an essentially metaphysical question: can the mind, in an immediate way and without 
 
87 See: W. M. Wundt, Beiträge zur Theorie der Sinneswahrnehmung (Leipzig und Heidelberg: C. F. Win-
ter’sche Verlagshandlung, 1862), 12–13. 
88 W. M. Wundt, “Zur Theorie der räumlichen Gesichtswahrnehmungen”, in Philosophische Studien (Leipzig: 





the help of other organs, perceive the extension through retinal images? Or, should we think 
of a means by which the mind can transform intensive into the extensive elements? 
 According to Lotze, through the system of local signs the mind transforms purely 
intensive sensations into spatial representations. According to Wundt, however, this approach 
would not solve the problem of the spatial perception (Raumvorstellung). Lotze’s local signs 
are just “physiological nervous processes”.89 As such, they can only produce intensive 
sensations. The mind attributes an extensive, measurable spatial value to these intensive 
sensations—it has such an innate capacity. Unfortunately, this original ability of the mind to 
attribute extension to what is by definition purely intensive—such as a set of tones—does not 
solve the problem of spatial perception (Raumvorstellung). On the contrary, according to 
Wundt, it actually raises a new problem. 
In short, Wundt’s criticism of Lotze can be reduced to the following question: how is it 
possible that, alongside possessing a certain intensity and quality that distinguishes them 
from each other, physiological nervous processes, such as local signs, are also located in a 
specific space which provides them with a third property: spatiality?90 
In summary, this is why, according to Wundt, Lotze grasped the centrality of the mind by 
space perceiving (Raumvorstellung) only indirectly: because he realized that physiology 
alone cannot explain the genesis of the spatial order. In consequence, it must postulate the 
existence of an organizing capacity providing spatial order to physiological complexes. Lotze 
certainly understood the centrality of psychological analysis in the processes of perception. 
Unfortunately, he failed to directly address the problem of mind. According to Wundt, the 
 
89 R. H. Lotze, Medicinische Psychologie, 331. 




only way to do this is to observe its internal functioning by means of an experimental 
method. 
Wundt clearly acknowledges the existence of a psychic sphere whose internal functioning 
had been described by Weber-Fechner’s law which had an eminently theoretical value. 
Wundt applied to psychology the experimental method of physical science, stating that it is 
possible to directly measure the stimulus that produces the sensation (response of the mind). 
The psychic effect is indirectly measured on the basis of the direct measurement of the 
physical cause. Wundt’s experiments were aimed at demonstrating that the psyche is 
endowed with regularity so that it might be possible to formulate the law of its behavior with 
the help of Weber-Fechner’s law. Most importantly, by means of this lawful regularity, the 
experimenter can indirectly measure the activity of the mind. Wundt’s experimental 
psychology is based on a philosophical vision called psycho-physical parallelism whose main 
character is the interaction between mind and body. Whereas Lotze considered the interaction 
as based on a fundamental incomparability between mind and body (precisely for this reason 
his psychology is dualistic and he developed his peculiar occasionalist vision of this 
relationship), Wundt interpreted it in a monistic sense. He rejected the conception of the 
incomparability in favour of a possible comparison of mind and body. Without such a 





4.6.3. William James  
 Lotze’s theory of local signs was also important to William James, who in the chapter 20 
of his The Principles of Psychology dealt with the perception of space. The analysis of the 
theory of local signs is a key topic of this chapter.91  
 According to James, sensation has two parameters. It has a specific qualia that radically 
differs in different sensations; and it has its specific location.92 James raised the question that 
Lotze had already posed in the Medicinische Psychologie, namely, the question of the 
relationship between quality and locality, or position of sensation. Undoubtedly, the locality 
or the position has a spatial character that the qualia of the sensation cannot have. James said: 
 
Can these differences of mere quality in feeling, varying according to locality yet having each sensibly and 
intrinsically and by itself nothing to do with position, constitute the ‘susceptibilities’ we mentioned, the 
conditions of being perceived in position, of the localities to which they belong?93 
 
And he continued: 
 
Lotze, who in his Medizinische Psychologie first described the sensations in this way, designating them, thus 
conceived, as local-signs. This term has obtained wide currency in Germany, and in speaking of the 
‘LOCAL-SIGN THEORY’ hereafter, I shall always mean the theory which denies that there can be in a 
sensation any element of actual locality, of inherent spatial order, any tone as it were which cries to us 
immediately and without further ado, ‘I am here’, or ‘I am there’. If, as may well be the case, we by this 
 
91 See: W. James, The Principles of Psychology (New York: Henry Holt and Co, 1890); repr. New York: Dover 
Publications, 1950, II, 155–66. 
92 According to James, the sensations have their specific qualia that differs from a qualia of another sensation 
and they (the sensations) are felt where they belong. 





time find ourselves tempted to accept the Local-sign theory in a general way, we have to clear up several 
farther matters. […] The sign is a quality of feeling and the thing is a position.94 
 
James suggested a reasonable interpretation of Lotze’s theory. According to Lotze, additional 
sensations (Nebenempfindungen) are signs or hints that, in themselves, are not spatial; these 
signs are occasions which the mind orders spatially. Space is extrinsic and supplementary to 
sensation. As conclusion, Lotze postulated the existence of an innate mind activity which 
orders the various sensations in spatial series. James opposed the mentalism of Medicinische 
Psychologie and stated that the extension is given directly in the sensation itself.95 James 
replaced Lotze’s atomistic and punctual sensation with a stimulated sensation, in which the 
extension of the stimulus was given directly without the need for mind’s mediation.96 
James rejected Lotze’s mentalism already in the Preface because 
 
all attempts to explain our phenomenally given thoughts as products of deeper-lying entities (whether the 
latter be named ‘Soul’, ‘Transcendental Ego’, ‘Ideas’, or ‘Elementary Units of Consciousness’) are 
metaphysical. This book consequently rejects both the associationist and the spiritualist theories; and in this 
strictly positivistic point of view consists the only feature of it for which I feel tempted to claim originality.97 
 
The limits of this positivist and anti-metaphysical statement became clear in the course of the 
Principles. Consciousness could not be understood as an association of discrete and atomistic 
entities—as considered by the German psychological-scientific tradition (Müller, Helmholtz, 
 
94 Ibid., 157–58. 
95 See: James, op. cit., I, 349 n. Here Lotze is defined by James as “a strong defender of the Soul-Substance the-
ory” in his Medicinische Psychologie; cf., James, op. cit., II, 275–6.  
96 See: Woodward, op. cit., 225. 




and Wundt)––but as a continuous change, a ‘stream’ in which transition and continuity have 
more value than substantive and punctual states. In this sense, Lotze’s criticism of 





5.  H. Lotze and W. James: dependence and originality 
William James was a passionate reader of Rudolph Hermann Lotze’s works, in particular, 
of Medicinische Psychologie and Mikrokosmos.1 The accurate reading of these books is 
evident in The Principles of Psychology in which he mentioned Lotze already in the 
“Preface”. Otto F. Kraushaar highlighted Lotze’s “influence” on William James; Paul 
Grimley Kuntz even spoke of a “dependence”.2  
The fundamental idea that James drew from Lotze’s works is that psychology should take 
into account not only the scientific-experimental investigation of the psyche but should also 
make philosophical inquiry in this area, both metaphysical and epistemological. The search 
for truth in psychology is the synthesis between observational facts (Thatsachen des 
Augenscheins) and the principle of criticism or judgment (Principien der Beurtheilung), of 
reflective observation (reflectirende Beobachtung). These philosophical principles, 
fundamental for the search of truth, are human views on the world, including moral and 
religious views. James stated that: 
 
That theory will be most generally believed which, besides offering us objects able to account satisfactorily 
for our sensible experience, also offers those which are most interesting, those which appeal most urgently to 
our aesthetic, emotional, and active needs.3 
 
 
1 James bought a copy of the Medicinische Psychologie in 1867 in Germany and there is a great number of notes 
in his copy that prove an accurate and detailed reading of the book. (See: W. Woodward, op. cit., 224) James 
also admired Lotze’s Metaphysic. 
2 O. F. Kraushaar, (1936, 1938, 1939, 1940); P. G. Kuntz, (1971). 




The cooperation of philosophical and scientific interests aimed at producing a satisfactory 
psychological theory is undoubtedly an idea that James drew from Lotze. 
 According to both, psychology must postulate a dualism of mind and body. The 
interaction between mind and body cannot become a subject-matter of an exact science; it 
must rather be understood as a correlation between mind and brain. According to James, the 
task of psychology was to confirm this correlation. On the contrary, Lotze postulated the 
existence of a Soul-Substance unifying all mental states. Such a mentalistic claim was 
rejected by James, who only collected, described and correlated mental states. Unlike James, 
Lotze understood mental states as effects of deep causes composing the mind. 
 Finally, in Essays in Radical Empiricism James replaced the mind/body dualism of the 
Principles with the concept of “pure experience” in which the subject/object dualism 
eventually disappears. 
 
5.1. The limits of the scientific psychology 
In the “Preface” to the Principles James discriminated psychology as a natural science from 
metaphysical psychology. As a natural science, psychology must uncritically accept certain 
data as basis for its research: it is science that studies thoughts and feelings. The task of 
psychology is to ascertain “the empirical correlation of the various sorts of thought or feeling 
with definite conditions of the brain, can go no farther––can go no farther, that is, as a natural 
science. If she goes farther she becomes metaphysical”.4 Psychology becomes metaphysical 
when it explains thoughts or feelings on the basis of deep causes such as mind or the 
elementary units of consciousness. For this reason, James opposed the associationist and the 
mentalist theories. 
 




In the second half of the nineteenth century, Francis Bowen, leading figure of the 
American academic psychology (he had been professor at Harvard University), still 
investigated the faculty of the mind. This was the context against which James’ empiricist 
and anti-metaphysical approach stood out as definitely new.  
During his stay in Germany in 1868 (James visited his colleagues in Dresden, Berlin, and 
Heidelberg) James came into contact with the scientific psychology of Johannes Petrus 
Müller’s school: Helmholtz and Wundt. As a result of this formative experience in Germany, 
in 1875 James founded one of the first experimental laboratories of psychology at Harvard 
University. Wundt opened his own laboratory in Leipzig a few years later, in 1879. G. 
Stanley Hall, James’ former student, opened his own laboratory at the Johns Hopkins 
University in 1881.  
While writing his work, however, James became progressively more critical towards the 
attempt to consider psychology as a natural science. James’ anti-metaphysical attitude did not 
lead him to a total endorsement of the conceptions of scientific psychology.5 As James wrote: 
 
The spiritualist and the associationist must both be ‘cerebralists’, to the extent at least of admitting that 
certain peculiarities in the way of working of their own favorite principles are explicable only by the fact 
that the brain laws are a codeterminant of the result. Our first conclusion, then, is that a certain amount of 
brain-physiology must be presupposed or included in Psychology. […] Mental states occasion also changes 
in the calibre of blood-vessels, or alteration in the heart-beats, or processes more subtle still, in glands and 
viscera. If these are taken into account, as well as acts which follow at some remote period because the 
 
5 It is important to highlight that James’ interest was wide-ranging. Alongside the chapters that demonstrated an 
accurate knowledge of the most recent studies of cerebral physiology, there were chapters of clear metaphysical 





mental state was once there, it will be safe to lay down the general law that no mental modification ever 
occurs which is not accompanied or followed by a bodily change.6 
 
According to James, ‘cerebralism’ means that there is a correlation between physical and 
mental states, but such a correlation is not to be understood as the strict mechanism of 
Weber’s law. To remind the reader, Weber’s law claims that there is a logarithmic relation 
between body and mind. At that time, the most important work of the scientific psychology 
was undoubtedly Wundt’s Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie (1874). In this work, 
the law of Weber-Fechner was adopted as the fundamental law of psychology. 
James also rejected Fechner’s interpretation of Weber’s law. According to Fechner, “the 
just-perceptible increment is the sensation-unit” and, consequently, all our sensations would 
be masses of sensation-units. The associationist theory that considered sensations as “masses 
of units combined” was defined by James as “fragile” and “absurd”. James declared himself 
against the associationism as an attempt to turn psychology into an exact science.7  
Human mental states, human behavior could not be considered as simple logarithmic 
increments of a physical stimulus, because this would disregard a fundamental factor, that is, 
the human ability to act according to ends. It is a matter of fact that in his Principles James 
explored the metaphysical theme of the mechanism-teleology relationship and free will.8 This 
gives reason to say that the anti-metaphysical way declared in the “Preface” was not 
consequentially followed. Lotze, whose name appears since the “Preface”, became a leading 
authority of the book for James.  
 
6 James, op. cit., I, 4–5. 
7 See: ibid., I, 545–9. 





James’ critique of scientific psychology went even further, holding that these 
psychologists “give one nowhere a central point of view, or a deductive or generative 
principle. They distinguish and refine and specify in infinitum without ever getting on to 
another logical level”.9 They study consciousness by dividing it into smaller and smaller 
parts, which are, then, combined together in accordance with the laws of association. In this 
way, the unitary point of view on consciousness is not taken into account. They give more 
importance to the atomic facts than to the connecting element. 
 
5.2.  James’ critique of associationism 
Ralph Barton Perry, James’ pupil, stated that: 
 
James’s early and persistent rejection of associationism, in what he called its ‘nihilistic’ implications, 
certainly owed something to Lotze, who had distinguished merely external conjunctions from the ‘inward 
kinship’ of things that ‘belong’ together.10 
 
James explicitly dealt with associationism in the chapter 6 of The Mind-Stuff Theory, an 
“exclusively metaphysical” chapter.11 According to the associationist theory, human mind is 
 
9 James, op. cit., II, 448. 
10 R. B. Perry, The Thought and Character of William James (Little, Brown, 1935), I, 586–7. In 1936 Perry won 
the Pulitzer Prize for biography and autobiography with such a biographical book dedicated to his master James. 





constituted by a multiplicity of distinct ideas associated in a unit.12 According to James this is 
“logically unintelligible” because: 
 
12 Herbart developed an associationist psychology. To specify better such a theory, we must deal with the prob-
lem of metaphysics. According to Herbart, there is a radical distinction between the real essences, metaphysi-
cally understood, and the way in which these essences are perceived and known by the subject. On this point 
Herbart followed the Kantian distinction between noumenon and phenomenon. The real essences are simple and 
have no relation with other essences; relations are only the accidental point of view of the knowing subject on 
reality. The relations between things that we perceive and know are only psychological representations which 
refer to things but do not exhaust their essence. According to Herbart, from the metaphysical point of view, rela-
tion has no value and the whole knowledge building is made of judgments, which are associations of ideas or 
representations.  
 Herbart’s psychological associationism was sharply criticized by Lotze. He argued that reality, metaphysi-
cally speaking, is relation. In Mikrokosmos (III, IX) Lotze wrote about things’ interrelation (der Zusammenhang 
der Dinge) and rejected the concept of position (Position, Setzung) of being. The ontological form of substances 
is a relation, because the whole substance consists of single elements that Lotze named atoms. Lotze’s meta-
physical building is then represented by three fundamental concepts: atoms, substances and relations. The sub-
stances constructed by atoms and relations are states of affairs (Sachverhalt). According to Lotze, these latter 
are expressed in logical forms by judgments. Judgments (logical forms) connect ideas in the same way as sub-
stances (ontological forms) are interrelated in reality; this is possible because judgment is no longer, as Herbart 
said, a simple association of ideas or representations; judgment connects things or contents. This means that the 
logical and epistemological forms of judgments are secondary and depend on those ontological forms that are 
primary and independent. On the basis of this general assumption we can state that “the content of a judgment 
manifests, in Lotze’s view, the structure of the minimal ontological interrelation that obtains among objects 
(things)” (N. Milkov, “Hermann Lotze and Franz Brentano”, in Philosophical Readings. Online Journal of Phi-
losophy, M. Sgarbi and D. De Santis (ed.), 10 vol., 2, 2018, 117.). 
 Furthermore, Lotze argued for the primacy of judgement on the concept and for a variation of the context-
principle. In this connection Lotze criticized Plato precisely because he claimed a primariness of the idea with 






All the ‘combinations’ which we actually know are EFFECTS, wrought by the units said to be ‘combined’, 
UPON SOME ENTITY OTHER THAN THEMSELVES. Without this feature of a medium or vehicle, the 
notion of combination has no sense. […] In other words, no possible number of entities (call them as you 
like, whether forces, material particles, or mental elements) can sum themselves together. Each remains, in 
the sum, what it always was; and the sum itself exists only for a bystander who happens to overlook the 
units and to apprehend the sum as such; or else it exists in the shape of some other effect on an entity 
external to the sum itself.13  
 
According to James, human mind is not composed of smaller units––as claimed by 
Fechner’s psychophysics (Fechner is quoted by James as the defender of the Mind-Stuff 
theory)––because mind connects the units in a sum or a whole; in other words, mind is an 
entity external to the elements that it connects and, therefore, the constitutive elements of the 
 
the Platonic doctrine that this, which was its actual undertaking, it only half accomplishes. An account of the 
necessary connexion of two contents of thought must always assume the logical form of a judgment; it cannot 
be expressed in the form of a mere notion which does not in itself contain a proposition at all. Thus we have al-
ways employed laws, that is to say propositions, which express a relation between different elements, as exam-
ples to explain the meaning of Validity in contradistinction to Existence. The term cannot be transferred to sin-
gle concepts without some degree of obscurity: we can only say of concepts that they mean something, and they 
mean something because certain propositions are valid of them, as for example the proposition that the content 
of any given concept is identical with itself and stands in unchangeable relations of affinity or contrast to oth-
ers.” (R. H. Lotze, Logic: In Three Books, of Thought, of Investigation, and of Knowledge, B. Bosanquet 
(trans.), (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1884), 447–8). This conception of Lotze was consequentially adopted by 
Brentano. See: N. Milkov, “Lotze’s Concept of ‘States of Affairs’ and its Critics,” Prima Philosophia, 15, 2002, 
437–50; N. Milkov, “Hermann Lotze and Franz Brentano”, in Philosophical Readings. Online Journal of Phi-
losophy, M. Sgarbi and D. De Santis (ed.), 10 vol., 2, 2018. 





mind are the transition and connection of the elements themselves. James’ criticism against 
associationism can be already found in Lotze’s Medicinische Psychologie. James clearly 
stated that “Lotze has set forth the truth of this law more clearly and copiously than any other 
writer.”14  
Lotze rejected a one-to-one correspondence between body and mind and developed his 
own psycho-physical mechanism as an original alternative to psychophysics. His conception 
of the relationship between mind and body was not logarithmic. Bodily movements were 
conceived as occasions that activate the free production of human mind. The mind is different 
in type from the body and their relationship can only be interpreted in an occasionalistic 
way.15 
James’ critique of associationism relied, as we have seen, on Lotze’s critique. Once 
consciousness is broken down into atomic parts, then it is no longer possible to weld them 
together by means of the laws of association.16 Scientific psychology is consequently not able 
to comprehend the psychological reality such as it is perceived by the human being: 
 
The traditional psychology talks like one who should say a river consists of nothing but pailsful, spoonsful, 
quartpotsful, barrelsful, and other moulded forms of water. Even were the pails and the pots all actually 
 
14 James, ibidem. 
15 The example of the lemonade is helpful to understand this difference. Physical lemonade is a sum of units 
which, as a sum, remain what they always were: lemon and sugar. When we drink lemonade things are 
completely different. The taste of lemonade is not a sum of the two different tastes of lemon and sugar but is a 
completely new taste that cannot be reduced to the simple sum of the two tastes. Cfr. James, op. cit., 158 n. 





standing in the stream, still between them the free water would continue to flow. It is just this free water of 
consciousness that psychologists resolutely overlook.17  
 
This stream of thought is the psychological reality that man directly perceives; it represents 
the primary data of consciousness. The conclusion can be made that the critique of 
associationism that James drew from the Lotze’s Medicinische Psychologie helped him by 
developing the notion of stream of thought.18  
 
5.3. Lotze’s influence on James’ theory of emotions 
Lotze also influenced James’ study of emotions. Otto F. Kraushaar maintained that: 
 
In spite of the absence of acknowledgment on the part of James, the striking similarity of the two doctrines, 
plus the herein established fact of James’ knowledge of Lotze’s exposition, leads irresistibly to the 
conclusion that Lotze was one of the great formative influences in James’ theory of the emotions. James’ 
position is, in fact, simply a restatement of the Lotzean one, but more clear, incisive and radical; where in 
Lotze’s view the organic responses are still for the most part only contributory to the emotion, for James 
they become actually constitutive of it. Also, James supports his position with evidence from introspection 
and pathology of which Lotze had been quite innocent.19  
 
There are many similarities between Lotze’s and James’ theory of emotions. Indeed, both 
thinkers considered emotions as developing in accordance with a cause-and-effect pattern; 
 
17 Ibid., 255. 
18 See: Lotze, Medicinische Psychologie, 210ff; Mikrokosmos, book II, chapter I, § 5; Metaphysik, §§ 242, 260. 






there is no special brain-centre for emotions20—the reason is that the latter develop from the 
peripheral nervous activity; both the authors shared the idea that our body is a “sounding-
board” for mental states. 
 Lotze held that there is a physiological mechanism for the development of emotions and 
that the organ and functions produce emotions. The kind of body’s movement, the number of 
anatomical elements involved, the movement of joints and muscles: all this directly affects 
the intensity of the emotion. This led Lotze to reject the existence of a central and separated 
organ for mental manifestations of emotions. At this issue, Lotze wrote: 
 
Wir glauben die nächste und wichtigste Begründung der geistigen Functionen nicht sowohl in den centralen, 
als vielmehr in den peripherischen Organen und ihren Functionen suchen zu müssen.21 
  
According to Lotze’s Medicinische Psychologie, bodily changes––such as the oscillations of 
the central organs––are the “effects” of a mental stream of ideas, a mental cognition which is 
their “cause”. As Lotze wrote: 
 
Und so mögen allerdings, wie wir früher bereits andeuteten, schwache Mitoscillationen der Centralorgane 
den psychischen Vorstellungslauf überall begleiten, doch nicht als seine Ursachen, sondern als seine Folgen, 
als eine Art von Resonanz, welche die Thätigkeit der Seele zur Verstärkung der Lebhaftigkeit ihrer 
Vorstellungen secundär in den materiellen Substraten hervorruft.22 
 
 
20 A century later, in his Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), Wittgenstein produced similar 
argument. There is no special center of language or of calculi in the brain. 
21 Lotze, Medicinische Psychologie, 554; see: ibid., pp. 257ff.  




Mental states (cause) generate body movements (effect), because the body function as the 
sounding-board of the mind.  
James embraced this view of Lotze in his somatic theory of emotions. He presented it in 
1884 in an article published in Mind (old series). The following year (1885), also the Danish 
physiologist Carl Georg Lange developed, independently from his American colleague, a 
somatic theory of emotions.23 James claimed that the cause of emotion is not something 
mental, such as grief or rage, but a somatic and physiological phenomenon—tears, heart-beat, 
blood pressure, breathing, etc. But he immediately added that his somatic theory of emotions 
was not materialistic, because 
 
our emotions must always be inwardly what they are, whatever be the physiological ground of their 
apparition. If they are deep, pure, worthy, spiritual facts on any conceivable theory of they physiological 
source, they remain no less deep, pure, spiritual and worthy of regard on this present sensational theory. […] 
If such a theory is true, then each emotion is the resultant of a sum of elements, and each element is caused 
by a physiological process of a sort already well known. The elements are all organic changes, and each of 
them is the reflex effect of the exciting objects.24  
  
James’ somatic theory of emotions holds that the perception of exciting facts can produce 
bodily changes as its effect. These bodily changes are the “general causes” of emotions.25 
 
23 James stated that: “Prof. C. Lange, of Copenhagen, in the pamphlet from which I have already quoted, 
published in 1885 a physiological theory of their [of emotion] constitution and conditioning, which I had 
already broached the previous year in an article in Mind.” (James, op. cit., II, 449). 
24 Ibid., 453. 





James further wrote that “the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting 
fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion.”26  
This view contrasts the common-sense theory of emotion which assumes that the 
perception of the exciting facts (mental states) causes in us the corresponding emotion 
(mental state) and the latter causes in us the physical change (physiological plane). James 
opposed this conception, stating that: 
 
Common-sense says, we lose our fortune, are sorry and weep; we meet a bear, are frightened and run; we are 
insulted by a rival, are angry and strike. The hypothesis here to be defended says that this order of sequence 
is incorrect, that the one mental state is not immediately induced by the other, that the bodily manifestations 
must first be interposed between, and that the more rational statement is that we feel sorry because we cry, 
angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that we cry, strike, or tremble, because we are 
sorry, angry or fearful, as the case may be. Without the bodily states following on the perception, the latter 
would be purely cognitive in form, pale, colorless, destitute of emotional warmth. We might then see the 
bear, and judge it best to run, receive the insult and deem it right to strike, but we should not actually feel 
afraid or angry.27  
 
According to the understanding of common-sense, the emotion is the second step of the 
sequence, whereas the physical change is the third. This means that emotion is theoretically a 
mental state separated from the physiological plane that it causes. In contrast, according to 
James, the separation between emotion and bodily changes is “inconceivable”. A purely 
disembodied emotion is a “nonentity”. Emotion is bodily and cannot be relegated to a purely 
“intellectual realm”.28 James further claimed that: 
 
26 Ibidem. 
27 Ibid., 449–50. 





I now proceed to urge the vital point of my whole theory, which is this: If we fancy some strong emotion, 
and then try to abstract from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its bodily symptoms, we find we have 
nothing left behind, no ‘mind-stuff’ out of which the emotion can be constituted, and that a cold and neutral 
state of intellectual perception is all that remains.29    
  
The somatic theory of emotions proposes a different sequence giving rise to emotions. The 
perception of the exciting fact causes an instinctive reaction of the body, which, next, causes 
the emotion. In other words, this instinctive reaction consists of reflex movements that 
generate a certain feeling in us. This feeling is the emotion. According to James, there is a 
coexistence between bodily perturbation and subjective feeling. As James put it: 
 
To begin with, no reader of the last two chapters will be inclined to doubt the fact that objects do excite 
bodily changes by a preorganized mechanism, or the farther fact that the changes are so indefinitely 
numerous and subtle that the entire organism may be called a sounding-board, which every change of 
consciousness, however slight, may make reverberate.30 
 
Another similarity to Lotze’s perspective consists in rejecting the existence of a special brain-
centre for emotions. The physiological basis of emotions simply consists of incoming nerve 
currents, muscles and skin; nothing more needs to be postulated. James wrote: 
 
An object falls on a sense-organ, affects a cortical part, and is perceived; or else the latter, excited inwardly, 
gives rise to an idea of the same object. Quick as a flash, the reflex currents pass down through their 
preordained channels, alter the condition of muscle, skin, and viscus; and these alterations, perceived, like 
 
29 Ibid., 451. 




the original object, in as many portions of the cortex, combine with it in consciousness and transform it from 
an object-simply-apprehended into an object-emotionally-felt. No new principles have to be invoked, 
nothing postulated beyond the ordinary reflex circuits, and the local centres admitted in one shape or another 
by all to exist.31    
 
5.4. The Will: the feeling of innervation and the ideomotor action in Lotze and James 
As said above, the psychophysical law of stimulus-reaction reduced human behavior to a 
mere logarithmic increase. This certainly simplified the work of analysis in the laboratory but 
did not account for the purposiveness (intentionality) of consciousness because it linked body 
and mind mechanically.  
 According to James, there is a correlation between mind and body––in fact, cerebralism 
states that mental modifications are accompanied or followed by bodily changes––that must 
be interpreted in a voluntaristic and not in a mechanical way.  
 James dedicated an entire chapter of The Principles to the functions of the brain, 
considered as an organ of the mind. In it he attested his wide-ranging knowledge of 
physiological studies in this topic: Broca, Ferrier, Wernicke, Wundt, Luciani, Buccola.32 
These physiological analyse was useful to James as a foundation for his evolutionary 
approach which in 1907 led him to define his functional psychology.33 Although James 
criticized Herbert Spencer’s definition of mind as correspondence of the real and 
consequently rejected the conception of the mind as a simple effect of the external 
environment on the nervous system, he eventually adopted Spencer’s idea that the essence of 
 
31 Ibid., 473–74. 
32 See: James, op. cit., I, ch. II.  
33 See: James, “The Energies of Men”, in Philosophical Review, XIV, 1907, 1–20. Functionalism dates back to 





mental and bodily life is “the adjustment of inner to outer relations”.34 Mind inhabits the 
environment; this latter acts on the mind and the mind on the environment. James concluded 
that: 
 
On the whole, few recent formulas have done more real service of a rough sort in psychology than the 
Spencerian one that the essence of mental life and of bodily life are one, namely, “the adjustment of inner to 
outer relations.” Such a formula is vagueness incarnate; but because it takes into account the fact that minds 
inhabit environments which on them and on which they in turn react; because, in short, it takes mind in the 
midst of all its concrete relations, it is immensely more fertile then the old-fashioned ‘rational psychology,’ 
which treated the soul as a detached existent, sufficient unto itself, and assumed to consider only its nature 
and properties.35    
 
The body or, taken more exact, the nervous system is placed in an environment with 
which it shares a mutual action which is not only mechanical but also teleological.36 
Mechanical actions are different from mental or intelligent actions, because the latter are able 
to pursue an end and to find the most adequate means to achieve it.37 As iron filings are 
directed towards the magnet, so instincts and reflex acts are certainly mechanical actions 
 
34 Cf. James, “Remarks on Spencer’s ‘Definition of Mind as Correspondence’”, in Journal of Speculative 
Philosophy, XII, 1878, 1–18. According to James, defining mind as a correspondence of the real, understood as 
external environment, does not account for a fundamental dimension of human existence: free action in pursuit 
of ends according to subjective inclinations. According to James, the mind is not a mirror that passively reflects 
what happens in front of it, but an active intelligence that consciously wants and tries to achieve goals through a 
process that may be successful or fail. 
35 James, op. cit., I, 6. 
36 See: James, “Are we Automata?”, in Mind (old series), IV, 1879, 1–22.  
37 See: James, Principles, I, ch. I. James’ conception of the end is similar to the Aristotelian concept of “causa 




tending to a certain end, that is, self-preservation. However, when the environment creates a 
new situation in which we cannot achieve a particular end with the usual means, the 
consciousness chooses other means to achieve it. This was defined by James as intelligent 
action. According to James, 
 
The mental life seems to intervene between impressions made from without upon the body, and reactions of 
the body upon the outer world again. […] The pursuance of future ends and the choice of means for their 
attainment are thus the mark and criterion of the presence of mentality in a phenomenon. We all use this test 
to discriminate between an intelligent and a mechanical performance. […] Just so we form our decision 
upon the deepest of all philosophic problems: Is the Kosmos an expression of intelligence rational in its 
inward nature, or a brute external fact pure and simple? If we find ourselves, in contemplating it, unable to 
banish the impression that it is a realm of final purposes, that it exists for the sake of something, we place 
intelligence at the heart of it and have a religion. If, on the contrary, in surveying its irremediable flux, we 
can think of the present only as so much mere mechanical sprouting from the past, occurring with no 
reference to the future, we are atheists and materialists. […] No actions but such as are done for an end, and 
show a choice of means, can be called indubitable expressions of Mind.38  
 
‘Cerebralist theory’ is the way in which James tried to combine naturalistic psychology with 
philosophical-metaphysical issues such as the mind-body problem and the mechanism-
teleology relation.  
 Consciousness was no longer understood by James as a priori mind devoid of a temporal 
development, as was considered by mentalism and rational psychology. He considered 
consciousness in a dynamic way: it is located in time and within the environment which 
affect its development. The nervous system was no longer understood as a mechanism 
producing mental states but as a dynamic system that collects the environmental inputs; the 
 




latter are interpreted by the mind in accordance with the dichotomy means-ends that produces 
body’s output in form of a reaction to the environment. In this way the dynamic system 
replaced the mechanical one.  
 Undoubtedly, James’s conception of mind as a kind of dynamics detecting the most 
adequate means to pursue its ends raised the problem of human freedom. This is also the 
reason why James did not keep psychology within the limits of naturalism. These theoretical 
questions can only be tackled by metaphysics. In this respect, James resorted again to Lotze’s 
Medicinische Psychologie. The latter had been a strong supporter of the idea that psychology 
cannot be a science.39  
 In short, according to James, the environment affects our body and mind; the mind, in 
order to achieve its ends, induces bodily changes. The main role at that is performed by the 
 
39 See: Lotze, Medicinische Psychologie, pp. 65 and 77. According to Lotze, psychology cannot be considered 
as a natural science, because it is not a constructive form of science. The first element of psychology is the 
mind-body relation; it is impossible to explain the mind on the basis of the body, because they are incomparable 
and between them there is a fundamental dualism. The science of nature has nothing to do with dualism but with 
the comparable movements that take place under certain given conditions and this is precisely what makes the 
science of nature constructive. According to Lotze, things are different for psychology. Based on the occasional-
istic theory of mind-body relation, Lotze affirmed that that scientific research was also possible in psychology, 
if for scientific research we mean the description of the empirical correlation between physical and mental 
states and we do not pretend to build the latter on the former. The explanation of how and why a physical state 
is transformed into a mental state—i.e. the true meaning of the mind-body problem—is not a question that can 
be tackled by psychology. It is a metaphysical question. Fechner rejected dualism in psychology and accepted 
the monistic view according to which all mind-body relations are made by simple elements that grow logarith-
mically in accordance with the stimulus that generated them. For this reason, Fechner argued for an association-
ist conception of the mind; it is an association of smaller elements: sensations. Lotze and James clearly rejected 





brain; the brain, in fact, is the point of connection between freedom of mind and 
neurophysiological determinism. The brain is the place of mind’s realization. In fact, once it 
has freely chosen the end to be pursued, this choice becomes ‘effective’ and enters the 
mechanical realm. Mind employs the nervous system to effectively achieve its ideal ends. 
The nervous system works in accordance with the laws of neurophysiology, that is, in a 
mechanistic way; once the mind has given the nervous system the input to pursue an end, the 
nervous system proceeds in accordance with its own laws. Finalism and mechanism, free will 
and necessity are concretely interconnected in James’ psychology. The similarity of this 
thesis of James with that proposed by Lotze in Allgemeine Physiologie des körperlichen 
Lebens is remarkable.40 
Like Lotze, James advanced a psychology that postulated the dualism of mind and nervous 
system—central and peripheral. Scientific psychology does not deal with the question of the 
interaction between mind and nervous system from the point of view of the specific nature of 
the object; it postulates dualism, because it is more useful from a practical point of view. As 
Charles Mercier wrote: 
 
Having thoroughly recognized the fathomless abyss that separates mind from matter, and having so blended 
the very notion into his very nature that there is no chance of his ever forgetting it of failing to saturate with 
it all his meditations, the student of psychology has next to appreciate the association between this two 
orders of phenomena. […] They are associated in a manner so intimate that some of the greatest thinkers 
consider them different aspects of the same process. […] When the rearrangement of molecules takes place 
in the higher regions of the brain, a change of consciousness simultaneously occurs. […] The change of 
 
40 It is nevertheless appropriate to keep them apart. Whereas in Lotze the purposiveness of nature has universal 
significance, James links it to the subjectivity of the single individual able to adapt to the environment. This idea 




consciousness never takes place without the change in the brain; the change in the brain never … without the 
change in consciousness. But why the two occur together, or what the link is which connects them, we do not 
know, and most authorities believe that we never shall and never can know. Having firmly and tenaciously 
grasped these two notions, of the absolute separateness of mind and matter, and of the invariable 
concomitance of a mental change with a bodily change, the student will enter on the study of psychology 
with half his difficulties surmounted.41      
 
James further maintained that through concepts such as “concomitance” or “absolute 
separateness” scientific psychology has not overcome the problem of the mind–body 
relationship but simply circumvented it. Psychology should rather try to give answer this 
metaphysical problem. James writes that: 
 
The fact is that the whole question of interaction and influence between things is a metaphysical question, 
and cannot be discussed at all by those who are unwilling to go into matters thoroughly.42 
 
In order to explain consciousness’ “interaction” with and “influence” on the body, James 
recalled Lotze’s conception of the Doppelsinnigkeit of the ideal, developed in Lotze’s 
Medicinische Psychologie, according to which feelings and ideas are forces able to cause 
body movement. According to James: 
 
As in the night all cats are gray, so in the darkness of metaphysical criticism all causes are obscure. But one 
has no right to pull the pall over the psychic half of the subject only, as the automatists do, and to say that 
that causation is unintelligible, whilst in the same breath one dogmatizes about material causation as if 
 
41 C. A. Mercier, The Nervous System and the Mind (London: Macmillan, 1888), 9–11; see also James, Princi-
ples, I, 135–6.  





Hume, Kant, and Lotze had never been born. One cannot thus blow hot and cold. One must be impartially 
naif or impartially critical. If the latter, the reconstruction must be thorough-going or ‘metaphysical’, and 
will probably preserve the common-sense view that ideas are forces, in some translated form.43 
  
 Lotze’s conception of mind as a force causing bodily movement strongly influenced 
James’ psychology. This latter thought that consciousness is impulsive by nature.44 This 
central doctrine of James’ psychology is rooted in the Medicinische Psychologie.45  
According to James, the kinaesthetic idea is the characteristic feature of the voluntary acts. 
When we consciously want to perform an act, we have in our mind an idea consisting of 
memory-images of the sensible effects of our act.46  
 James rejected the feeling of innervation, which was central in the psychology of Bain, 
Wundt, Helmholtz and Mach.47 According to them, in the voluntary act, in addition to 
memory-images, there is a current of energy running out from the brain and through the 
muscles. This current of energy produces a feeling of innervation (Innervationsgefühl). 
According to James, the discharge of energy from the brain through the motor nerves 
transmits movement to the appropriate muscles is an insentient process.48 It does not produce 
feeling.  
 
43 James, ibid., I, 137. 
44 See: James, ibid., II, 526. 
45 See: O. F. Kraushaar, “Lotze’s Influence on the Psychology of William James”, in Psychological Review, 
XLIII, 1936, 250ff. 
46 See: James, Principles, II, 492. 
47 See: ibid., 516. 





 Whereas Bain, Wundt, Helmholtz and Mach upheld an efferent interpretation of the 
muscular-feeling (Muskelgefühl), according to which it is produced by outgoing energies 
from the brain, James claimed an afferent interpretation of the same feeling. James did not 
conceive this muscular-feeling as ‘outgoing’ from the brain and then directing towards the 
muscle, but, on the contrary, as an effect of the muscle contraction that through ‘incoming’ 
nerve currents becomes feeling. The idea guiding James’ critique of the feeling of innervation 
as a prerequisite for the voluntary act, alongside the memory-images, was that consciousness 
is simple; it tends to a minimal level of complication.49  
Once again, James adopted his afferent interpretation of Muskelgefühl from Lotze’s 
Medicinische Psychologie. According to James, 
 
In his admirably acute chapter on the Will this author [Lotze] has most explicitly maintained the position 
that what we called muscular exertion is an afferent and not an efferent feeling: “We must affirm universally 
that in the muscular feeling we are not sensible of the force on its way to produce an effect, but only of the 
sufferance already produced in our movable organs, the muscles, after the force has, in a manner 
unobservable by us, exerted upon them its causality”. [Lotze, Medicinische Psychologie, 311]. How often 
the battles of psychology have to be fought over again, each time with heavier armies and bigger trains, 
though not always with such able generals!50 
 
49 See: James, ibid., 496. 
50 Ibid., 523 n. Lotze further wrote: “Unmittelbar hat daher das Muskelgefühl wenig Anspruch auf den Namen 
eines Kraftsinnes; er gebührt ihm selbst in der Art noch nicht, dass es die Kraft, statt sie direct zu messen, 
vielmehr nach der Grösse ihrer nutzbaren Wirkung schätzte. Denn nicht sowohl die Intensität der functionellen 
Thätigkeit des Muskels scheint das zu sein, was in ihm empfunden wird, sondern vielmehr die Grösse der 
Störung oder der Ermüdung, die mit der Ausübung derselben verbunden ist, und die weder Gradunterschieden 
der Innervation, noch dem erzeugten nutzbaren Effecte der Muskelcontraction überall proportional ist.” (Lotze, 






The kinaesthetic idea, whose construction has been described above, is sufficient to produce 
bodily movement. This is “the type of the process of volition” that James called “ideomotor 
action”.51 This ideomotor process is evident in the quasi-automatic acts in which the flux of 
thought immediately stimulates the bodily movement. Here, too, James quoted Lotze’s 
Medicinische Psychologie, in which the latter had provided a definition of the fundamental 
features of this process of volition.52 In James’ translation, 
 
We see in writing or piano-playing a great number of very complicated movements following quickly one 
upon the other, the instigative representations of which remained scarcely a second in consciousness, 
certainly not long enough to awaken any other volition than the general one of resigning one’s self without 
reserve to the passing over of representation into action. All the acts of our daily life happen in this wise: 
Our standing up, walking, talking, all this never demands a distinct impulse of the will, but is adequately 
brought about by the pure flux of thought.53 
 
In such elementary cases of volition there is no gap between the idea and the action. Indeed, 
in our mind there is no other antagonistic representation that might assume the impulsive 
nature of the original representation. In other words, if there were no other antagonistic ideas 
simultaneously present in the mind and able to oppose their impulsive power to the others, 
then all ideas would turn into action. 
 
amount of energy that running through and moving muscles, but by the amount of effort present in the muscle 
after movement, as its effect.    
51 James, Principles, II, 522. 
52 James quoted Lotze, Medicinische Psychologie, 293–4. 





Once again, James quoted Medicinische Psychologie to explain what the impulsive nature 
of our consciousness means.54 Ideas and feelings are forces that move the body; muscular 
contractions comply with the ideas. In James’ translation, 
 
The spectator accompanies the throwing of a billiard-ball, or the thrust of the swordsman, with slight 
movements of his arm; the untaught narrator tells his story with many gesticulations; the reader while 
absorbed in the perusal of a battle-scene feels a slight tension run through his muscular system, keeping time 
as it were with the actions he is reading of. These results become the more marked the more we are absorbed 
in thinking of the movements which suggest them; they grow fainter exactly in proportion as a complex 
consciousness, under the dominion of a crowd of other representations, withstands the passing over of 
mental contemplation into outward action.55  
 
It is clear that James’s theory of the ideo-motor action was directly inspired by Lotze’s 
doctrine of the ideas of movement (Bewegungsvorstellungen). 
 
54 James quoted Lotze, Medicinische Psychologie, p. 293.  
55 James, Principles, II, 525; “Eine andere Gruppe, die Nachahmungsbewegungen, sehen wir nicht mehr von 
Gefühlen, sondern von Bewegungsvorstellungen ausgehen, auch sie, ohne dass irgend ein bemerkbarer 
Entschluss des Willens mitthätig wäre. Mit leisen Bewegungen des Armes begleitet der Zuschauende den Wurf 
der Kegelkugel oder die Stösse des Fechters, mit ausführlichen Gesticulationen der ungebildete Erzähler seine 
Geschichte; während der andächtigen Lectüre einer Schlachtbeschreibung fühlen wir leise Anspannungen unser 
Muskelsystem entsprechend den geschilderten Bewegungsmomenten durchziehen. Alle diese Wirkungen 
erfolgen um so deutlicher, je unbefangener wir uns in die Anschauung der Bewegungen vertiefen; sie nehmen 
ab in dem Masse, als ein gebildetes Bewusstsein beständig zugleich von einer Mehrzahl anderer Vorstellungen 
beherrscht wird, die diesem Uebergange der Anschauung in wirkliche Bewegung widerstehen.“ (Lotze, 





In short, the point of departure of exploring any process of volition is the intrinsic 
impulsive nature of consciousness. James agreed with Lotze on this point. Undoubtedly, the 
ideomotor action is the most elementary case of volitional process in which the idea 
immediately moves the body without an intermediate deliberation. The process of volition 
becomes more complicated when in mind there are several antagonistic ideas that might 
inhibit each other but still have an impulsive nature.  
James also agreed with Lotze on the fact that these higher processes of volition involve 
additional conscious elements such as consent, fiat and imperative.56 Will, therefore, requires 
a deliberative process through which one representation, among other possibilities, is chosen 
over another, but it also requires an element of attention that allows the chosen representation 
to be maintained in the mind.57 Both Lotze and James were aware of the drama of the will 
which selects an idea activating the physical mechanism. They both upheld the freedom of 
will. 
 
5.5. Interim remark on Lotze’s Logik and James’s pragmatism: the conception of 
truth 
William James’s interest was not focused only on Lotze’s Medicinische Psychologie and 
Mikrokosmos, but also on his Metaphysik58 and “great” Logik (1874). Most importantly, this 
work helped James to further develop his pragmatism. He understood pragmatism as a 
 
56 See: Lotze, Mikrokosmos, I, 289, and James, Principles, II, 526ff. 
57 See: Lotze, Mikrokosmos, I, 288, and James, Principles, II, 584. 
58 On September 8, 1879, William James wrote: “This summer I’ve read about a half of Lotze’s Metaphysik. He 
is the most delectable, certainly, of all German writers—a pure genius.”. See: R. B. Perry, op. cit., II, p. 16 and 





completely new way of considering the relationship between mind and reality. It maintains 
that the value of ideas lies in their working process and in their consequences. 
 According to James, truth should be no longer understood as a system of valid and eternal 
propositions that mind can copy. The “philosophic criticisms” of Lotze undermined the 
absoluteness of this system, emphasizing the “incongruence” of forms and laws of our 
thought with respect to the “things” tackled by thought. In these “things” subjects and 
predicates are not separated as in our judgments on them.59  
 James’ claims were clearly connected with Lotze’s Logik in which the real and the formal 
meaning of “logical acts” are neatly distinguished and in which Lotze maintained his anti-
psychologist perspective. According to Lotze, skepticism was rooted in the gap between 
thought and the world of things (Sachenwelt). The correspondence theory of truth, in its 
classical version, held that truth is the correspondence of thought and the things external to 
thought (Veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus). This way of understanding knowledge 
allowed for an indefinite renewal of skepticism. Lotze criticized this conception claiming that 
human knowledge is not directly related to the world of things but to the world of 
representations (Vorstellungswelt). This epistemological position allowed Lotze to refute 
skepticism but, at the same time, raised the problem of psychologism.  
 Indeed, the search for truth becomes a process immanent in the thought itself. However, 
the truth, understood by Lotze as value (Geltung), does not coincide with the psychical 
process (psychische Vorgang) through which our thought is realized. It is precisely for this 
reason that Lotze distinguished an instrumental significance of thought from its valid content. 
It produces (constructs), through its forms and logical laws, objective contents that, once 
 
59 See: James, “Review of ‘Humanism: Philosophical Essays’ by Ferdinand C. S. Schiller (1904)”, in The Works 




produced, are separated from the merely instrumental conceptual structure. Most importantly, 
the distinction between formality and reality of thought cannot be overcome at a logical but at 
a moral level. A divided world would be morally unacceptable. 
 In summary, the process of thought has an instrumental significance and the proper form 
of reality of the products of thought is their objective Geltung: these products and this process 
have different “significances” and this difference entails pragmatic implications. 
 William R. Woodward investigated James’s reception of Lotze’s Logik and, in particular, 
the sections “Real and Formal Significance of Logical Acts” and “The a priori truth”. James 
embraced Lotze’s critique of the correspondence between act and logical content as well as 
his critique of associationism. Judgement is no longer considered as a mere association of 
ideas, but as a relation of contents of thought. As Woodward puts it: 
 
James paraphrased Lotze’s critique of correspondence as saying that “the judgment expresses a relation of 
two contents, not two ideas,” and that we justify this relation by specifying the conditions x under which S is 
P. He also echoed Lotze with his marginal remark “hypothetical form of all knowledge of reality.” But he 
mocked Lotze in this remark inside the back flyleaf: “the ‘a priority’ of the Anschauung consists in 
instantaneously seeing that any simple truth which these forms make possible is universally valid.”  
 In 1878 James showed the first results of his recourse to the Kantian tradition. He argued that humans 
think by choosing the “reason” or “means,” m, that connects two otherwise dissimilar ideas, A and Z. Using 
the example of a dog fetching a sponge, James observed that the association of water-in-boat and sponge 
was due to mere contiguity. Human reasoning involves the further step of dissociating the capacity for 
taking up water from this situation and bringing back perhaps a dipper or a mop. By 1890, James had 
adopted Lotze’s argument for replacing the association of ideas with the function of judgments. He defined 
the “psychologist’s fallacy” as the “confusion of his own standpoint with that of the mental fact about which 




fragmentary impressions interrupting each other; what we think is an abstract system of hypothetical data 
and laws.”60 
 
In James’ Pragmatism’s Conception of Truth we see how fundamental Lotze’s “philosophic 
criticism” was to him. Truth is no longer considered an eternal property of our ideas; it no 
longer means agreement between ideas and reality. If true ideas were the copy of reality, the 
whole process of knowledge would culminate in an “inert static relation”. James concluded 
that: 
 
When you’ve got your true idea of anything, there’s an end of the matter. You’re in possession; you know; 
you have fulfilled your thinking destiny. You are where you ought to be mentally; you have obeyed your 
categorical imperative; and nothing more need follow on that climax of your rational destiny. 
Epistemologically you are in stable equilibrium.61   
 
Basing on Lotze’s conception, James developed a dynamic conception of truth as a process 
and  as provided with a temporal development. Truth is the product of thought: it must be 
verified experimentally from time to time. As James wrote: 
 
True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify. False ideas are those we can 
not. […] The truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth happens to an idea. It becomes 
true, is made true by events. Its verity is in fact an event, a process: the process namely of its verifying itself, 
its veri-fication. Its validity is the process of its valid-ation.62  
 
60 Woodward, op. cit., 364–5. 
61 James, “Pragmatism’s Conception of Truth”, in Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking 
(New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1907), 200.  





Consequently, science is not a system of propositions valid in themselves, but rather a human 
product that must be empirically verified. Scientific theories can be considered true if, once 
verified, they produce satisfactory practical consequences for human needs. Only experience 
can distinguish what is effective and functional––and therefore true––from what is not. The 
conception of truth is thus based on that of ‘usefulness’ and vice versa: the concept of truth is 
understood as the “idea [that] starts the verification-process, useful is the name for its 
completed function in experience.”63  
 According to James, the meaning of ideas lies in their working process and their 
consequences, such that ideas have an eminently practical value. For this reason, he did not 
dwell much on the genesis of ideas, on their history; at the core of his conception of truth 
there was the future usefulness of ideas. The pragmatic philosophical doctrine considered 
truth not as a rational destiny that man must fulfill once and for all, but as a future of multiple 
open possibilities of development of human inventiveness. His own philosophy, as James 









Lotze’s psychology took into account the results of scientific research and adopted the 
method of the psychophysiological analysis. Moreover, Lotze maintained that the scientific 
psychology was not able to satisfy the deepest human needs, including the research on the na-
ture of mind. In his opinion, psychology was rather the discipline that can mediate between 
natural sciences and philosophy. Physiology and biology are fundamental to the development 
of the scientific psychology. Psychology can never be a constructive science like physics, 
since it is based on an underlying dualism (mind-body) that does not allow for an analytical 
comparison between physical and mental states. However, this does not prevent in principle 
the possibility of scientific research in psychology, if we understand scientific-psychological 
research as the detection of correlations between mind and body. The fact that the core of 
Lotze’s Psycho-Physical Mechanism is his peculiar occasionalist perspective gives more so-
lidity to this kind of scientific research. Scientific psychology can only record the elements of 
correlation between the physical and the psychical dimension, but it cannot provide an actual 
positive theory of the nature of mind. Between mind and body there is not such thing as a 
one-to-one correspondence, as claimed by Fechner, who had tried in his psychophysics to 
found mathematically the mental sphere on the physical one—human deepest needs (Bedürf-
nisse des Gemütes) could certainly not be satisfied by such a knowledge. Nevertheless, there 
is an occasionalistic correlation. Physical states are occasions (Veranlassungen) or signs 
(Zeichen) that allow the mind to activate itself and to organize them; this task of the mind—
the organizing activity—cannot be expressed mathematically. The task of scientific psychol-
ogy is precisely to describe this correlation, that Lotze called ‘Psycho-Physical Mechanism’. 
Scientific psychology thus has a descriptive value and is not a positive theory that explains 




materialism—which, thanks to the results of natural science research, affirmed the possibility 
of reducing all mental states to physical states of the brain—Lotze argued that only the philo-
sophical reflection, understood as metaphysical speculation, was able to explain the actual 
nature of this correlation. From a metaphysical point of view there is no dualism between 
mind and body, because mind is the primordial reality; the body is a secondary property or an 
appearance of the mind. For this reason, in Lotze’s opinion, psychology had to be under-
stood, nourished and based not only on the physiological research but also on a metaphysical 
investigation: a mentalist metaphysics that rejects the ontological consistency of the matter 
and considers such a consistency as specific of the mind. This metaphysical-mentalistic ex-
planation of the mind-body correlation is not scientifically useful and applicable. The actual 
scientific research is mostly characterised by the mind-body dualism, based on the type-dif-
ference between the two spheres.  
In the attempt to mediate between the metaphysical understanding of reality and the scien-
tific conception of the world, Lotze tried to unify what he considered the best aspects of Ide-
alism and those of Realism at his time. He accepted the idealistic conception of the primor-
dial reality as something ideal, mental, and he founded the possibility of a concrete scientific 
research on this metaphysical conception. According to Lotze, the limits of Hegelian idealism 
consisted in having considered the ideal (das Ideal) as the pure form of the idea (die Idee 
selbst) without reference to any specific content. For this reason, Hegel had considered psy-
chology as the discipline that deals with the development of the pure form of the mind. Ac-
cording to Lotze, in this sense psychology was one-sided (einseitig). Psychology must con-
stantly take into account the results of both the physiological and the biological research, be-
cause they provide this discipline with its concrete content and the philosophical speculation 




The foundation of Lotze’s psychological pattern therefore consists in the scientific re-
search and the critical-philosophical activity. If one of these two principles is removed, the 
discipline becomes one-sided. Not considering the philosophical activity makes materialist 
positions possible again. And if there is no longer a constant attention to the results of scien-
tific research, another type of one-sidedness may arise: the pure mind without specific con-
tent. Besides the first cornerstone of Lotze’s psychological reflection, i.e. the mediation be-
tween science and philosophy, there is another element, with which the first one is closely 
linked: his harsh criticism of materialism.  
Lotze’s thought is influenced by the development of psychological investigation as well as 
by the foundations and perspectives of the logical investigation. Lotze’s distinction of Gel-
tung and Sein as two different and irreducible (in sich selbst beruhenden Grundbegriffe) 
forms of reality, his rejection of the correspondence theory of truth, the epistemological im-
manentism and his distinction between the real and the formal meaning of logical forms have 
deeply influenced not only William James, as I showed in Appendix I, but also the Neo-Kant-
ian Baden School, Frege, Brentano, Dilthey, Husserl and the young Heidegger.  
Although I consider important to show the general influence of Lotze’s thinking, in this 
work I have not considered these authors as I did in “The Logik by R. H. Lotze: the Concept 
of Geltung”,1 because the subject of the present dissertation is rather how Lotze approached 
the mind-body problem in his Medicinische Psychologie.  
Nevertheless, I dedicated the last part of my dissertation to the influence of Lotze’s psy-
chological investigation on William James, showing that Lotze was an important, albeit not 
 
1 M. Vagnetti, “The Logik by R. H. Lotze: the Concept of Geltung”, in D. De Santis (ed.) “Lotze’s back!”, in M. 




the only, reference point for James’ work The Principles of Psychology. Besides some evi-
dent similarities, it is worth saying that James’ work only partially embraced Lotze’s thought. 
For this reason, in the present dissertation I have clearly underlined that between the two au-
thors there are similarities but also clear differences. Whereas Lotze had postulated the exist-
ence of a Soul-Substance that unifies all mental states, James rejected this conception—
which he considered “spiritualist”—affirming a simple phenomenal continuity of states of 
mind without claiming a deeper cause. Furthermore, the dualism common to Lotze and  
James in Principles was then denied by James in his Essays in Radical Empiricism, in which 
he postulated the existence of a ‘pure experience’.2 James, in particular, intended to integrate 
neurophysiological research into psychology, transforming thus psychology into a natural sci-
ence, but at the same time he wanted to integrate also metaphysical issues such as conscious-
ness, i.e. the ‘Stream of Thought’, and the problem of the freedom of will. 
The important role that Rudolph Hermann Lotze played in the rise and development of 
one of the most important philosophers of the 20th-century American debate is, therefore, ev-
ident and undeniable.  
In conclusion, it is important to understand to what extent Lotze may be read seriously 
philosopher still today. Lotze’s harsh criticism of the materialism of his time may be a key 
element to analyze the contemporary materialism in the philosophy of mind which is rather 
popular nowadays. In the 1960s a group of Australian philosophers (Ullin Place, John Smart, 
David Armstrong) presented the type identity theory in the “Australasian Journal of Philoso-
phy”. This theory affirmed the absolute identity of mental states with the physical states of 
the brain in the same way in which we claim that water is identical to H2O. Type identity was 
 
2 See: S. Poggi and M. Vagnetti, “James lecteur de Lotze”, in F. Boccaccini (ed.) Lotze et son héritage. Son in-





considered as the only alternative to dualism. Consciousness was understood as identical to 
the nervous system.3 
 Undoubtedly, type identity theory is a materialist theory because it states that primordial 
reality is matter and that, since, according to them, mental states and brain states are identical, 
it is possible to reduce the mind to the body. This reductionism is both intertheoretic and on-
tological. The possibility of an intertheoretic reductionism is due to the existence of appropri-
ate bridge laws that make it possible to completely translate psychology into neuroscience. 
The Australian materialists were in complete contradiction with Leibniz’s principle of the 
indiscernibility of identicals. If it was true that mental and bodily states are identical, then 
they should have all their properties in common, but experience tells us rather the opposite. 
The pain (mental state) that I perceive is sharp but the nerve fibers not. Hilary Putnam’s mul-
tiple realizability of mental states is the most famous criticism of the new materialism. In his 
opinion, it is impossible that men, octopuses, inferior organisms or extraterrestrials provided 
with a silicon nervous system share the same identical physical state, when they feel pain.  
Putnam aimed at rejecting any kind of materialism as well as the affirmation of the irre-
ducibility of the mind. The concept on which this critique was based was the idea that be-
tween mind and body, that is, between mental state and physical state there is a basic type-
difference which does not allow for any reduction of the one to the other. The idea of incom-
 
3 Paul Churchland in 1979 in Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1979) argued for a similar idea. Neurophysiology could replace the whole mental life precisely as modern 
chemistry dismissed the phlogiston. Of course, this position represented a radical inter theoretic (psychology 





parability was upheld by Lotze in Medicinische Psychologie and was the basis of his occa-
sionalistic theory. Although in a completely new context Lotze’s type-difference is still a 
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